中介不同

J. Donaldson, Giorgia Piacentino, A. Thakor
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引用次数: 16

摘要

我们在一个模型中解释了各种中介机构的出现,该模型仅基于其融资成本的差异。银行的资金成本较低,这要归功于安全网或类似货币的负债。然而,我们表明,这可能是一个缺点,因为它加剧了软预算约束问题,使创新项目的融资成本高昂。非银行机构开始为它们提供融资。它们的高资本成本是一个优势,因为它可以作为一种承诺手段来扣留资本,解决软预算约束问题。不过,非银行机构永远不会接管整个市场,而是与银行在均衡状态下共存。国家经济研究局工作论文系列的机构订阅者和发展中国家的居民可以在www.nber.org免费下载本文。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Intermediation Variety
We explain the emergence of a variety of intermediaries in a model based only on differences in their funding costs. Banks have a low cost of capital due to, say, safety nets or money-like liabilities. We show, however, that this can be a disadvantage, because it exacerbates soft-budget-constraint problems, making it costly to finance innovative projects. Non-banks emerge to finance them. Their high cost of capital is an advantage, because it works as a commitment device to withhold capital, solving soft-budget-constraint problems. Still, non-banks never take over the entire market, but coexist with banks in equilibrium.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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