IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Quality Regulation on Two-Sided Platforms: Exclusion, Subsidization, and First-Party Application","authors":"Peng Huang, Gaoyan Lyu, Yi Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3738426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3738426","url":null,"abstract":"Managing the quality of complementary applications is vital to the success of a two-sided platform. While prior research has focused solely on restricting platform access based on a quality threshold, we compare three quality regulation strategies: (1) the platform excludes access to low-quality complementors, (2) it provides a fixed amount of subsidy to high-quality complementors, and (3) it develops its own high-quality applications in addition to those from third-party complementors. Our analyses reveal that the widely adopted exclusion strategy is a special case of the subsidization strategy, and it does not always benefit the platform. In contrast, both subsidization and first-party applications strategies render the platform owner better off, with higher profits, higher average quality, and a larger consumer network, but only subsidization always improves social welfare. In addition, the trade-off between subsidization and first-party applications strategies depends on the development cost of first-party applications and the fraction of high-quality complementors, but the relationship is not monotonic. Our results demonstrate that the platform does not have to sacrifice application quantity for higher application quality. With the right choices, it can profitably improve both measures simultaneously. This research provides concrete guidelines to help platform managers make decisions about regulating the quality of complementary applications. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131542944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Preferences, Altruism, Technocracy, & Power Grabbing: Cumulative Effects on Equilibriums induced by Ability and `Doubtfulness'","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3620030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3620030","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose an economy within which rational expectations equilibriums (REE) are predicated on the distribution of ability, and the extent to which economic agents are doubtful (`doubtfulness') as to true realizations of their ability. Let a `societal REE' denote an REE that, simultaneously constitutes a dominant equilibrium for each of individual economic agents, and society. This study provides formal theoretical evidence that cumulative layering of each of risk preferences (risk aversion or risk seeking) and heterogeneity as to altruism on economic agents does not induce any alterations to societal REE that are predicated on ability and doubtfulness. Layering of heterogeneity with respect to preference for a (professional) Technocracy on all of the preceding factors induces a societal REE that Pareto Dominates all preceding REE. Suppose technocrats that are appointees of politicians (`political technocrats') coexist with professional technocrats and do not practice `power grabbing', that is, arrive at policy decisions on basis of scientific, as opposed to political merits of alternate courses for action. In presence of stated coexistence, there is arrival at a societal REE, which Pareto Dominates the societal REE that is induced by presence only of professional technocrats. In this respect, presence of political technocrats who act on scientific merits induces unilateral increase to incomes of professional technocrats. In the societal REE in context of which political technocrats practice power grabbing, resources of society are sub-optimally directed away from efforts at generation and implementation of innovations. There is arrival then at an economy that revolves around government. Consistent with sub-optimality of a `power grabbing' economy, while government consists of three-tenths of the workforce in context of political technocrats who act on scientific merits, introduction of power grabbing induces allocation of five-sixths of the workforce to the government sector.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"152 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121215665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Impact of Government Grants on Venture Capital Funding of Deep Technology University Spinoffs","authors":"A. Belz, F. Zapatero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493973","url":null,"abstract":"Because both scientific research and startups contribute strongly to major economic outcomes, university spinoffs (USOs) have been the subject of great interest and new policies. Unfortunately, prior research on early steps as firms coalesce and make their first decisions has been sparse, in part because of the difficulty of identifying USOs at the time that the firm launches. We use a dataset of participating academic entrepreneurs identified through the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps (``I-Corps'') program to study newly formed USOs. We find a firm formation rate of roughly 60%; of those, roughly 2/3 apply for an SBIR award. We find that few of these firms migrate from the region of their home universities, negating the idea of a ``brain drain'' following experiential entrepreneurship training, and those that do move do not experience greater success in raising venture capital (VC). While a single SBIR award does not predict VC success, two or more SBIR awards generate an average marginal effect of approximately 30% on the likelihood of raising venture capital.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128690846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Empirical Assessment of Performance Measurement & Management of the Public Sector by Way of the NPM Tools: A Review of the Public Sector of Czech Republic","authors":"Frederick Anning","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3290055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3290055","url":null,"abstract":"Czech Republic’s 2017 economic indicators gave quite significant performance and also showed resilience with consistency and prudence in its monetary policies within its inflation targeting framework. This performance could be attributed to prudent economic factors and also due to a combined relatively tight monetary policy and also accommodating fiscal policy measures. (IMF country Report Oct. 2017).