{"title":"“A Most Disagreeable Problem”","authors":"M. Faulkner","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"In the vast literature concerning the German attack on Allied maritime communications in the Atlantic theater during the Second World War, one particular factor has received little to no consideration – the potential threat that German aircraft carriers posed to Allied naval operations and the passage of maritime traffic in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. While ultimately the Kriegmarine never fielded an operational carrier, such a development could not be discounted at the time. This chapter addresses what the British knew about the German effort and what implications this had on British strategy, naval planning, and fleet deployments. In covering these aspects, this chapter by Marcus Faulkner fills an existing gap concerning the Admiralty's perception and contributes to understanding the complexity of the maritime threat Britain faced during the war. It also illustrates the problems involved in evaluating enemy military capabilities and intentions on the basis of a very limited intelligence picture. This in turn helps historians understand why the Admiralty remained so apprehensive of the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet until 1943.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129661675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cruise of U-188:","authors":"David Kohnen","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvdmwxs5.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdmwxs5.13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129332175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meat Exports and the Limits of Wartime Multilateralism","authors":"K. Smith","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"During the Second World War, the United States transitioned gradually to a foreign policy of \"multilateral engagement\" from a policy of \"unilateral political disengagement.\" One of those tasked with implementing policy, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard, reverted to nationalism and unilateralism when pressed to implement a promise to expand meat exports to Britain as part of an effort to maximize efficiency in usage of refrigerated shipping capacity during the Battle of the Atlantic. This episode illustrates the challenges in this transition and also depicts the broader managerial context of maritime warfare, ranging far beyond anti-submarine warfare to questions of shipping allocation, cargo provision, and inter-Allied relations. Thus this chapter by Kevin Smith integrates the study of resource management, scarcity, alliance diplomacy, and maritime warfare.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133236763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Cruise of U-188","authors":"David Kohnen","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter by David Kohnen examines the Allied response to the initial German submarine operations in the Indian Ocean during the Second World War. Roughly forty German submarines sailed for East Asian waters after 1942; U-188 was among the few to navigate the Allied gauntlet in the Atlantic to reach the Indian Ocean. Only three German submarines, including U-188, returned to Europe from operations in the Indian Ocean before the Allied victory in May of 1945. The discussions between key British and American commanders regarding the presence of German submarines in the Indian Ocean provide unique insight into the operations and intelligence organizations of the Admiralty and Navy Department and are examined in detail. The chapter also looks at the Allied submarine tracking rooms, which assisted the Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services in the capture of the skipper of U-188 – thereby securing information on the Imperial Japanese during a critical period in the closing months of the Second World War.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123819918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The View from the Top","authors":"C. Bell","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter by Christopher M. Bell examines how Winston Churchill's approach to the Battle of the Atlantic was shaped by the demands of British grand strategy. His preference for offensive operations on the largest possible scale deprived the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force's Coastal Command of resources needed for the protection of merchant shipping. Churchill counted on the United States to replace Britain's shipping losses so that imports would not decline to critical levels. American ships did not appear in the expected numbers, and in late 1942 Britain appeared to be heading towards an import crisis. Churchill was forced to reconsider his strategic priorities. Some resources were diverted from the strategic bombing campaign to trade defense, but Churchill remained reluctant to abandon his offensive priorities. He pursued a diplomatic agreement with the United States to secure additional merchant ships and expedited efforts to master the U-boat challenge by increasing the number of very-long-range aircraft capable of protecting Allied convoys in the mid-Atlantic.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124324295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"All Should be “A” Teams:","authors":"J. Goldrick","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvdmwxs5.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdmwxs5.9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129176591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Fleet Air Arm and Trade Defense, 1939–1944","authors":"B. Jones","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvdmwxs5.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvdmwxs5.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter by Ben Jones examines the efforts of the Fleet Air Arm to assist in the defense of Britain's sea-borne trade, especially in the Atlantic and Arctic, between 1939–1944. It assesses early setbacks, the hunting for surface raiders, and the options considered to deploy aircraft at sea in defense of convoys. In the early war years, the Fleet Air Arm was thinly-spread and lacked the resources for trade defense. Due to a lack of other assets, the Royal Navy was forced to employ its escort carriers for a range of duties, rather than just trade defense, and the arguments with the Americans over their employment will be explored. Finally, the effectiveness of the Fleet Air Arm's aircraft in the anti-submarine role is assessed in terms of their design, the types of operations they undertook, and the weapons they carried. There is a comparison between the success of the escort carriers of the British and American navies in the anti-submarine role and an explanation of why the latter achieved greater success.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115237587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Atlantic War, 1939–1945","authors":"M. Milner","doi":"10.1017/CHO9781139855969.020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CHO9781139855969.020","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter by Marc Milner challenges the popular perception of the \"Battle of the Atlantic\" as a shooting war, and the notion that Allied strategy was impaired by the depredations of Germany's U-boats. He asserts that the Atlantic war of 1939-45 is better understood like the great maritime wars of the age of sail, in which battle played a small part in the larger struggle for resource accumulation and the application of power ashore. The British and Canadians understood the Atlantic war in precisely this way, and focused on avoidance of the enemy as their primary method of defending shipping. In contrast, the USN followed a Mahanian concept of naval warfare in which destruction of the enemy was the underlying concept of escort operations. In this \"new\" paradigm, the Allied (really British) victory over the U-boats in 1943 was not something that could be achieved quickly. Rather, like the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, it was the culmination of a long process that forced the enemy to stand and fight in a campaign he had already lost.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"173 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116500683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：