{"title":"Asymmetric Information versus Banks’ Costumer Trust, Albania Case Linked With SEE Countries","authors":"Artur Ribaj, Orkida Ilollari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3409406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3409406","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the impact of information asymmetry on the level of trust customers have towards their banks in Albania. Specifically, the article analyses the implementation of transparency and information symmetry related to pricing and publishing banking interest rates, commissions and fees, clarity of banking products, and reports. The minimal obligation of Albanian banks is to obey the legal and regulatory requirements regarding transparency and information symmetry. However, banks in Albania - for pricing, commissions and fees of their typical services - follow their competition which is a relatively low level of transparency. Comparison of products’ terms and conditions among banks is difficult for the public as a result of the information asymmetry. In addition, some banks are in breach of regulation on transparency for banking and financial products and services. As importantly, expensive bank money transfer commissions increase customer tendency to avoid paying through the banking system, which in turn increase informality and potential forms of tax evasion. These findings are compared with data on other banks in South East Europe to identify the mechanism(s) that affect costumer trust. The article presents several conclusions and implications for Central Banks in Albania and the region to prevent potential costumer distrust by requiring banks to establish a common methodology for pricing and publication of symmetric information for products’ terms and conditions, which will be a good practice for the banking markets in Albania and the region.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130707225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sustained Credit Card Borrowing","authors":"Daniel Grodzicki, Sergei Koulayev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3403045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403045","url":null,"abstract":"Using a large panel of credit card accounts, we examine the dynamics of credit card borrowing and repayment in the United States and what these imply for the expected costs of credit card debt to consumers. Our analysis reveals that: (1) credit cards are predominantly used to borrow, (2) card debt is sustained for long periods and balances frequently rise before being repaid, (3) this debt is potentially more costly than anticipated. Specifically, we document that 82% of outstanding balances are debt and that 70% of this debt accrues to those borrowing continuously for a year or more. The expected annualized cost of a borrowing episode is 28% of its initial balance, or 13 p.p. higher than the average APR. Moreover, credit scores decline during episodes, further raising the expected cost of borrowing on a card.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124849117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Volatility and Welfare in a Crypto Economy","authors":"Fahad Saleh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3235467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235467","url":null,"abstract":"Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains possess at least two undesirable characteristics: exceptional price volatility and welfare impairment. Exceptional price volatility arises because PoW implements a passive monetary policy that fails to modulate cryptocurrency demand shocks. Welfare impairment arises because PoW compensates those updating the blockchain through seigniorage while facilitating free-entry among them. This paper theoretically formalizes the aforementioned points and also examines an alternative blockchain protocol that induces low volatility and enhanced welfare. The alternative protocol generates low volatility via an active monetary policy that modulates cryptocurrency demand shocks and facilitates welfare gains by supporting cryptocurrency prices with blockchain updating expenses.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122182212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Blockchain-Based Financial Services and Virtual Currencies: United States","authors":"Larry A. DiMatteo, J. Jiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3656577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3656577","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we analyze how the United States responds to blockchain technology, especially in blockchain-based financial services and virtual currencies. At the federal level, four different agencies have produced at least four different classifications of digital assorts—commodity, security, currency, and property. At the state level, only a handful of laws have been enacted, and numerous bills have been proposed. In addition, several court decisions have addressed the status of blockchain technology and smart contracts. Congress has provided some broad recommendations relating to blockchain and its applications. Overall, blockchain is seen as an exciting new technology, but virtual currencies have drawn skeptics worried about their speculative nature, volatility, and potential for consumer abuse.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117149564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intermediation Variety","authors":"J. Donaldson, Giorgia Piacentino, A. Thakor","doi":"10.3386/w25946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w25946","url":null,"abstract":"We explain the emergence of a variety of intermediaries in a model based only on differences in their funding costs. Banks have a low cost of capital due to, say, safety nets or money-like liabilities. We show, however, that this can be a disadvantage, because it exacerbates soft-budget-constraint problems, making it costly to finance innovative projects. Non-banks emerge to finance them. Their high cost of capital is an advantage, because it works as a commitment device to withhold capital, solving soft-budget-constraint problems. Still, non-banks never take over the entire market, but coexist with banks in equilibrium.<br><br>Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at <a href=\"http://www.nber.org/papers/w25946\" TARGET=\"_blank\">www.nber.org</a>.