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CEO Education and its Contribution to Capital Structure CEO教育及其对资本结构的贡献
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3583637
Z. Hall
{"title":"CEO Education and its Contribution to Capital Structure","authors":"Z. Hall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3583637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583637","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relationship between individual characteristics of management, specifically the formal education of the CEO, and the CEO’s capital structure choices. It is hypothesized that a formal post-secondary education contributes to a CEO’s choice of debt-to-equity financing. Furthermore, this paper investigates how educational components, those being, level of education, university ranking, and discipline of explain differences in capital structures. It is hypothesized that all the educational characteristics contribute to a CEO’s choice of capital structure. Empirical evidence is however inconsistent with the hypotheses put forward in this paper.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114210632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Express Loans for Small Business: Supplementing the CARES Act 小企业快速贷款:补充关怀法案
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3592945
Thomas Storrs
{"title":"Express Loans for Small Business: Supplementing the CARES Act","authors":"Thomas Storrs","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3592945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3592945","url":null,"abstract":"In this brief, I propose to supplement the CARES Act by enhancing the SBA Express program of the Small Business Administration (SBA). My proposal is inspired by the success of Title I of the Federal Housing Act (FHA) of 1934.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121826330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stock Market Liberalization and Corporate Investment Revisited 股票市场自由化与企业投资再论
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-02-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3505971
Zhisheng Li, Xiaoran Ni, Jiaren Pang
{"title":"Stock Market Liberalization and Corporate Investment Revisited","authors":"Zhisheng Li, Xiaoran Ni, Jiaren Pang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3505971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3505971","url":null,"abstract":"A recent reform in China, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program, made a subset of Chinese stocks investable for foreign investors, thus partially opening China’s stock market. We use this reform to examine the quantity and quality effects of stock market liberalization on corporate investment and address some of the data and methodological concerns raised in previous studies. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that the reform boosts the investment of investable firms relative to non-investable firms. It also makes the investable firms’ investment more responsive to growth opportunities, increases their total factor productivity, and improves their operating performance. Further analysis finds that the reform increases equity issuance, reduces agency costs, and mitigates earnings management, which helps explain its quantity and quality effects on corporate investment.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116615581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure: Where Do We Stand? 资本结构的啄序理论:我们站在哪里?
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-02-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3540610
Murray Z. Frank, V. Goyal, Tao Shen
{"title":"The Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure: Where Do We Stand?","authors":"Murray Z. Frank, V. Goyal, Tao Shen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3540610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540610","url":null,"abstract":"The pecking order theory of corporate capital structure states that firms finance deficits with internal resources when possible. If internal funds are inadequate, firms obtain external debt. External equity is the last resort. Some financing patterns in the data are consistent with pecking order: firms with moderate deficits favor debt issues; firms with very high deficits rely much more on equity than debt. Others are not: many equity issuing firms do not seem to have entirely used up the debt capacity; some firms with a surplus do issue equity. The theory suggests a sharp discontinuity of financing methods between surplus firms and deficit firms and another at the debt capacity. The literature provides little support for the predicted threshold effects.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"118 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120858361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Shareholder Litigation Rights and Capital Structure Decisions 股东诉讼权利与资本结构决策
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-01-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3230102
N. Nguyen, Hieu V. Phan, Eunju Lee
{"title":"Shareholder Litigation Rights and Capital Structure Decisions","authors":"N. Nguyen, Hieu V. Phan, Eunju Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3230102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230102","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit the staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws across U.S. states, which impedes shareholder rights to initiate derivative lawsuits, as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the relation between shareholder litigation rights and firm capital structures. We find that weaker shareholder litigation rights due to the UD laws adoption lead to higher financial leverage, which enhances firm value. Furthermore, the positive relation between the UD laws adoption and financial leverage is more pronounced for firms exposed to higher shareholder litigation risk ex ante or financially constrained firms. Our evidence is consistent with lower shareholder litigation threats motivating firms to increase financial leverage.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127090811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 36
Firm or Bank Weakness? Access to Finance Since the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 公司还是银行疲软?欧洲主权债务危机以来的融资渠道
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3517294
G. Corbisiero, Donata Faccia
