{"title":"Parliament and the Poll Tax: A Case Study in Parliamentary Pressure","authors":"P. Cowley","doi":"10.1080/13572339508420416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339508420416","url":null,"abstract":"Using interviews with Conservative MPs, three aspects of the Poll Tax not covered by the extant literature are examined. Conservative backbenchers are shown to be more supportive of the tax than in previous accounts. The nature and effect of both the legal and non‐legal protests against the Poll Tax are discussed. The effect of petitioning is found to be minor, but the amount and (especially) the nature of post which MPs received had more impact. Other than the quantity, five characteristics are identified which contributed to making this post more significant than other ‘issue’ post received by MPs. The extra‐parliamentary action is also shown to have had a surprisingly strong effect on Conservative MPs.","PeriodicalId":313993,"journal":{"name":"The Impact of Legislatures","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133221166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making Inside the European Parliament","authors":"George Tsebelis","doi":"10.1080/13572339508420415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339508420415","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits two mistaken impressions about the process of European integration. The first is that the European Parliament (at least before Maastricht) is a weak Parliament. The second is that in a Europe of mutual recognition of standards (Cassis de Dijon), the natural level of harmonis‐ation standards is the lowest common denominator (or close to it) because countries with low standards have no incentive to vote for improvements. The article makes the argument that the basis for both of these mistaken impressions is lack of understanding of the European Parliament's role as ‘conditional agenda‐setter’, which is specified by the co‐operation procedure of the European Union. According to this procedure, the Parliament can make a proposal which, if accepted by the Commission, is easier for the Council to accept than to modify. Elsewhere, I have argued that this procedure places significant decision‐making powers in the hands of the Parliament.1 Here I make two extensions. First, I explain how this...","PeriodicalId":313993,"journal":{"name":"The Impact of Legislatures","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128393245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rational-Choice Theory in Legislative Studies: Models of Politics without Romanticism","authors":"Thomas Saalfeld","doi":"10.1080/13572339508420414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339508420414","url":null,"abstract":"Rational‐choice theory, especially in its neo‐institutionalist variants, is a useful tool for the explanation of legislative behaviour. It allows to generate testable hypotheses about the link between the motives of individual parliamentarians, institutional structures and policies. Based on a general theory of action, rational‐choice explanations are deductive and reductionist making them particularly useful for the comparative study of parliaments. Many criticisms of rational‐choice theory do not apply in the well‐structured, competitive context of democratic parliamentary politics. Analytical tools like the concept of the ‘legislative firm’ or the ‘interest‐group approach of government’ help to generate explanations of the link between institutions and policy outputs that are not ad hoc and can be tested against a broad array of empirical data.","PeriodicalId":313993,"journal":{"name":"The Impact of Legislatures","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116375122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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