发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Hume Studies最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
"Distinction of Reason" is an Incomplete Symbol “理性的区分”是一个不完整的象征
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0008
J. Cleve
{"title":"\"Distinction of Reason\" is an Incomplete Symbol","authors":"J. Cleve","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In Treatise 1.1.7, Hume poses the problem of how to understand the \"distinction of reason\" that figures in the philosophies of the medievals, Descartes, and the Port Royalists. The problem in a nutshell is that a distinction of reason is supposed to be a distinction in thought between things that are inseparable in reality; yet according to Hume's own principles, whatever things are distinct are separable in thought and therefore also in reality. It follows that things inseparable in reality should be neither distinguishable in thought nor distinct, period, so a distinction of reason ought on Hume's principles to be impossible. Yet Hume goes on to try to make room for it, to the consternation of many commentators. I argue that he can indeed make room for it; the key is to recognize that 'distinction of reason' is an incomplete symbol.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42214770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber by Abraham Anderson (review) 亚伯拉罕·安德森《康德、休谟与教条主义睡眠的中断》(书评)
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0012
Robert Gressis
{"title":"Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber by Abraham Anderson (review)","authors":"Robert Gressis","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41543362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume's Use of "Moral Distinctions" in Treatise 3.1.1 休谟在3.1.1论中对“道德区分”的运用
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0010
Dejan Šimković
{"title":"Hume's Use of \"Moral Distinctions\" in Treatise 3.1.1","authors":"Dejan Šimković","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:There is widespread scholarly disagreement concerning Hume's use and understanding of the term \"moral distinctions.\" While commentators offer a range of interpretations of this term, there has been little attempt to understand the diverse range of meanings attributed to it, or to adjudicate between them. The present paper attempts to contribute to the understanding of Hume's position on the nature and origin of moral distinctions by filling this lacuna. I argue that Hume uses \"moral distinctions\" in two senses. First, in the context of his refutation of the moral rationalist position on moral distinctions, Hume uses \"moral distinctions\" to refer to the demonstrable, eternal, and necessary relations that obtain between, and apparently exist separately from, moral qualities. And second, in the context of his account of the role that sentiment plays in moral perception, Hume uses \"moral distinctions\" to refer to the differences that we uniformly experience when evaluating an object, between qualities that are both distinctively moral and the strict opposites of one another. For example, the difference between moral good and evil, or the distinction between particular virtues and vices, such as the difference between justice and injustice, or between gratitude and ingratitude, and the like. Hume explains the uniformity in the way we experience and talk about moral distinctions, by locating their origin in the same sentiment or impression that, in his understanding, explains how we perceive and, consequently, have ideas of moral qualities themselves. This enables Hume not just to replace the rationalist's moral epistemology, but also to reject Hobbesian skepticism about \"the reality of moral distinctions\" (EPM 1.2; SBN 169–70), despite arguing that \"moral distinctions\" does not represent anything external to the mind.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48338716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume's Pivotal Argument, and His Supposed Obligation of Reason 休谟的核心论点及其假定的理性义务
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0009
P. Millican
{"title":"Hume's Pivotal Argument, and His Supposed Obligation of Reason","authors":"P. Millican","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Treatise 1.4.1 argues that whenever we assess our probability of error, \"we are oblig'd by our reason\" to consider also the probability of error in that assessment, leading to a fatal regress which—but for irresistible nature—would extinguish all belief. The argument plays a huge role in the Treatise, and has recently attracted many defenders, rejecting the previously standard objection that iterated reflection need not imply reduction of probability. This paper, however, presses a more fundamental objection—that there is no obligation of reason to iterate in the first place—something obscured by the failure of previous analyses to focus on specific examples. Unlike the Treatise, Hume's Enquiry of 1748 is richly illustrated with examples, making it likely that he himself would have encountered these problems. And there are traces in the Enquiry of a fundamental change of view, corroborating the significance of this argument for his philosophical development.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47488042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naturalness and Artificiality in Humean Virtue Theory 休谟德性理论中的自然性与人为性
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0011
Emily M. Kelahan
