监管合作和外国证券投资

Mark Lang, Mark Maffett, James D. Omartian, R. Silvers
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引用次数: 23

摘要

摘要本文研究了跨国监管合作对证券法律执行对全球共同基金投资组合配置的影响。我们的研究设计利用了美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)对在美国证券交易所交叉上市的外国公司的监管所带来的冲击,这些监管围绕着多边谅解备忘录(MMoU)的签署,这是一项全球证券监管机构之间不具约束力的信息共享安排。在签署国,对美国交叉上市公司的外国投资相对于非交叉上市公司增加了1100亿美元。影响最大的是那些面临更大信息不对称的投资者、那些来自与美国关系密切的国家的投资者,以及非美国的外国投资者,这表明国际监管合作产生了显著的溢出效应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Regulatory Cooperation and Foreign Portfolio Investment
Abstract We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation in the enforcement of securities laws on global-mutual-fund portfolio allocations. Our research design exploits a shock to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of foreign firms cross-listed on a US stock exchange around the signing of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), a non-binding, information-sharing arrangement between global securities regulators. In signatory countries, foreign investment in US-cross-listed firms increases by $110 billion relative to non-cross-listed firms. The strongest effects are for investors facing greater information asymmetries, those from countries closely linked to the US, and non-US foreign investors, suggesting significant spillover effects from international regulatory cooperation.
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