{"title":"The Collateral Supply Effect on Central Bank Policy","authors":"Carolyn Sissoko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3545546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545546","url":null,"abstract":"This paper starts by describing the evolution of US money markets over the course of the 1990s and the 2000s. The crucial transition was from an unsecured core money market, the Federal Funds market, to a collateralized market, the repo market. Due to this shift, collateral supply has become an important factor in money market dynamics. Three important implications of this transformation are discussed: First, government debt issues now affect the money market not just due to the need to settle payment for the debt, but also due to the on-going need to fund the carry of the debt. Second, because long-term debt is an important component of collateral supply, any significant increase in long-term rates will have a dramatic effect on the value of the aggregate collateral supply thereby making monetary policy implementation more difficult. Third, the events of March 2020 provide evidence of structural instability in the repo market, and of the problematic nature of a ‘dealer of last resort’ solution. This paper argues that the collateral supply implications of the new money market environment merit careful study, and critically evaluates the dealer of last resort, the proposal for a centralized counterparty for Treasuries, and the proposal for a standing repo facility.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"16 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114106469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Funding Rate Spikes: How the Fed’s Balance Sheet Impacts Monetary Policy Transmission","authors":"Y. Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3721785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721785","url":null,"abstract":"Sufficient reserve balances are crucial for effective monetary policy transmission by allowing arbitrage to close the gap between the central bank deposit rate and short-term funding market risk-free rates. Unexpected large spikes in U.S. dollar repo rates in recent years have posed challenges to the Fed's balance sheet normalization policy, leaving open the question of what factors determine the sufficiency of reserve balances. To address this question, I build a theoretical model that explicates the impact on short-term funding rates of strategic complementarity in intraday payment timing among banks. I show that beyond the roles of post-Global Financial Crisis liquidity and capital regulations, the sufficiency of reserves depends on a complicated interaction of (1) strategic behavior in intraday interbank payment timing, and (2) demands in wholesale funding markets. A low supply of reserves causes banks to strategically hoard reserves in intraday interbank payment timing. This strategic hoarding of reserves raises financial stability concerns for the interbank payment network and disincentivizes banks from providing liquidity to short-term funding markets, impeding monetary policy transmission. Crucially, my model reveals that as reserve balances get sufficiently low, only small or moderate changes in macroeconomic conditions are enough to have strong nonlinear or even discontinuous impacts on wholesale funding rates.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116356959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Market Freeze and Bank Capital Structure Heterogeneity","authors":"Fenghua Song, A. Thakor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3667175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3667175","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a theory wherein a priori identical banks may trade loans in a search market with reusable information. The equilibrium is unique, but its nature depends on the probability of a future market state. When the probability of a boom is high, all banks hold no equity and do no screening. When this probability is low, all banks choose a high level of equity and screen loans. For intermediate probability values, the equilibrium is heterogeneous, with some banks posting equity and screening and others avoiding equity and screening. This endogenously arising heterogeneity generates interbank trading. The credit market is partially frozen in a recession: only high-capital banks have continued funding access. Low-capital banks obtain funding by selling legacy loans to banks with “financial muscle,” so market funding is reallocated from low-capital to high-capital banks. This paper was accepted by Bruno Biais, finance.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127831742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The disconnect of funding from wealth creation","authors":"S. Savvides","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3489546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489546","url":null,"abstract":"Unproductive debt and a broken banking system are identified as the main reasons why the real economies of developed countries are experiencing financial crises. Moreover, the paper identifies concentration of money and power and loosely regulated financial markets as the main drivers impeding the efficient allocation of economic resources into productive uses. The pursuit of return without risk inevitably leads to the transfer of wealth through a failing banking system which collaborates with hedge funds and global wealth management groups who constantly seek low risk and high returns for the benefit of their wealthy clients. It is further argued that conditions conducive to economic development hardly exist in highly indebted countries and that wasteful finance inevitably brings about financial crises and recessions. The promise of a return without risk leads financial intermediaries in the direction of an elusive quest whereby the only way to attain this is through directing funding towards the capture of existing assets rather than it being invested back in the real economy to create new wealth.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116497027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Immaculate Deception: How (and Why) Bankers Still Enjoy a Global Rescue Network","authors":"E. Kane","doi":"10.36687/inetwp130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp130","url":null,"abstract":"Dodd-Frank is an example of counterfeit reform. It is designed principally to benefit very big banks and it has helped these banks to increase their market share greatly during the last 10 years. The Act provides lesser and contradictory forms of costs and comfort to smaller US bankers and taxpayers, foreign bankers (especially the managers of Deutsche Bank), and foreign governments. Small bankers and taxpayers are encouraged to believe that the 2007-2009 US rescue of the world’s biggest banks was a one-time maneuver. But an opposite message is sent through the press as (with great fanfare) the industry absolves and congratulates ex-officeholders: (1) for having transferred massive amounts of subsidized support not just to stakeholders in US megabanks, but also to European bankers and governments, and (2) for keeping the subsidies flowing long past the panic’s expiry date. Genuine reform will require changes in fraud laws and an effort to post on a continuing basis the value of the safety-net subsidies individual megabanks enjoy.