<br><br>In spite of all these positive macroeconomic indicators one cannot overlook the role played by measuring and managing performance within the country’s public sector. It is worthy to know that the introduction of Performance measurement as well as management within the public sector is a way to ensure transparency, Efficiency and Effectiveness in making decision that will inure to the benefit of the public sector in terms of using public funds to boost performance in the economy.<br><br>This notwithstanding the picture is quite different in terms of its practice thus striking several impediments defining performance, identifying suitable indicators as well as implementing a performance management system. It is however noteworthy that the challenge is still present as of today i.e. identifying the most suitable modules for measuring and managing performance within the public sector so as not to come up with a speculative behavior of managers within the public sector of global economies.<br><br>We are by this paper seeking to present the modules employed in measuring performance within the public sector of the Czech Republic as well as other drawbacks generated by these modules. We further do an assessment of the perverse effects measuring performance have on the public sector, since its knowledge will be useful in building an optimal system for measuring and managing performance. We will also do a critical review of the New Public Management (NPM) considered by many as a paradigm shift in public administration which points out the failures and or the limitations of public sector overtime and the associated problems, its nature and processes. We will also do a further assessment of some of the criticism of the NPM doctrine from the political point of view in other transitional countries and finally hypothesize the way by which these systems are employed depending on the characteristics of its activities especially in terms of contractibility, which is considered a broad construct incorporating clarity of goals, its ability to select undistorted performance metrics, and the degree by which public sector managers appreciate and control its transformational process. <br><br>","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"432 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120872235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Governments Foster the Development of Venture Capital?","authors":"C. Fei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3221997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3221997","url":null,"abstract":"Exploring a novel dataset and a unique policy experiment, this paper examines the role of government intervention in the emergence of venture capital (VC) in China during 1999-2013. Using difference-in-difference methodology, I find that the central government program leads to an increase in local investment from both government and private VCs, which doubles the number of successful companies. The positive impact is most pronounced in relatively less developed regions and during the early development of the VC sector. I present two micro-level transmission channels of the crowding-in effects, through networks formed by previous investments and through co-ownership in VC affiliates.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122453108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taxation and the Peer-to-Peer Economy","authors":"Aqib Aslam, Alpa Shah","doi":"10.5089/9781484313763.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484313763.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"The growth of the peer-to-peer (P2P) economy over the last decade has captivated both stock markets and policymakers alike. While the means for transacting might be different to existing firm structures-with the emergence of digital platforms that connect individual buyers and sellers directly-the tax behavior of individuals operating in this new economy are very familiar. What is clear is that while the P2P economy has potentially exacerbated existing policy, administrative, and revenue-mobilization challenges associated with small business taxation-such as the choice of the tax base and how to set tax thresholds-, the technology behind P2P platforms presents a valuable opportunity to eventually solve them.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114745927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Technology Competition, Cumulative Innovation, and a Grant-Back Clause","authors":"Masahito Ambashi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3408708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3408708","url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to investigate which scheme of technology development is desirable in the stream of cumulative innovation, in particular, with uncertainty on the part of follow-on innovation. Technology competition is likely to generate social overincentives for innovation especially when consumer surplus is negligible. The study finds that a grant-back clause combined with an appropriate distribution of expected profits mitigates social overinvestment in the both initial and follow-on technologies, and thereby, improves social welfare. Among other things, it is shown that if a government authority can specify a particular distribution of profits between the firms, socially optimal investment in the initial technology can be realized. On the other hand, assuming a significantly positive consumer surplus instead, it is revealed that competition in the follow-on technology creates higher social welfare as consumer surplus is large. Finally, the model is extended so as to include uncertainty on the part of initial innovation, so that it derives the intuition that competition in the initial technology would be much more important for the advent of improved final products through building a basis for cumulative innovation.