{"title":"Regulatory Carrots and Sticks in Climate Policy","authors":"J. Johnston","doi":"10.37419/LR.V6.I1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V6.I1.5","url":null,"abstract":"This Article sets out an informal political economic theory which explains the relative permanence of regulatory carrots—legislative subsidies and mandates for product use—versus the transience of regulatory sticks—traditional costly regulatory requirements. After setting out the elements of this theory, I illustrate it with the dramatic rise in the Obama Administration and abrupt cessation in the Trump Administration of attempts to use conventional U.S. environmental regulatory sticks to end the U.S. coal industry. The Article turns then to describe a concrete example of a regulatory carrot—the U.S. corn ethanol mandate—that has survived despite overwhelming evidence that its environmental benefits, if any, are far outweighed by its environmental and economic costs. This Article concludes by discussing subsidies for solar energy.","PeriodicalId":316761,"journal":{"name":"Texas A&M Law Review","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123149264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Comparative Institutions Approach to Wildlife Governance","authors":"D. Lueck","doi":"10.37419/LR.V6.I1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V6.I1.6","url":null,"abstract":"This Article develops a comparative institutions approach to wildlife governance by examining the property rights to the habitat and the stocks of wild populations. The approach is based on the transaction cost and property rights approach and lies primarily in the traditions of Coase, Barzel, Ostrom, and Williamson. The approach recognizes the often-extreme costs of delineation and enforcement of property rights to wild populations and their habitats; thus, all systems are notably imperfect compared to the typical neoclassical economics approach. These costs arise because wildlife habitat and wildlife populations are part of the land which has many attributes and uses—most notably, residential and agricultural uses. In turn, the optimal ownership sizes (and shapes) vary across land uses (e.g., farming, urban, ranching, wildlife, parks). The organizations that govern wildlife tend to be ridden with transaction costs and imperfect property rights, and the most efficient system is one that maximizes the total value of the package less the enforcement and administrative costs. This Article develops a framework for considering different governance regimes for both the wild stocks and the habitats they require. A series of cases—focused especially on bison and caribou—show the range of governance regimes that have been used and how those governance regimes depend on history and on law.","PeriodicalId":316761,"journal":{"name":"Texas A&M Law Review","volume":"54 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123180617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Many Sins Of NEPA","authors":"R. Epstein","doi":"10.37419/LR.V6.I1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V6.I1.1","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this Article is to expose the weak technical underside of NEPA’s statutory scheme. This inquiry does not start with NEPA itself, but, by way of comparison, with the earlier network of common law and equitable rules— which for these purposes I shall treat as a single body of judge-made common law—that made far wiser design choices in the structure of the overall legal system.","PeriodicalId":316761,"journal":{"name":"Texas A&M Law Review","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126410264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unilateral Steps to End High Seas Fishing","authors":"K. Wyman","doi":"10.37419/LR.V6.I1.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V6.I1.10","url":null,"abstract":"In discussions about the overexploitation of the vast oceans that lie beyond national jurisdiction, one bold proposal is to close fishing entirely on the high seas. Existing research suggests that converting the high seas into a giant reserve for fish might increase overall global fish catches by boosting fish catches within the adjoining areas of the oceans under national control. This conversion also might help to protect marine biological diversity, which is particularly important in an era of climate change. This Essay identifies the potential that the United States—a significant importer of high seas fish—might unilaterally take steps to end fishing on the high seas, using its market leverage. This Essay then analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of taking unilateral steps to end fishing on the high seas and the conditions under which the United States might take such steps.","PeriodicalId":316761,"journal":{"name":"Texas A&M Law Review","volume":"490 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122751514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance","authors":"J. Gilligan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3284035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3284035","url":null,"abstract":"When public governance fails to address important environmental threats— such as climate change—private governance by firms, not-for-profits, individuals, and households can produce significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Private governance can take the form of either a carrot or a stick, using incentives or punishments. Shareholder activism as a form of private governance of corporations has largely been confrontational, leading most climate-related actions to fail. This Article examines the potential for private governance to take a more collaborative approach and to frame shareholder engagement with management in terms of opportunity. It also examines private governance successes at reducing household emissions and finds that these too emphasize making it attractive and convenient for households to act.","PeriodicalId":316761,"journal":{"name":"Texas A&M Law Review","volume":"405 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134621760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：