欧洲议会内部有条件的议程设置和决策

George Tsebelis
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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文回顾了关于欧洲一体化进程的两个错误印象。首先,欧洲议会(至少在《马斯特里赫特条约》之前)是一个软弱的议会。第二,在一个标准相互承认的欧洲(第戎卡西斯),自然水平的协调标准是最低的公分母(或接近它),因为低标准的国家没有动力投票支持改进。本文认为,这两种错误印象的基础是缺乏对欧洲议会作为“有条件议程制定者”的角色的理解,这是欧盟合作程序所规定的。根据这一程序,议会可以提出一项提案,该提案如果被委员会接受,则理事会接受比修改要容易。在其他地方,我认为这一程序使议会掌握了重大的决策权。在此,我提出两项延长。首先,我解释一下这是如何……
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making Inside the European Parliament
This article revisits two mistaken impressions about the process of European integration. The first is that the European Parliament (at least before Maastricht) is a weak Parliament. The second is that in a Europe of mutual recognition of standards (Cassis de Dijon), the natural level of harmonis‐ation standards is the lowest common denominator (or close to it) because countries with low standards have no incentive to vote for improvements. The article makes the argument that the basis for both of these mistaken impressions is lack of understanding of the European Parliament's role as ‘conditional agenda‐setter’, which is specified by the co‐operation procedure of the European Union. According to this procedure, the Parliament can make a proposal which, if accepted by the Commission, is easier for the Council to accept than to modify. Elsewhere, I have argued that this procedure places significant decision‐making powers in the hands of the Parliament.1 Here I make two extensions. First, I explain how this...
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