Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal最新文献

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The Digital Markets Act and Private Enforcement: Proposals for an Optimal System of Enforcement 数字市场法案与私人执法:最佳执法系统的建议
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3914932
A. Komninos
{"title":"The Digital Markets Act and Private Enforcement: Proposals for an Optimal System of Enforcement","authors":"A. Komninos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3914932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914932","url":null,"abstract":"The DMA Proposal is silent about private enforcement, although the general view takes this as granted. Indeed, as the Commission’s Proposal currently stands, national courts would apply Articles 5 and 6 and enforce the related obligations in civil litigation. However, the prospect of unlimited private enforcement raises concerns about fragmentation, especially in view of the novel nature of the DMA rules. For this reason, the EU legislator would be well-advised to introduce certain limitations on private enforcement and provide for a rule of precedence for public enforcement. Private enforcement should be allowed in its follow-on but not in its stand-alone form. This limitation could be revisited after a number of years and once a body of precedent on the DMA has been built. The DMA should also include concrete mechanisms of co-ordination and co-operation with the European Commission, with a view to safeguarding the consistent application of its rules in the Union.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124877206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Enforcement Functions of Indian Regulatory Bodies: Legislative Mapping of Key Regulators 印度监管机构的执法职能:主要监管机构的立法映射
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3911739
Rishika Rangarajan
{"title":"Enforcement Functions of Indian Regulatory Bodies: Legislative Mapping of Key Regulators","authors":"Rishika Rangarajan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3911739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3911739","url":null,"abstract":"Independent regulatory bodies continue to play a key role in the governance of the sector in India. Across several sectors, regulators are tasked with the responsibility of drafting regulations, enabling compliance, adjudicating disputes amongst other functions. With the mandate of regulators increasing, there is an increasing need to develop a framework to assist regulators in delivering these mandates. In that context, this paper focuses on the enforcement function of regulators and maps the enforcement powers of four key regulators in India.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"3 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114132803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Measuring and Stress-Testing Market-Implied Bank Capital 衡量和压力测试市场隐含的银行资本
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3911865
M. Indergand, E. Jondeau, A. Fuster
{"title":"Measuring and Stress-Testing Market-Implied Bank Capital","authors":"M. Indergand, E. Jondeau, A. Fuster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3911865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3911865","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a methodology for measuring the market-implied capital of banks by subtracting from the market value of equity (market capitalization) a credit-spread-based correction for the value of shareholders' default option. We show that without such a correction, the estimated impact of a severe market downturn is systematically distorted, underestimating the risk of banks with a low market capitalization. We argue that this adjusted measure of capital is the relevant market-implied capital measure for policy makers. We propose an econometric model for the combined simulation of equity and CDS prices, which allows us to introduce this correction in the SRISK framework for measuring systemic risk.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132183420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The GameStop Short Squeeze: Put-Call Parity and the Effect of Frictions Before, During and After the Squeeze GameStop短期挤压:买卖平价以及挤压之前、期间和之后摩擦的影响
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3911491
Jimmy E. Hilliard, Jitka Hilliard
{"title":"The GameStop Short Squeeze: Put-Call Parity and the Effect of Frictions Before, During and After the Squeeze","authors":"Jimmy E. Hilliard, Jitka Hilliard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3911491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3911491","url":null,"abstract":"The short squeeze in GameStop attracted worldwide attention and resulted in congressional hearings. The increase in price from $21 to $483 over a short period of time was not the result of obvious fundamental earnings prospects. Excess demand by investors on a social media site accompanied by the short-covering resulted in the stratospheric ascent of stock price. We use put-call parity to investigate the related issue of the no-arbitrage violations before, during, and after the squeeze. We do not find evidence of abundant free money after accounting for short-selling frictions.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129887397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Required Capital for Long-run Risks 长期风险所需资金
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3907847
C. Gouriéroux, A. Monfort, Jean-Paul Renne
{"title":"Required Capital for Long-run Risks","authors":"C. Gouriéroux, A. Monfort, Jean-Paul Renne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3907847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907847","url":null,"abstract":"One of the objectives of the recent prudential regulation is to separate the computation of required capital for short- and long-run risks. This paper provides a coherent framework to define, compute, and update these components. We provide different examples, among which is the transition to low carbon economies.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116224753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Platform Competition with Free Entry of Sellers 卖家免费进入的平台竞争
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3901080
Federico Etro
{"title":"Platform Competition with Free Entry of Sellers","authors":"Federico Etro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3901080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901080","url":null,"abstract":"We study platforms competing in commissions on revenues of sellers engaged in monopolistic competition, as the app providers on the app stores of iPhones and Android devices. Free entry of sellers on each platform generates multihoming superstars and a long tail of singlehoming sellers. Competition to attract buyers and sellers induces the platforms to set the commission rates at the optimal level for consumers and redistribute all the revenues through lower access prices or higher quality of the platforms. The commissions are lower when the pass-through on prices is higher, sellers's demand (surplus) is more (less) elastic to prices, and when sellers's entry is more reactive to profitability. We discuss the role of heterogeneous sellers, substitutability between sellers's products, direct channels for sellers and consumer myopia. We also unveil a channel through which hybrid platforms can benefit consumers by introducing own products and reducing commissions to attract new sellers and customers. The results are in contrast with the idea that device-funded platforms would harm consumers in the long run through excessive commissions or self-preferencing aimed at foreclosure.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122985632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
What Can We Learn from Idiosyncratic Wage Changes? 我们能从特殊的工资变化中学到什么?