<br>","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128657422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Geographic Diversification and Systemic Risk","authors":"Yongqiang Chu, Saiying Deng, Cong Xia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3400414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3400414","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Exploiting staggered interstate banking deregulation as exogenous shocks to bank geographic expansion, we examine the causal effect of geographic diversification on systemic risk. Using the gravity-deregulation approach, we find that bank geographic diversification leads to higher systemic risk measured by the change in conditional value at risk ($Delta$CoVaR) and financial integration (Logistic($R^{2}))$. Furthermore, we document that geographic diversification affects systemic risk via its impact on asset similarity. The impact of geographic diversification on systemic risk is stronger in BHCs located in states comoving less with the U.S. aggregate economy.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1202 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125603789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inside Money, Business Cycle, and Bank Capital Requirements","authors":"Jaevin Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3387079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3387079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A search theoretical model is constructed to study bank capital requirements in a perspective of inside money. In the model bank liabilities, backed by bank assets, are useful for exchange, while bank capital is not. When the supply of bank liabilities is not sufficiently large for the trading demand, banks do not issue bank capital in competitive equilibrium. This equilibrium allocation can be sub-optimal when the bank assets are exposed to the aggregate risk. Specifically, a pecuniary externality is generated because banks do not internalize the impact of issuing inside money on the asset prices in general equilibrium. Imposing a capital requirement can improve welfare by raising the prices of bank assets in both states.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"244 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116159955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Repo Specialness in the Transmission of Quantitative Easing","authors":"H. Roh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3387085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3387085","url":null,"abstract":"I show that the repo specialness of sovereign bonds can magnify the transmission of central bank quantitative easing into the real economy. Investors who cannot take advantage of the repo specialness of government bonds substitute for government bonds with riskier assets, such as corporate bonds. The extra demand from this portfolio substitution lowers corporate financing costs. I quantify the magnitude of this repo specialness channel for quantitative easing (QE) transmission in the context of the Public Sector Purchase Program of the Eurosystem.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132471564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Estimating the Demand for Settlement Balances in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System: How Much is Too Much?","authors":"Nellie Zhang","doi":"10.1111/caje.12380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12380","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies a static model of an interest rate corridor to the Canadian data, and estimates the aggregate demand for central-bank settlement balances in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). The empirical specification controls for various calendar effects that have been shown to cause fluctuations in LVTS payment flows. The analysis takes into account the downward divergence of the overnight interest rate from the target rate, which has been persistent since 2005. The results suggest that a target of $3 billion for LVTS settlement balances does not seem excessive during the time period when Canadian monetary policy was operating at the effective lower bound (ELB). Specifically, the model projects that, if the consistent downward divergence of overnight interest rate is taken into account, then on average $2.405 billion of LVTS settlement balances would probably have been sufficient to achieve the goal of keeping the overnight interest rate at or very close to the lower bound of the corridor. However, by targeting a slightly higher level, the Bank of Canada could be 95% certain that the overnight interest rate would on average not exceed its policy rate at the lower bound of the corridor. In addition, the estimation shows that the point elasticity of overnight interest rate is around 0.17 when the daily level of settlement balances is targeted at $3 billion under the ELB framework.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"317 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122735615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Money as a Medium of Exchange in Near-Cashless Credit Economies","authors":"R. Lagos, Shengxing Zhang","doi":"10.3386/W25803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25803","url":null,"abstract":"We study the transmission of monetary policy in credit economies where money serves as a medium of exchange. We find that—in contrast to current conventional wisdom in policy-oriented research in monetary economics—the role of money in transactions can be a powerful conduit to asset prices and ultimately, aggregate consumption, investment, output, and welfare. Theoretically, we show that the cashless limit of the monetary equilibrium (as the cash-and-credit economy converges to a pure-credit economy) need not correspond to the equilibrium of the nonmonetary pure-credit economy. Quantitatively, we find that the magnitudes of the responses of prices and allocations to monetary policy in the monetary economy are sizeable—even in the cashless limit. Hence, as tools to assess the effects of monetary policy, monetary models without money are generically poor approximations—even to idealized highly developed credit economies that are able to accommodate a large volume of transactions with arbitrarily small aggregate real money balances.","PeriodicalId":299344,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Monetary Economics: Financial System & Institutions (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122645488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}