{"title":"Market Finance as a Spare Tyre? Corporate Investment and Access to Bank Credit in Europe","authors":"M. Andersson, L. Maurin, D. Rusinova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3942253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942253","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate a FAVAR with Bayesian techniques in order to investigate the impact of loan supply conditions on euro area corporate investment and its financing structure. We identify shocks to overall demand and loan supply with sign and impact restrictions. Although tightened financial conditions have adversely impacted corporate investment during and after the sovereign debt crisis, the resulting impediments in loan supply, illustrated by lower loan volumes and higher spreads, have been partly alleviated by strengthened corporate debt issuance. We show that (1) part of the protracted increase in debt to loan ratio since the crisis reflects bottlenecks in the provision of bank credit and (2) the tightened loan supply has been more adverse for small corporations with limited market access. Overall, our analysis of macro-financial developments suggests the need for policy actions to deepen the European corporate debt market and enhance market access for smaller corporates. JEL Classification: E22, E66, G21","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124372870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Andrieu, Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, Raffaele Staglianò
{"title":"Debt Financing and Firm Growth: European Evidence on Startups","authors":"G. Andrieu, Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, Raffaele Staglianò","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3919521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3919521","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the bank financing policy of new small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), its evolution and its relevance during early growth stages over their first 10 years. We use a large European panel dataset on early-stage SMEs founded in 2007–2015. The study provides useful advice for practitioners and managers regarding the controversial relationship between debt financing and the life cycle. First, our results reveal the dynamics of firms’ financial behavior relative to age. The relation between debt financing and entrepreneurial firms’ growth is remarkably unstable over time. Debt is positively related to firm startup stage growth and decreases over time. Second, debt financing is significantly related to firm productivity over time and the probability of bankruptcy. We perform additional analyses to expand our baseline results and suggest future research directions.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128697041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financing Discretionary Payout via Debt or Equity – Evidence From India","authors":"Hardeep Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3882262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3882262","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the paper is to examine financing payout behavior of Indian firms. Specifically, the reliance of Indian firms on capital markets to finance their discretionary payouts (DCP) is explored using data of S&P BSE 500 firms for the sample period from 2010 to 2020. This study reports several new findings for the payout policies followed by Indian firms. First, dividend payouts are not disappearing in India because dividend payout ratio and share repurchase ratio for Indian firms are found to increase during the sample period. Second, rupee magnitude of dividend payments and percentage of firms paying dividends are also increasing. Third, the financing of DCP shows that firms finance DCP mostly with debt and occasionally with equity. Fourth, firm characteristics namely size, excess leverage, excess cash, market-to-book ratio, R&D (only for debt financing), managerial ownership, cash flows, and credit rating influence financing of DCP with debt and equity issuance. Lastly, business cycle conditions are shown to influence debt financed DCP. Overall, the findings run counter to existing studies which state that dividends are disappearing because this study finds evidence of increasing dividends among Indian firms and provides insights to practitioners and academicians on the financing of payout policy in India.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115551316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Pitfalls of Pledgeable Cash Flows: Soft Budget Constraints, Zombie Lending and Under-Investment","authors":"D. Bernhardt, Kostas Koufopoulos, G. Trigilia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3759075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759075","url":null,"abstract":"We show that when borrowers are privately informed about their creditworthiness and lenders have a soft budget constraint, efficient investment requires a limit on the fraction of a firm’s cash flows that can be pledged to outsiders. That is, pledgeability should neither be too low nor too high. An increase in pledgeability, or, more broadly, creditor rights, can either promote re-investment in zombie firms, which increases other firms’ cost of capital, or it can lead to inefficient under- investment, depending on the composition of equilibrium credit demand. Thus, greater pledgeability can reduce net social surplus, and even trigger a Pareto loss.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128743697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debt Financing of Small OTC Firms Reporting to the SEC","authors":"Rebel A. Cole, Claire Y. C. Liang, R. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3679594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679594","url":null,"abstract":"Although the concept of financial growth cycle proposed by Berger and Udell (1998) is intuitively appealing, empirical evidence has been scarce due to data limitations. In this study, we use a novel data set, small emerging firms trading on the OTC market and filing annual reports with the SEC, to provide empirical support for the financial growth-cycle paradigm. We find that as firms develop and gain track records, their debt usage increases and debt specialization decreases, suggesting a gradual easing of supply-side constraints. Further, positive sales and positive cash flows mark two milestones in debt financing: Positive sales broaden the firms’ access to various segments of the debt market, and positive cash flows deepen their relationships with banks. We also examine binary features of debt in our sample and find that convertible debt peaks when firms start generating sales, and firms increasingly rely on secured debt as they grow.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128372216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jumpei Hamamura, Kento Inoue, T. Yoshikawa, K. Arai