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128324765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory Capital and Incentives for Risk Model Choice under Basel 3","authors":"Fred Liu, Lars Stentoft","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3651455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3651455","url":null,"abstract":"In response to the Subprime Mortgage crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has spent the previous decade overhauling the regulatory framework that governs how banks calculate minimum capital requirements. In 2019, the BCBS finalized the Basel 3 regulatory regime, which changes the regulatory measure of market risk and adds new complex calculations based on liquidity and risk factors. This paper is motivated by these changes and seeks to answer the question of how regulation affects banks' choice of risk-management models, whether it incentivizes them to use correctly specified models, and if it results in more stable capital requirements. Our results show that, although the models that minimize regulatory capital for a representative bank portfolio also result in the most stable requirements, these models are generally rejected as being correctly specified and tend to produce inferior forecasts of the regulatory risk measures.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130060293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Liquidity Support in Financial Institutions","authors":"Falko Fecht, Egemen Genc, Yigitcan Karabulut","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3650373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3650373","url":null,"abstract":"We document that banks facilitate liquidity provision to their affiliated mutual funds that experience excessive withdrawals. The liquidity support, which mainly originates from institutional and retail clients of banks, limits the negative performance effects of financial distress and mitigates strategic complementarities. Parent bank flows during distress periods predict superior future fund performance over the following six months, suggesting that banks act as a coordination device for their clients to internalize the liquidity premium. Our findings demonstrate the existence of a mutual support system within financial institutions, and further highlight the potential benefits of bank-affiliation for fund investors.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114674976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Macroeconomic Policy and Islamic Banks’ Lending and Investment Decisions: An Empirical Assessment of Crowding out Effect of Private Credit.","authors":"M. Muzammil, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3641630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3641630","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of Bank specific and Macroeconomic variables on Islamic Banking financing and investment decisions. Specifically, this study sets to test the lazy banking hypothesis for Islamic Banks of Pakistan. Tightening of Monetary policy by raising policy rates crowds out private investment through its dampening effect on private credit. Data of all 4 Full fledge Islamic banks of Pakistan were taken for the period of 2006 to 2018. Banks’ lending and investment variables were taken as a dependent. That included advances and investment to deposits and assets ratios. Predictors included macroeconomic variables like inflation, GDP, Exchange Rate and Interest Rate, as well as Bank specific variables like Deposit, Size of Bank, Net interest margin, Bank spread, and Credit Risk. The results suggested that interest rates have a significant and negative effect on private lending (both Advance to deposit and advances to total assets). Investment and financing seem to be mutually exclusive. Both investment and financing have an inverse and significant effect on each other. Size has a positive and significant effect on both financing and investment. Findings also suggested both advances and investment decisions are positively and significantly affected by their lags. Higher spread represented by net interest margin significantly affects both financing and investment. Interestingly, GDP has a significant effect on investments as compared to financing. This study will help regulator, policymakers and bank management to better understand the key drivers that affect Islamic bank financing and investment decisions so they can properly structure the policies that will create an efficient, effective, and robust financial system which will ultimately benefit the economy as well.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130796821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heterogeneity in Bank Leverage: The Funding Channels of Complexity","authors":"M. Bussière, Baptiste Meunier, Justine Pedrono","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3638922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3638922","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the net impact of complexity on leverage, at the Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) level using unique French supervisory data from 2010 to 2017. Geographical and structural complexity introduce diversification benefits and agency problems that affect the risk of BHCs. Whether investors price this risk or not is decisive for the cost of equity and finally leverage. Our results show a negative impact of complexity on leverage. To explain this result, we then focus on the funding channels of complexity. We find that complexity goes hand in hand with additional capital surplus and increasing cost of equity. As a second major finding, our results show that the impact of complexity on leverage and the funding channels of complexity are heterogeneous across BHCs and depend on their systemic status. In fact, size, complexity and systemic status complement each other. Omitting one of these dimensions leads to misleading conclusions on bank stability.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127091007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Central Banking and Sustainable Development","authors":"Ali Nassiri Aghdam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3637485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637485","url":null,"abstract":"Can we consider any role for central banks in sustainable development? From mainstream economics perspective, monetary policy should be neutral, and the central banks have no role to play beyond inflation targeting. In contrast, the present study argues that environmental risks and climate changes entail significant costs for the banking system and deteriorate financial stability. Central banks to fulfill their mandate and safeguard financial stability inevitably react to environmental risks. Furthermore, they have efficient instruments at their disposal, relying on they are able to internalize externalities; the instruments which fiscal policy authorities are in lack of. From this perspective, central banks have to consider environmental risks and developmental issues when designing credit policies and setting micro and macro-prudential regulations, even if they are going to commit to their traditional mandates. They need to be mandated to motivate banks to extend credit for environment-friendly projects and increase the cost of finance for brown investments. This is the essence of developmental role that central banks are adopting increasingly, especially in developing countries.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114485939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}