Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making Inside the European Parliament

Abstract

This article revisits two mistaken impressions about the process of European integration. The first is that the European Parliament (at least before Maastricht) is a weak Parliament. The second is that in a Europe of mutual recognition of standards (Cassis de Dijon), the natural level of harmonis‐ation standards is the lowest common denominator (or close to it) because countries with low standards have no incentive to vote for improvements. The article makes the argument that the basis for both of these mistaken impressions is lack of understanding of the European Parliament's role as ‘conditional agenda‐setter’, which is specified by the co‐operation procedure of the European Union. According to this procedure, the Parliament can make a proposal which, if accepted by the Commission, is easier for the Council to accept than to modify. Elsewhere, I have argued that this procedure places significant decision‐making powers in the hands of the Parliament.1 Here I make two extensions. First, I explain how this...