Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal最新文献_第3页

Disagreement, polarization, and the flight of Minerva’s Owl. A reply to Vaidya 分歧，两极分化，还有密涅瓦猫头鹰的逃跑。回复Vaidya

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.11

R. Talisse, S. Aikin

引用次数: 2

Body and image 身体与形象

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.9

Maria Popczyk

引用次数: 0

Krytyka czystego rozumu jako krytyka czystego doświadczenia. Kant a współczesne spory wokół treści percepcji

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.4

P. Sikora

引用次数: 0

Cantor’s paradise from the perspective of non‐revisionist Wittgensteinianism 从非修正主义的维特根斯坦主义看康托尔的天堂

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.5

J. Gomułka

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引用次数: 0

The argument from correlation to cause in science communication 科学传播中从关联到原因的论证

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.3

Martijn H. Demollin

引用次数: 0

Sherlock Holmes introduces critical thinking 夏洛克·福尔摩斯引入了批判性思维

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.14

Avani Sabade

引用次数: 0

Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.6

Adriana Warmbier

{"title":"Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard","authors":"Adriana Warmbier","doi":"10.24917/20841043.10.2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.10.2.6","url":null,"abstract":"The authority of reflection. Moral agency in the light of Korsgaard’s constitutive arguments: In this paper I address the question as to whether Christine Korsgaard’s account of normative relations between the moral agent and the ends of her actions which constitutes her practical identity avoids falling into the trap of being just another abstract theory in moral philosophy. Proponents of constitutive arguments for the normative authority of reasons for action offer a promising approach to this meta‐ethical question by arguing that the normative authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself (in agency itself). In two constitutive arguments for the normativity of rational requirements, Korsgaard attempts first to argue that “the normative question” does not consist in looking merely for an explanation of moral practices but in asking “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?”, and secondly to establish that the reason why ethical standards make claims on us is that they represent commands which are constitutive of having a self (the cost of violating ethical standards is the loss of practical identity). Korsgaard deals with these two arguments using her own modified version of the reflective endorsement method. She claims that the reflective structure of human consciousness establishes the normative relation we have to ourselves and that this is a relation of authority (that is the source of obligation). I argue that Korsgaard’s account of action as self‐constitution (the constitution of a practical sense of identity) fails to arrive at establishing the authority of reflection. I draw on the discussed claim that reasoned authority for our actions comes from reflective scrutiny (the test of reflection). Viewing the Kantian model of practical reason which lies at the basis of Korsgaard’s approach, I suggest the possibility of applying the Aristotelian model of practical reason as an useful framework for the reflective endorsement strategy.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72531007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Myślenie krytyczne: kilka uwag historycznych i teoretycznych

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.1

A. Dąbrowski

引用次数: 0

Democracy and polarization. Comments on Aikin and Talisse’s Political argument in a polarized age 民主和两极分化。论两极分化时代的艾金和塔利斯的政治论述

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-03-31 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.10

A. Vaidya

引用次数: 5

Radykalność filozofii. Rozważania wokół książki Pawła Kłoczowskiego Rewolucja kartezjańska i inne szkice

Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.13

Anna Szklarska

引用次数: 0