{"title":"Firm or Bank Weakness? Access to Finance Since the European Sovereign Debt Crisis","authors":"G. Corbisiero, Donata Faccia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3517294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3517294","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a unique dataset where credit rejections experienced by euro area firms are matched with firm and bank characteristics. This allows us to study simultaneously the role that bank and firm weakness had in the credit reduction observed in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis, and in credit developments characterising the post-crisis recovery. Compared with the existing literature matching borrowers’ and lenders’ characteristics, our dataset provides a better representation of euro area firms of small and medium size. Our findings suggest that, while firm balance sheet factors have been strong determinants of credit rejections, in the crisis period bank weakness made it harder to obtain external finance for firms located in stressed countries of the euro area. JEL Classification: E44, F36, G01, G21","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122954056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Pecking Order Model of Corporate Financing: Review of Literature 企业融资的优先顺序模型:文献综述
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3506239
Zaur Abdullazade
{"title":"Pecking Order Model of Corporate Financing: Review of Literature","authors":"Zaur Abdullazade","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3506239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3506239","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the literature on a firm’s capital structure that is driven by asymmetric information. One of the most popular models of firm’s financing decisions under an asymmetry in the literature is the pecking order theory (POT) of Myers (1984). It is based on the argument that firms have preference ranking over sources of funds for financing based on the corresponding information asymmetry costs (Myers et al. 1984, p.15). In recent studies, many interesting discussions have been generated about the POT. These studies attempt to detect the extent to which the POT describes the financing choices of firms. The results of relevant studies about the POT are presented here, in this literature review.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124730197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Supply Chain Concentration and Cost of Capital 供应链集中度与资金成本
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3532089
James E. Upson, Chao D. Wei
{"title":"Supply Chain Concentration and Cost of Capital","authors":"James E. Upson, Chao D. Wei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3532089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3532089","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of supply chain concentration on firm’s financing costs. We show that purchasing firms engaging in multiple supplier relationships are subject to higher firm risk and cost of equity. This effect is more pronounced when the supplier’s financial performance deteriorates or when the purchasing firm’s purchase demand is large. We also provide evidence that lower supply chain concentration increases firm’s cost of debt. Lenders charge higher interest rate on the bank loans to compensate for additional risk implied from managing multiple supplier relationships, in particular when the loan is unsecured. Finally, our results are robust to combining the suppliers producing similar output and endogeneity issues.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"378 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115998679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Real Effects of Checks and Balances: Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment 权力制衡的实际影响:政策不确定性与企业投资
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3477792
Anne Duquerroy
{"title":"The Real Effects of Checks and Balances: Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment","authors":"Anne Duquerroy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3477792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477792","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the economic effects of checks and balances on corporate investment and employment. I use U.S. gubernatorial election results from 1978 to 2010 as a source of exogenous variation in whether the party controls both the executive and the legislative branch (unified government) or not (divided government), which determines its ability to implement its political agenda. I find that both public and private firms respond to the political cycle by reducing investment and hiring when government becomes unified. Investment drops by three to five percent in the year following an election resulting in unified government, while stock returns volatility is three percent higher. The findings support the hypothesis that moving from divided to unified government raises policy uncertainty by increasing the probability of future policy changes. Consistent with a real option channel, the effect is stronger for capital intensive firms with lower asset redeployability.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132570526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On Financial Frictions and Firm Market Power 金融摩擦与企业市场势力
ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3434946
M. Casares, J. Galdon-Sanchez, Luca G. Deidda
{"title":"On Financial Frictions and Firm Market Power","authors":"M. Casares, J. Galdon-Sanchez, Luca G. Deidda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3434946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3434946","url":null,"abstract":"We build a static general-equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive firms that borrow funds from competitive banks in an economy subject to financial frictions. These frictions are due to non verifiability of both ex post firm returns and managerial effort. Market power has opposing effects. On one side, firms' pricing over marginal cost reduces output compared to perfect competition. On the other, by increasing firms' profitability, market power reduces the impact of financial frictions. The resulting tradeoff is ambiguous. We show that, other things equal, there exists an optimal positive level of market power that maximizes welfare. Such optimal degree of market power increases with moral hazard and decreases with the efficiency of firm liquidation following bankruptcy.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132680904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
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