2010 Fifth International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection最新文献

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Is Apple's iMac Leopard Operating System Secure under ARP-Based Flooding Attacks? 苹果的iMac Leopard操作系统在基于arp的洪水攻击下安全吗?

2010 Fifth International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection Pub Date : 2010-05-09 DOI: 10.1109/ICIMP.2010.30

Sirisha Surisetty, Sanjeev Kumar

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引用次数: 12

Constructing Communication Profiles by Clustering Selected Network Traffic Attributes 选取网络流量属性聚类构建通信配置文件

2010 Fifth International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection Pub Date : 2010-05-09 DOI: 10.1109/ICIMP.2010.21

Olli Knuuti, Timo Seppälä, Teemu Alapaholuoma, J. Ylinen, P. Loula, P. Kumpulainen, Kimmo Hätönen

引用次数: 3

Coalitional Game Theory for Security Risk Management 安全风险管理的联盟博弈论

2010 Fifth International Conference on Internet Monitoring and Protection Pub Date : 2010-05-09 DOI: 10.1109/ICIMP.2010.14

W. Saad, T. Alpcan, T. Başar, A. Hjørungnes

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引用次数: 30

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