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3900750
Cynthia L. Doniger
{"title":"What Can We Learn from Idiosyncratic Wage Changes?","authors":"Cynthia L. Doniger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3900750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3900750","url":null,"abstract":"I document six facts about wage changes. First, most pay revisions occur at yearly frequency, but a small proportion occur at idiosyncratic times. Second, idiosyncratic pay changes are larger and more dispersed than year-end pay changes and resemble more pay changes occurring at job-to-job transitions. Third, idiosyncratic pay changes are more common for workers with less experience and, fourth, in firms higher on the job-ladder. Fifth, industries in which the incidence of idiosyncratic raises have risen have experienced greater declines in labor share. Sixth, industries in which more firms report willingness to negotiate wages have greater concentrations of idiosyncratic revisions. An on-the-job search model with heterogeneous wage contracts can rationalize these facts.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122615193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hysteresis Thesis: An Empirical Study of Copyright Injunctions After eBay 迟滞理论:eBay事件后版权禁令的实证研究
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3898460
Matthew J. Sag, Pamela Samuelson
{"title":"The Hysteresis Thesis: An Empirical Study of Copyright Injunctions After eBay","authors":"Matthew J. Sag, Pamela Samuelson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3898460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3898460","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange seemingly heralded a major change in not only patent law but also copyright law. The Court ruled that injunctions for patent infringement should no longer be granted automatically; instead, plaintiffs must establish the need for injunctive relief in particular and that such relief would be in the public interest. Although eBay concerned a patent claim, its reasoning relied on three copyright decisions, making its application to copyright cases compelling. Nevertheless, lower courts in some early post-eBay copyright cases rebuffed arguments that the Court’s ruling affected grants of injunctive relief. A 2012 empirical study of the first four years of post-eBay copyright cases seemed to show that those early cases were not aberrations, reporting that courts rarely cited eBay and continued to grant injunctions in a high percentage of copyright cases. Those conclusions were broadly accepted by the field. This Article tests these claims and finds statistically significant differences in the grant rate for both preliminary and permanent injunctions in copyright cases after the eBay decision. The impression of eBay lacking effect appears to be a product of hysteresis—a time lag between cause and effect, as lower courts initially delayed but eventually embraced eBay. This study reveals, moreover, that the earlier empirical study was flawed by biased sampling, most notably by including a large number of unreported cases and default judgments. This Article offers a corrective analysis and provides a more accurate understanding of the copyright injunction landscape, both pre- and post-eBay. It shows that eBay was in fact a landmark case for copyright law, both in terms of jurisprudence—it is highly cited—and real-world effect— it has a dramatic impact on case outcomes.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133059336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Coming Causation Revolution in Employment Discrimination Litigation 就业歧视诉讼中即将到来的因果革命
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3915252
D'Andra Millsap Shu
{"title":"The Coming Causation Revolution in Employment Discrimination Litigation","authors":"D'Andra Millsap Shu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3915252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915252","url":null,"abstract":"For more than a decade, employment discrimination causation law has been a confusing, often overly restrictive quagmire that has contributed substantially to the paltry success rate of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Most of these cases are dismissed pre-trial, all too often based on a failure of causation. A key reason traces back to loose and misleading language — centered on a single word — in a 2009 Supreme Court opinion involving the but-for causation standard that applies in most discrimination cases. The Court said that the discriminatory motive must be “the” but-for cause of the employer’s action when it should have said “a” but-for cause. This language incorrectly implies that the discriminatory motive must be the sole cause — “the” cause — of the employer’s action, and though that standard is demonstrably wrong, many courts nevertheless have required a sole-cause showing. In 2020, the Supreme Court held in Bostock that gay and transgender workers are protected from employment discrimination. But it did more than that. The Court discussed but-for causation in broad terms, making it clear that but-for cause does not require proof of sole causation. That discussion will likely change how causation impacts not only gay and transgender workers but in employment discrimination litigation generally. This article explains why. It studies the root of the causation problem and shows its real-world consequences with extensive case law analysis. Then, it analyzes how Bostock’s broad causation language, properly interpreted, should apply to most employment discrimination claims and details why Bostock should remedy each of the identified causation issues. Based on its study of the post-Bostock litigation outcomes and the promise of Bostock’s broad application, the article predicts a revolution in employment discrimination litigation.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127015039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
COVID-19 Lockdowns under Imperfect Redistribution: Stylized Facts and Theory 再分配不完善下的COVID-19封锁:程式化的事实和理论
Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3892886
J. Rothert, Joshua Lawrence
{"title":"COVID-19 Lockdowns under Imperfect Redistribution: Stylized Facts and Theory","authors":"J. Rothert, Joshua Lawrence","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3892886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3892886","url":null,"abstract":"The elasticity of economic restrictions with respect to the virus's reproduction rate is higher in countries that had lower pre-pandemic levels of disposable income inequality. A stylized, heterogenous agents model with costly redistribution can account for that pattern. Our results suggest that, via its impact on policymakers' incentives to impose less stringent lockdowns, GINI could have made the pandemic worse.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"526 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125734148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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