CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Regulatory Cooperation and Foreign Portfolio Investment","authors":"Mark Lang, Mark Maffett, James D. Omartian, R. Silvers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3217447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3217447","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation in the enforcement of securities laws on global-mutual-fund portfolio allocations. Our research design exploits a shock to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of foreign firms cross-listed on a US stock exchange around the signing of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), a non-binding, information-sharing arrangement between global securities regulators. In signatory countries, foreign investment in US-cross-listed firms increases by $110 billion relative to non-cross-listed firms. The strongest effects are for investors facing greater information asymmetries, those from countries closely linked to the US, and non-US foreign investors, suggesting significant spillover effects from international regulatory cooperation.","PeriodicalId":314833,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125581451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Financial Standards: An Argument for Discernment","authors":"Cally Jordan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3258591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3258591","url":null,"abstract":"Multiple shocks have led regulators and policy makers to put increasing faith in the diagnostic and prophylactic powers of international financial standards, but the nature, appropriateness and normative force of such standards varies. As a standard setter, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has pursued global consensus, harmonization and international best practices for many years. International standards, however, are often created under suboptimal conditions by actors with a broad range of motivations, assumptions and biases. Frictions between state-level regulation and international standards can undermine their effectiveness. This policy brief examines the process of standard setting and two very different sets of standards and their standard setters to illustrate some of the anomalies associated with them. The process has become more complex, more compromised and more politicized, leading in some cases to “pseudo-international” standards or a riot of diverse viewpoints, of limited practical use. The danger lies in major economies walking away from international standards which no longer demonstrate pertinence or credibility. Greater discernment should be exercised by state-level policy makers, international financial institutions and the international organizations themselves in proposing, deploying and implementing international standards.","PeriodicalId":314833,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131236512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"(How) Does Self-Regulation Work? Evidence from Brazilian Corporate Governance Listing Segments","authors":"Angela Rita Franco Donaggio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3198201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3198201","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the enforcement of the Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3) self-regulation on companies listed on its special corporate governance segments: Levels 1, 2 and the New Market. From the theoretical perspective, I discuss the main doctrines and international experiences on the subject. The legal analysis shows the contract between the B3 and listed companies being an instrument of this relation. This relation, in turn, is grounded on legal based disciplinary power aimed to be used in the public interest. From the empirical perspective, I analyze fourteen years of data of the sanctions applied by the B3 for companies listed on the special segments. The results show that: (i) sanctions imposed by the B3 have procedural nature instead of substantive; (ii) the number of sanctions did not grow proportionally to the number of listed companies; (iii) there is a negative correlation between the number of fines and the stock market momentum (“bear” or “bull market”); and (iv) on average, companies that receive more fines are smaller, younger, with lower profitability, lower stock returns and higher indebtedness. I present solutions to increase public oversight of the enforcement of the listing segments’ rules, such as: enhancing transparency and accountability; strengthening the state supervision over the private regulator’s enforcement activities; and, implementing mechanisms to mitigate the risks of under-enforcement caused by conflicts of interests. The Brazilian case is relevant to the global debate because its results suggest responses to the following issues: (i) the limitations of Stock Exchanges to enforce its own rules; (ii) the discussion whether listing rules lead to a “race to the bottom” or “race to the top”; and, (iii) whether “bull” or “bear markets” are related to the enforcement activity. These results highlight the relevance of more research and debates on this issue in the academic world. Taken together, the debate and proposals have the ultimate goal of improving investor protection and strengthen the credibility of the stock markets in order to contribute to greater economic and social development.","PeriodicalId":314833,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124710007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shareholder Types, Their Concentration and Its Effects on Demutualized Exchanges' Operating and Financial Results - An Empirical Study","authors":"Samer Iskandar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2412409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2412409","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars are divided over whether listing the shares of stock exchanges improves their financial performance. Applying simple OLS regressions, I test the hypothesis that exchanges’ post-IPO owners are value maximizers. However, recently demutualized exchanges have a high proportion of shareholders with conflicts of interest. Therefore, I also test whether different types of shareholders have different effects on performance. I find that investment managers behave like true value maximizers. The results also show that a higher fragmentation of share ownership is associated with lower performance. The proportion of brokers, who are the most conflicted shareholders in exchanges (since they are large customers as well as owners), is too small to have a measurable effect on performance. Most interestingly I find, by way of an inductive approach to shareholding structure, that strategic shareholders, a wide array of investors with various agendas, are on balance detrimental to shareholder value. This chapter is the first in a trilogy of articles that make up my Ph.D. dissertation. It is followed by an in-depth study of the shareholding structure of individual stock exchanges, notably in order to understand more clearly who these strategic investors are and what effects they have on exchanges.","PeriodicalId":314833,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130289446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internal Controls and Accounting Restatements Under Sarbanes-Oxley Regime: A Survey of Literature","authors":"Joshua King Obeng-Nyarko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1941839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941839","url":null,"abstract":"The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 of the U. S. was passed to instil investor confidence in financial reporting following the spectacular collapse of high ranking firms in the US. Sections 302 and 404 provide clear guidelines to both management and their auditors on their respective roles as well as stipulating the penalties for non-compliance. The role of internal controls failures in corporate collapses cannot be overstated; however, not much attention has been paid to it in the past. Thanks to this act, the role of internal control over financial reporting has been recognized for some time now as an important component of corporate governance for both management and auditors (Kinney, 2000). Using mainly electronic searches, this critical review has found that scholars do not agree over the significance of sections 302 and 404 on internal control over financial reporting. Since the ACT was passed to improve the quality of financial reporting and to bring back investor confidence in the capital markets, the apparent inconsistencies over its impact on companies, provides opportunities for further research, especially from the UK companies perspective.","PeriodicalId":314833,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129803848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reflections on the Intersection between Labour Law and Corporate Law","authors":"Dr Victoria Lambropoulos","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2634827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2634827","url":null,"abstract":"Academic scholars in Australia and internationally have been observing the intersection and potential merger of corporate law and labour law for some time. The fields have had varying degrees of impact on each other in the areas of corporate governance and labour management. How labour is managed also impacts on shareholder value. International and domestic scholarship has observed that the pursuit of shareholder primacy has been linked to diminished outcomes for labour. The paper will focus on the relevance to corporate law from a labour lawyer’s perspective. It will outline the Australian labour law system as principally governed by the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and discuss the changing redefinition of labour law. It will then examine certain aspects of corporate governance that have an influence on labour law.","PeriodicalId":314833,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: International/Non-US (Topic)","volume":"137 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124475203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}