{"title":"Over-Investment and Product Market Competition","authors":"Jumpei Hamamura, Kento Inoue, T. Yoshikawa, K. Arai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3738899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3738899","url":null,"abstract":"This study uses both theory and empirical evidence to examine over-investment by managers. Based on analytical research, we find that complementary goods are an essential factor contributing to decisions regarding over-investment. Due to the complementarity of goods, an increase in the demand for efficient firms’ products increases the demand for inefficient firms. Efficient firms are then likely to resort to aggressive investments to gain a competitive advantage and improve demand. In addition, we present an empirical case for over-investment by testing the relationship between current year investments and future performance. We introduce a new variable using an analytical model and demonstrate that it impacts managerial investment decision-making. While previous economic theory-based studies frequently applied contract theory to consider managers’ behavior, this study contributes to the literature by indicating that it is also essential to use the industrial organization model. Our study makes the following unique contribution. It proposes a new variable that affects over-investment using the analytical model and demonstrates that it has a significant impact on managers’ decision-making. This finding has an essential contribution to the over-investment literature.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129516037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asset Growth Effect and Q Theory of Investment","authors":"L. Kogan, Jun Li, Xiao Qiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3734333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3734333","url":null,"abstract":"We extend the standard q theory of investment into a two-capital setup in which firms use both physical capital (long-term asset) and short-term capital (current asset) as production inputs. We find this simple extension is capable of explaining the stronger return predictive power of total asset growth than current and long-term asset growths. A novel asset imbalance channel creates negatively correlated comovement between current and long-term asset growths that are unrelated to the discount rate effect. Part of this comovement is cancelled out in the total asset growth, giving rise to its stronger return predictive power. Empirically, once controlling for this comovement, the return predictive power of current and long-term asset growths substantially improves. Furthermore, we document compelling evidences for the model's prediction that the asset growth effects are more prominent among firms with low asset imbalance. Our results support the q-theory based explanation for the asset growth effect.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131481432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financing Corporate Growth","authors":"Murray Z. Frank, A. Sanati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3377665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3377665","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Considerable research tackles the aggregate impact of debt financing. We show that equity is more important for firm growth than generally understood. A dollar of equity issuance is associated with an extra $$0.93$ of real assets, whereas a dollar of debt issuance is associated with an extra $$0.14$. Firms issue equity first, then increase real assets, and, finally, issue debt while repurchasing equity. We explain this sequence using a model in which debt is tax preferred relative to equity but is subject to limited commitment. We use the estimated model to evaluate how several government policies affect corporate growth.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132945566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anticorruption, Political Connections, and Corporate Cash Policy: Evidence from Politician Downfalls in China","authors":"Haohan Ren, Xiaofeng Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2725075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2725075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We examine how firms change their cash policies in response to the downfall of corrupt politicians in China. We find that firms connected to their local government increase cash holdings when high-profile politician downfalls occur in the government. Consistent with the precautionary saving argument, the effect is stronger for firms that have greater investment opportunities or face greater financial constraints. Compared to unaffected firms, affected firms save more cash out of cash flows and have a higher marginal value of cash holdings. Overall, we show that the collapse of firms' political connections has significant impacts on those firms' financial policies.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"303 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128626119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Task Allocation and On-the-job Training","authors":"Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, Leeat Yariv","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3708552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708552","url":null,"abstract":"We study dynamic task allocation when service providers' expertise evolves. Clients arrive sequentially seeking service. Seniors provide superior service but entail waiting in a queue, which progresses at a speed dependent on their volume. Juniors offer service without wait and become seniors with experience. We show that clients choose senior service too frequently, generating longer waits and little training relative to the social optimum. Welfare gains from centralization are greater for larger institutions, better training technologies, and lower waiting costs. Finally, monitoring the seniors' queue increases welfare but may decrease training. Methodologically, we explore a matching setting in which agents' types are endogenous, and illustrate the usefulness of queueing theory techniques.","PeriodicalId":289993,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firms Temporal Investment & Financing Behavior (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132697265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}