C. Ewald, Erik Haugom, Gudbrand Lien, S. Størdal, Yuexiang Wu
{"title":"Trading Time Seasonality in Commodity Futures: An Opportunity for Arbitrage in the Natural Gas and Crude Oil Markets?","authors":"C. Ewald, Erik Haugom, Gudbrand Lien, S. Størdal, Yuexiang Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3792028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3792028","url":null,"abstract":"For fixed maturity, under the no-arbitrage assumption, futures prices should follow a martingale with respect to the trading time, at least under the pricing measure. Therefore, a prominent display of trading time seasonality under the physical measure raises warning signs and can only occur by means of strong seasonality in the pricing kernel. We show that for natural gas and crude oil, trading time seasonality is present to an extent where it may violate the no-arbitrage assumption. We provide three layers of evidence. The first layer is descriptive only, the second involves the Kruskal--Wicksell test for establishing trading time seasonality, and the third is in the form of a trading strategy, which exploits trading date seasonality. This strategy can produce statistically significant positive alphas in the CAPM context, thereby indicating the possibility of an arbitrage.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"30 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123874756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Curse of Knowledge: Having Access to Customer Information Can Reduce Monopoly Profits","authors":"D. Laussel, Ngo van Long, J. Resende","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3352381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3352381","url":null,"abstract":"We demonstrate the \"curse of knowledge\" when a monopolist can recognize different consumer groups through their purchase histories, which are influenced by the firm's dynamic pricing policies. Under the Markov-perfect equilibrium, after each commitment period, the firm offers a new introductory price so as to attract new customers. More and more market segments are added gradually. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening the commitment period will result in a fall in profit. In contrast, a full-commitment monopolist prefers to stick to uniform pricing, achieving higher profit. Hence, the firm is better off by refraining from collecting customer information.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126411707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Expected Utility an Ex-Hypothesis? Some Implications of Reference-Dependent Expected Utility Model","authors":"Michał Lewandowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3064682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3064682","url":null,"abstract":"Rabin and Thaler (2001) declared Expected Utility an ex-hypothesis or a dead parrot alluding to the famous sketch from Monthy Pythons Flying Circus. Following Cox and Sadiraj (2006) and others, one should distinguish between Expected Utility (EU) theory (a purely mathematical theory based on axioms) and Expected Utility models (EU theory plus a given economic interpretation). The most prevalent EU model is one that assumes consequentialism (Rubinstein, 2012). Consequentialism states that the decision maker has a single binary preference relation comparing probability distributions over final wealth levels. Preference relations over wealth changes for different levels of wealth are derived from this single preference relation. EU theory plus consequentialism is referred to as the standard EU model. It is argued that most of the critique against EU is against the standard EU model, or against consequentialism. We replace consequentialism with reference-dependence, retaining the EU hypothesis. Using Sugden (2003) framework, we show that many violations of the standard EU model can be explained assuming this different interpretation. Among the topics considered are: WTA/WTP disparity, preference reversal, complementary symmetry, preference homogeneity, loss aversion, reflection effect and the coexistence of insurance and gambling.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"227 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113972341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revenue Maximization Under Two-Dimensional Buyers with Type Uncertainty Using Dynamic Mechanism Design","authors":"Chaitanya Kaligotla","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2392849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2392849","url":null,"abstract":"I study a decision problem to maximize seller revenue under a two-dimensional buyer with multiple type space with private information. I consider the general case of a single seller with a single good to sell to buyers with private attribute values arriving over 2 time periods. The seller's problem is to determine the optimal time period of allocation. I use mechanism design theory to find an optimal policy for the seller and investigate structural conditions for the optimal seller policy. This paper aims to show that there are tractable and relatively simple ways to deal with multidimensional type space in Revenue Management problems through the application of mechanism design.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115358167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decisions, Stocks, and Time Diversification","authors":"D. McLeavey, Sébastien Lleo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2172483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172483","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents three definitions of time diversification and analyzes their implications for investment horizons. Using decision quality criteria and methodology, we question standard advice. In analyzing time diversification with a minimum of assumptions, we answer two main questions: how to rigorously define time diversification and what conditions favor it.