{"title":"The View from the Top","authors":"C. Bell","doi":"10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter by Christopher M. Bell examines how Winston Churchill's approach to the Battle of the Atlantic was shaped by the demands of British grand strategy. His preference for offensive operations on the largest possible scale deprived the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force's Coastal Command of resources needed for the protection of merchant shipping. Churchill counted on the United States to replace Britain's shipping losses so that imports would not decline to critical levels. American ships did not appear in the expected numbers, and in late 1942 Britain appeared to be heading towards an import crisis. Churchill was forced to reconsider his strategic priorities. Some resources were diverted from the strategic bombing campaign to trade defense, but Churchill remained reluctant to abandon his offensive priorities. He pursued a diplomatic agreement with the United States to secure additional merchant ships and expedited efforts to master the U-boat challenge by increasing the number of very-long-range aircraft capable of protecting Allied convoys in the mid-Atlantic.","PeriodicalId":314430,"journal":{"name":"Decision in the Atlantic","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Decision in the Atlantic","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/KENTUCKY/9781949668001.003.0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter by Christopher M. Bell examines how Winston Churchill's approach to the Battle of the Atlantic was shaped by the demands of British grand strategy. His preference for offensive operations on the largest possible scale deprived the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force's Coastal Command of resources needed for the protection of merchant shipping. Churchill counted on the United States to replace Britain's shipping losses so that imports would not decline to critical levels. American ships did not appear in the expected numbers, and in late 1942 Britain appeared to be heading towards an import crisis. Churchill was forced to reconsider his strategic priorities. Some resources were diverted from the strategic bombing campaign to trade defense, but Churchill remained reluctant to abandon his offensive priorities. He pursued a diplomatic agreement with the United States to secure additional merchant ships and expedited efforts to master the U-boat challenge by increasing the number of very-long-range aircraft capable of protecting Allied convoys in the mid-Atlantic.
克里斯托弗·m·贝尔(Christopher M. Bell)撰写的这一章考察了温斯顿·丘吉尔(Winston Churchill)对大西洋海战的态度是如何受到英国大战略要求的影响的。他倾向于尽可能大规模的进攻行动,这剥夺了皇家海军和皇家空军海岸司令部保护商船所需的资源。丘吉尔指望美国来弥补英国的航运损失,这样进口就不会下降到临界水平。美国军舰没有达到预期的数量,1942年末,英国似乎正走向一场进口危机。丘吉尔被迫重新考虑他的战略重点。一些资源从战略轰炸转移到贸易防御,但丘吉尔仍然不愿意放弃他的进攻重点。他寻求与美国达成外交协议,以确保更多的商船,并通过增加能够保护大西洋中部盟军车队的超远程飞机的数量,加快应对u艇挑战的努力。