{"title":"Naturalness and Artificiality in Humean Virtue Theory","authors":"Emily M. Kelahan","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this paper I explore a parallel between Hume's virtue ethics and his virtue epistemology. Hume makes a categorical distinction between natural and artificial moral traits. Though it is less conspicuous, I argue that he draws a similar distinction between natural and artificial intellectual traits. In both the moral and the intellectual case, I argue that artificial traits are vulnerable to vice in a way that natural traits are not. Examination of this parallel opens the possibility of understanding Hume as a comprehensive virtue theorist while also raising questions about the distinction between moral and intellectual virtue in Hume's philosophy.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42846999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Hume’s Last Book Review? A New Attribution 休谟最后的书评?新的归因
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-06-09 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0002
Mark G. Spencer
{"title":"Hume’s Last Book Review? A New Attribution","authors":"Mark G. Spencer","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This essay argues for a new Hume attribution. It does so by pursuing an endnote—related to the Rev. Thomas Percy’s The Regulations and Establishment of the Household of Henry Algernon Percy, the Fifth Earl of Northumberland—that Hume added to the 1773 edition of his History of England. Establishing the contexts of Hume’s elaborate endnote—including his later revisions to it and his correspondence with Percy, Adam Smith, William Strahan, and others—leads us to an anonymous book review of Percy’s volume, published in Gilbert Stuart’s Edinburgh Magazine and Review. If the argument presented here is right, that review is Hume’s. Appearing in January 1774, it is also the last known book review that Hume published.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/hms.2018.0002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43755046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the Treatise and Enquiry 休谟的附录问题与《论著与探究》中的联想联系
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-06-09 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0001
Daniel R. Siakel
{"title":"Hume’s Appendix Problem and Associative Connections in the Treatise and Enquiry","authors":"Daniel R. Siakel","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Given the difficulty of characterizing the quandary introduced in Hume’s Appendix to the Treatise, coupled with the alleged “underdetermination” of the text, it is striking how few commentators have considered whether Hume addresses and/or redresses the problem after 1740—in the first Enquiry, for example. This is not only unfortunate, but ironic; for, in the Appendix, Hume mentions that more mature reasonings may reconcile whatever contradiction(s) he has in mind. I argue that Hume’s 1746 letter to Lord Kames foreshadows a subtle, but significant, shift in Hume’s reasonings regarding the relevance of “real connexions”; that the Enquiry of 1748 provides evidence for this shift; and that this shift obviates Hume’s second thoughts by reconciling the contradiction that he had in mind. In short, Hume’s letter to Kames and Enquiry supply the retrodictive keys to a systematically satisfactory account.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/hms.2018.0001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43885290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Hume’s Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation by David Landy (review) 《休谟的人性科学：科学实在论、理性与实证阐释》大卫·兰迪（综述）
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-06-09 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0004
Emily M. Kelahan
{"title":"Hume’s Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation by David Landy (review)","authors":"Emily M. Kelahan","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/hms.2018.0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46059088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Two Forms of Doxastic Normativity in Hume’s Treatise 休谟《人性论》中荒诞规范的两种形式
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-06-09 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0000
Sam Zahn
{"title":"The Two Forms of Doxastic Normativity in Hume’s Treatise","authors":"Sam Zahn","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Recent commentators have contended that Hume’s skeptical arguments in the Treatise lead him to eschew a traditional epistemic account of justification in favor of a pragmatic account. While this view resolves some textual puzzles, others arise. Instead, Hume should be read as endorsing two completely distinct standards of doxastic normativity: the epistemic and the pragmatic. The epistemic grants beliefs philosophical approval, while the pragmatic circumscribes the domain of investigation to prevent reasoning that leads to extreme skepticism. I argue that the mixed account of justification makes better sense of key passages in the Treatise than either constituent can on its own. One notable virtue of this account is that it explains how Hume can hold that the vulgar can have all things considered warrant.","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/hms.2018.0000","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45618136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume, Passion, and Action by Elizabeth Radcliffe (review) 休谟《激情与行动》伊丽莎白·拉德克利夫著(书评)
4区 哲学
Hume Studies Pub Date : 2021-06-09 DOI: 10.1353/hms.2018.0006
Katharina Paxman
{"title":"Hume, Passion, and Action by Elizabeth Radcliffe (review)","authors":"Katharina Paxman","doi":"10.1353/hms.2018.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/hms.2018.0006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42497208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信