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125530285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pattern-Based Modeling and Solution of Probabilistically Constrained Optimization Problems","authors":"M. Lejeune","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1662685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1662685","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new modeling and solution method for probabilistically constrained optimization problems. The methodology is based on the integration of the stochastic programming and combinatorial pattern recognition fields. It permits the fast solution of stochastic optimization problems in which the random variables are represented by an extremely large number of scenarios. The method involves the binarization of the probability distribution and the generation of a consistent partially defined Boolean function pdBf representing the combination F,p of the binarized probability distribution F and the enforced probability level p. We show that the pdBf representing F,p can be compactly extended as a disjunctive normal form DNF. The DNF is a collection of combinatorial p-patterns, each defining sufficient conditions for a probabilistic constraint to hold. We propose two linear programming formulations for the generation of p-patterns that can be subsequently used to derive a linear programming inner approximation of the original stochastic problem. A formulation allowing for the concurrent generation of a p-pattern and the solution of the deterministic equivalent of the stochastic problem is also proposed. The number of binary variables included in the deterministic equivalent formulation is not an increasing function of the number of scenarios used to represent uncertainty. Results show that large-scale stochastic problems, in which up to 50,000 scenarios are used to describe the stochastic variables, can be consistently solved to optimality within a few seconds.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127677999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note on Confidence Momentum and Term Structure of Confidence with Applications to Financial Markets","authors":"G. Charles-Cadogan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2003319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2003319","url":null,"abstract":"This note is based on a recent confidence index introduced in the context of compensating probability factors for deviations of subjective probability measures from equivalent martingale measures. The index is adjusted for loss gain probability spreads, and it explains momentum in confidence. We use the index to introduce a confidence matrix operator which shows how a subject transforms gain domain into fear of loss. So she is loss averse or risk averse. By contrast, the adjoint confidence matrix operator is an Euclidean motion which rotates and reverses loss domain into hope of gain. Thus, signifying risk seeking over loss domains in hope of gain. Simulation of the model shows that the distribution of prior loss [gain] probabilities is a predictor of confidence momentum and fields of confidence. Moreover, our field theory of confidence mimics a sample of Gallup Monthly Economic Confidence Index, and depicts a term structure of confidence for hope and fear. It plainly shows that the growth rate of Gallup Economic Confidence Index -- which is highly correlated with popular confidence indexes like UBS/Gallup Investor Optimism Index; Michigan Consumer Confidence Index; and Yale Investor Confidence Index -- predict bubbles and crashes.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125618532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competing Against Oneself in Sealed-Bid Combinatorial Auctions","authors":"Natalia Santamaría","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1941814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941814","url":null,"abstract":"Combinatorial auctions are auctions of multiple heterogeneous objects that allow bids on subsets of the objects, giving bidders the flexibility to express if the objects in a set are more valuable together than separate. This added flexibility makes it possible for the bidders to express a variety of preferences, but also complicates the problem they need to solve to find their bidding strategies. I study the problem a bidder has to solve in first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction of two objects. I find that bidders should avoid bidding for overlapping sets, if their bids can be greater than the best competitive bids; however, this theoretical prediction fails to hold in controlled laboratory experiments.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126896392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effects of Government Credit on Investment Efficiency in the Presence of Adverse Selection","authors":"Sangkyu Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1091569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1091569","url":null,"abstract":"This paper looks at the effects of adverse selection on investment efficiency and derives the conditions under which government credit can improve investment efficiency. The model produces more general results than those of previous studies by allowing both the return and the risk of each investment project to be random variables. Unsubsidized government credit has no net effect on investment efficiency. Subsidized credit can improve investment efficiency under certain conditions, but those conditions are restrictive. When many individuals with high-return projects fail to obtain credit due to adverse selection, subsidized credit can replace marginal projects with high-retun projects. The subsidy, however, also induces individuals with low-return projects to undertake their projects, making the net effect ambiguous.","PeriodicalId":308717,"journal":{"name":"OPER: Single Decision Maker (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134012685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}