{"title":"Protecting Children and Virtual Worlds","authors":"R. Bloomfield, B. Duranske","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1375726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1375726","url":null,"abstract":"Advances in virtual world technology pose risks for the safety and welfare of children. Those advances also alter the interpretations of key terms in applicable laws. For example, in the Miller test for obscenity, virtual worlds constitute places, rather than \"works,\" and may even constitute local communities from which standards are drawn. Additionally, technological advances promise to make virtual worlds places of such significant social benefit that regulators must take care to protect them, even as they protect children who engage with them.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129465519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Firm Value: the Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules","authors":"Vidhi Chhaochharia, Yaniv Grinstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.556990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556990","url":null,"abstract":"The 2001 to 2002 corporate scandals led to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and to various amendments to the U.S. stock exchanges' regulations. We find that the announcement of these rules has a significant effect on firm value. Firms that are less compliant with the provisions of the rules earn positive abnormal returns compared to firms that are more compliant. We also find variation in the response across firm size. Large firms that are less compliant earn positive abnormal returns but small firms that are less compliant earn negative abnormal returns, suggesting that some provisions are detrimental to small firms.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126153608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Thomas, J. O. McClain, L. Robinson, Kenneth L. Schultz
{"title":"The Use of Framing in Inventory Decisions","authors":"L. Thomas, J. O. McClain, L. Robinson, Kenneth L. Schultz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1012695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1012695","url":null,"abstract":"Research has demonstrated that people often use decision criteria other than expected profit. This paper uses \"framing\" to investigate whether this phenomenon occurs in inventory decisions. Risk reflection is a human decision bias where questions that are framed to emphasize gain often induce risk averse behavior while those emphasizing loss often induce risk seeking behavior. The Newsvendor inventory decision provides a simple case to test whether this occurs in Operations Management situations. We frame the decision emphasizing first profit and then cost. Surprisingly, the expected results do not occur. To investigate why, we start with the initial work on framing and increase the complexity of the situation to gain insight into behavioral reactions. In the process we discuss both the relevance of the findings and some of the difficulties inherent in behavioral research in Operations Management.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121846446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Behavioral Finance","authors":"R. Bloomfield","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.941491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.941491","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioral finance began as an attempt to understand why financial markets react inefficiently to public information. One stream of behavioral finance examines how psychological forces induce traders and managers to make suboptimal decisions, and how these decisions affect market behavior. Another stream examines how economic forces might keep rational traders from exploiting apparent opportunities for profit. Behavioral finance remains controversial, but will become more widely accepted if it can predict deviations from traditional financial models without relying on too many \"ad hoc\" assumptions.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124134526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evolution of Preannouncements and Their Impact on New Product Release Timing: Evidence from the U.S. Motion Picture Industry","authors":"N. Foutz, Vrinda Kadiyali","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1019531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019531","url":null,"abstract":"This research examines the process by which firms preannounce and adjust the targeted release dates of their new products in the context of U.S. motion picture industry. To model the evolution of these preannouncements leading up to the final release dates, we construct a dynamic model under the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) framework and account for firms' discrete strategic choices of release dates, heterogeneity among new products, and unobserved payoffs in the course of the preannouncement game before the new products are released and revenues accrued. Our primary findings are that preannouncements in this industry contain important competitive intelligence and are not vaporware or cheap talk. The dynamic model of firms accounting for rivals' preannouncements increases their ability to forecast rivals' future moves and hence improves their preannouncement and release timing decisions. We also demonstrate the managerial usefulness of the model in conducting \"what-if\" analyses e.g. seeing how a change in the attractiveness of a release date influences the optimal preannouncement and release timing of a new product.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123764883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements","authors":"Alok Kumar, Charles M. C. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.502843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.502843","url":null,"abstract":"Using a database of more than 1.85 million retail investor transactions over 1991–1996, we show that these trades are systematically correlated—that is, individuals buy (or sell) stocks in concert. Moreover, consistent with noise trader models, we find that systematic retail trading explains return comovements for stocks with high retail concentration (i.e., small‐cap, value, lower institutional ownership, and lower‐priced stocks), especially if these stocks are also costly to arbitrage. Macroeconomic news and analyst earnings forecast revisions do not explain these results. Collectively, our findings support a role for investor sentiment in the formation of returns.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131861979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Statistical Arbitrage and Market Efficiency: Enhanced Theory, Robust Tests and Further Applications","authors":"R. Jarrow, Melvyn Teo, Y. Tse, M. Warachka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.659941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.659941","url":null,"abstract":"Statistical arbitrage enables tests of market efficiency which circumvent the joint-hypotheses dilemma. This paper makes several contributions to the statistical arbitrage framework. First, we enlarge the set of statistical arbitrage opportunities in Hogan, Jarrow, Teo, and Warachka (2004) to avoid penalizing incremental trading profits with positive deviations from their expected value. Second, we provide a statistical methodology to remedy the lack of consistency and statistical power in their Bonferroni approach. In addition, this procedure allows for autocorrelation and non-normality in trading profits. Third, we apply our tests to a wide range of trading strategies based on stock momentum, stock value, stock liquidity, and industry momentum. Over 50% of these strategies are found to violate market efficiency. We also identify dominant trading strategies which converge to arbitrage most rapidly.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127693797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Governance Role of Institutional Investors and Outsider Directors on the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts","authors":"Bipin B. Ajinkya, Sanjeev Bhojraj, P. Sengupta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.488107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.488107","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the relation between institutional ownership and board of directors' composition and the properties of management earnings forecasts. A firm's optimal disclosure policy is determined by a trade-off between costs and benefits of disclosure. Managers acting in their self-interest may have incentives to distort disclosure policy. Governance mechanisms, to the extent they are effective in protecting the interests of the providers of capital, should mitigate these distortions. We find evidence that institutional ownership and outsider directors are favorably associated with the properties of earnings forecasts. Firms with greater institutional ownership and outside directorship are more likely to issue a forecast and do so consistently. Further, these forecasts tend to be more specific and accurate. The governance measures also mitigate managers' tendency to issue optimistic forecasts.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115099985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Talking Up Liquidity: Insider Trading and Investor Relations","authors":"Ming-hsiang Huang, Harrison G. Hong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.354383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354383","url":null,"abstract":"Managements (“insiders”) of many corporations, especially small or newly-public firms, invest considerable resources in investor relations. We develop a model to explore the incentives of insiders to undertake such costly investments. We point out that insiders may undertake such investments not necessarily to improve the share price, but to enhance the liquidity of their block of shares. This leads to a divergence of interest between insiders and dispersed outside shareholders regarding investor relations. Our model predicts that the demographics of insiders (e.g. liquidity needs, size of equity stakes) are important determinants of the extent of investor relations across firms.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116418990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades","authors":"D. Easley, Liuren Wu, R. Engle, Maureen O'Hara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.294870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.294870","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a dynamic econometric microstructure model of trading, and we investigate how the dynamics of trades and trade composition interact with the evolution of market liquidity, market depth, and order flow. We estimate a bivariate generalized autoregressive intensity process for the arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades for 16 actively traded stocks over 15 years of transaction data. Our results show that both informed and uninformed trades are highly persistent, but that the uninformed arrival forecasts respond negatively to past forecasts of the informed intensity. Our estimation generates daily conditional arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades, which we use to construct forecasts of the probability of information-based trade (PIN). These forecasts are used in turn to forecast market liquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads and the price impact of orders. We observe that PINs vary across assets and over time, and most importantly that they are correlated across assets. Our analysis shows that one principal component explains much of the daily variation in PINs and that this systemic liquidity factor may be important for asset pricing. We also find that PINs tend to rise before earnings announcement days and decline afterwards. Copyright The Author 2008., Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127821114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}