{"title":"谈论流动性:内幕交易和投资者关系","authors":"Ming-hsiang Huang, Harrison G. Hong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.354383","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Managements (“insiders”) of many corporations, especially small or newly-public firms, invest considerable resources in investor relations. We develop a model to explore the incentives of insiders to undertake such costly investments. We point out that insiders may undertake such investments not necessarily to improve the share price, but to enhance the liquidity of their block of shares. This leads to a divergence of interest between insiders and dispersed outside shareholders regarding investor relations. Our model predicts that the demographics of insiders (e.g. liquidity needs, size of equity stakes) are important determinants of the extent of investor relations across firms.","PeriodicalId":309400,"journal":{"name":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"100","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Talking Up Liquidity: Insider Trading and Investor Relations\",\"authors\":\"Ming-hsiang Huang, Harrison G. Hong\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.354383\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Managements (“insiders”) of many corporations, especially small or newly-public firms, invest considerable resources in investor relations. We develop a model to explore the incentives of insiders to undertake such costly investments. We point out that insiders may undertake such investments not necessarily to improve the share price, but to enhance the liquidity of their block of shares. This leads to a divergence of interest between insiders and dispersed outside shareholders regarding investor relations. Our model predicts that the demographics of insiders (e.g. liquidity needs, size of equity stakes) are important determinants of the extent of investor relations across firms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":309400,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-10-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"100\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354383\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.354383","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Talking Up Liquidity: Insider Trading and Investor Relations
Managements (“insiders”) of many corporations, especially small or newly-public firms, invest considerable resources in investor relations. We develop a model to explore the incentives of insiders to undertake such costly investments. We point out that insiders may undertake such investments not necessarily to improve the share price, but to enhance the liquidity of their block of shares. This leads to a divergence of interest between insiders and dispersed outside shareholders regarding investor relations. Our model predicts that the demographics of insiders (e.g. liquidity needs, size of equity stakes) are important determinants of the extent of investor relations across firms.