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125964662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Undertaking Nonharmful or Harmful Public Projects Through Unit-by-Unit Contribution: Coordination and Pareto Efficiency","authors":"Ryusuke Shinohara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2842135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2842135","url":null,"abstract":"We examine in detail the implementation of a project that is non-harmful for all agents as well as a project that is harmful for some agents through a unit-by-unit contribution mechanism. For a project that is non-harmful for all agents, efficient implementation is supported at one regular Nash equilibrium and several refined Nash equilibria that are stable against coalition deviations. In this sense, this mechanism works well. On the other hand, when the project is harmful for some agents, this mechanism may not have a Nash equilibrium with efficient implementation of the project. Even when such a Nash equilibrium exists, it may not be selected by any of the refined Nash equilibria. Thus, in this case, this mechanism does not work. Our result shows that the merit of the unit-by-unit contribution mechanism reported in the literature is partially extensible to the implementation of a public project.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124159891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Knowledge Management Implementation Impacts, in Tanzania's Public Sector: Case Study Ministry of Finance and Planning, Tanzania","authors":"Jacob Joseph Kassema","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2790205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2790205","url":null,"abstract":"Organizations, especially those adopting Knowledge Management (KM) face the challenge of being able to maintain and implement it successful and on time, this study report examine the failure and success of KM implementation by looking into basic and important issues including KM awareness, initiatives, availability, policies and strategies, tools and technologies, and technology status in terms of it growth (trend) and finally provide evidence of what it has been found and what an organization can do to implement it successful by using the introduced implementation model.Ministry of Finance and Planning of Tanzania \"Financial Information Systems Management Department\" is one of those organizations which face those challenges, these challenges have been examined by answering the following research questions: how deeply the concept of knowledge and KM understood and established?, how far the KM implemented?, what are the basic requirements for the KM implementation?, what strategies and policies needed for the successful KM implementation? The importance of these questions were to provide a clear picture of the study area based on the selected unit of study which is Financial Information Systems Management Department under Ministry of Finance and Planning of Tanzania.The examination on those challenges were done by answering the research questions, where by many literature's were reviewed for providing theoretical evidence and data collection and analysis for providing practical evidence of the unit of study.In this research I have found that theoretically, the concept is still new all over the world and it is important for the Ministry of Finance and Planning to take it on board for better performance and to gain competitive advantage, and practically in the Ministry of Finance, this concept of knowledge and KM is good-to-very-good known to most of the staff and managers, but there was no proper policies and strategies for the KM implementation which as a results its implementation were not 100% successful, although the basic requirements were not fully available such as KM tools and technologies. The unsuccessful of the KM implementation were contributed by many factors such as unavailable KM ownership, KM tools and technologies, proper KM policies and strategies, and complexity of the KM concepts itself, and these are one of the basic and common requirements for the KM implementation where by without them the failure is obvious. Therefore, the proper implementation model which will provides all necessary issues for successful implementation has to be introduced and used as I have introduced in this study report.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122082478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Fiscal History of Boyacá, 1863-1886: Liberal Dreams and Limited Resources (La Historia Fiscal De Boyacá, 1863-1886: Sueños Liberales Y Recursos Limitados)","authors":"Joshua M. Rosenthal","doi":"10.21789/24222704.1058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.1058","url":null,"abstract":"La historia fiscal de Boyaca entre 1863 y 1886 reflejo la tension entre la realidad de la economia moribunda del Estado y los ideales progresistas de los liberales radicales que controlaron su gobierno. El Estado se apoyo en tributos utilizados en el pasado colonial, como el de deguello, y en innovaciones liberales, como el impuesto directo, que proveyo una fuente de ingreso sorprendentemente efectiva para una economia subdesarrollada. El patron de gasto publico reflejo la misma tension dinamica: los costos presupuestados fueron ajustados en linea con los recursos miserables del Estado, que en terminos per capita estaban entre los mas bajos de la Confederacion. Esta restriccion opero cuando se trato de educacion, una prioridad del gobierno, pero alcanzo un punto extremo con la fracasada Ferreria de Samaca. Detras de estos esquemas ambiciosos y de alto costo estaban las promesas de apoyo financiero del Gobierno Federal, aunque no es claro que tan frecuentemente esas promesas se cumplieron.Esta dinamica fue un factor en la compleja formula politica en la que Boyaca era un puntal de apoyodel pequeno circulo liberal que controlaba el Gobierno Federal, aun cuando sus politicos se quejaban de que Cundinamarca impedia el desarrollo de Boyaca.","PeriodicalId":308400,"journal":{"name":"IRPN: Innovation & Public Economics (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125527797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}