{"title":"Reevaluating the productivity effects of the environmental regulation through the lens of firm dynamics: the case of China's eleventh Five-Year Plan","authors":"Xiangyu Shi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3943772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3943772","url":null,"abstract":"I study how environmental regulation, or the COD reduction mandates during Chinese eleventh five-year plan (2006-2010), affects firm dynamics: entry, exit, and (aggregate) productivity. While most existing literature on environmental regulation focuses on the effects on incumbent firms (intensive margin), I examine the effects on entry and exit, and how they contribute to aggregate productivity (extensive margin). Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy, I find that during the period of environmental regulation, in polluting sectors, and in more tightly regulated cities, firm entry and exit both significantly drop. Such decrease in market turnover leads to less competition and worsened incumbent performance, which corresponds to the decompetition effect of the regulation. Moreover, the regulation leaves firms with higher productivity entering and staying in the market, which corresponds to the selection effect. These two effects on aggregate productivity are opposite and thus the combined effect (plus the decrease in productivity due to compliance of regulation, or compliance effect) is muted, implying that the negative effects of environmental regulation on productivity might be overestimated if we only consider the intensive margin. I build and estimate a quantitative firm dynamics model to rationalize such facts and quantify the importance of these two effects. The implications for optimal regulation design are discussed.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"137 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116050812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monopolistic Competition and Mathematical Model of MMT with Profit Return","authors":"Yasuhito Tanaka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3939970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3939970","url":null,"abstract":"Even under constant returns to scale technology there is a positive profit return if the goods are produced in monopolistic competition. By a two-periods overlapping generations (OLG) model with production in monopolistic competition under constant returns to scale in which the economy grows by technological progress and the older generation consumers receive the profits, we consider the problem of budget deficit. The following results will be proved. 1) A budget deficit is necessary to realize full employment with constant price when the economy grows. 2) If the budget deficit exceeds the level necessary and sufficient to maintain full employment in a growing economy with constant price, inflation will occur. A stable budget deficit is necessary to prevent further inflation. 3) If the budget deficit is insufficient to maintain full employment, a recession with involuntary unemployment occurs. We can overcome a recession and restore full employment making a budget deficit larger than the one necessary and sufficient to maintain full employment without a recession. Since we can maintain full employment by constant budget deficits, we should not offset the deficit created for overcoming the recession by budget surpluses. Also, we show that the budget deficit equals the difference between the net savings of the younger generation consumers and that of the older generation consumers in each case.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121223553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Capital Regulation and the Sovereign-Bank Nexus: Evidence from European Banks","authors":"Rainer Baule, Oliver Beckmann, Christian Tallau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3939044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3939044","url":null,"abstract":"European sovereign debt benefits from privileges in banking regulation throughout all risk categories. In contrast to the risk-based approach applied to other asset classes, it does not have to be backed by equity, can be fully financed by short-term, unstable funding sources, is treated as liquid as cash and is not subject to exposure limits, regardless of its actual riskiness. We explore the effects of these regulatory privileges on the co-variation between sovereign and bank sector credit risks–the so-called sovereign-bank nexus. Examining sovereign bond portfolios of large European banks between 2010 and 2020, we show that additional capital buffers stemming from non-zero sovereign risk weights would indeed weaken the sovereign-bank nexus and thus serve as a reasonable starting point for the future regulatory treatment of sovereign debt. However, the impact of banks' domestic sovereign exposures is state-dependent and the sovereign-bank nexus is not strongest for banks with the highest risk-weighted sovereign exposures. As a result, the impact of capital requirements based on traditional risk-weighting schemes would be limited.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134432391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The proposal for an EU Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market: how will it impact corporate mergers and acquisitions?","authors":"J. Blockx","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3936624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3936624","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission’s proposal for an EU Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market was provoked by the failure to reach international agreement on the regulation of foreign subsidies and the increased amount of Chinese investment in the EU. The proposal allows the Commission to review foreign subsidies and requires notification of such subsidies in the context of concentrations and public procurement procedures. While explicitly aimed at levelling the playing field, the notification regime for concentrations may disadvantage investors which received foreign subsidies compared to those which benefited from State aid from EU Member States. By taking into account “financial contributions” from third countries rather than foreign subsidies, the second notification threshold may cast its net wider than required. Several open questions remain on the application of the Proposed Regulation, if adopted: in terms of its interaction with the EU merger control regime, the ability of the Commission to enforce it, the meaning of several terms, and the procedures for the review.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132339166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"100 Years of Rising Corporate Concentration","authors":"S. Kwon, Yueran Ma, Kaspar Zimmermann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3936799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3936799","url":null,"abstract":"We collect data on the size distribution of U.S. corporate businesses for nearly 100 years. We document that corporate concentration (e.g., asset share or sales share of the top 1%) in the U.S. economy has been increasing persistently over the past century. Across different industries, rising concentration was more pronounced in manufacturing, mining, and utilities before 1970s, and more pronounced in services, retail, and wholesale after 1970s. We find that the timing and the degree of rising concentration in an industry align closely with the investment intensity in research and development and information technology. In addition, industries with higher increases in concentration also exhibit higher output growth. The evidence suggests that the long-run trends of rising corporate concentration reflect increasingly stronger economies of scale.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128576452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risk-Based Capital and Leverage Ratios Adjustments by Banks: Experience from Canada and the U.S.","authors":"Hélyoth T. S. Hessou, Van Son Lai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3930101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3930101","url":null,"abstract":"The Basel III framework comes with the requirement of a minimum leverage ratio acting as a backstop to the existing Basel II risk-based capital ratio. Given that Canada and the US have adopted similar double capital rules prior to Basel III, we study the implications of these two rules on bank capital adjustments. We show that the mix of the two-capital rules can be viewed as a “hockey stick” shape single leverage ratio with limits equal to the value of a call option on the bank risk-weighted assets density. Since the imposed limit on the \"combined\" leverage ratio was tighter in Canada than in the US, Canadian banks exhibit asset risk-sensitive leverage ratios well before the 2007 global financial crisis (GFC). Meanwhile, the loosening limit on the US leverage ratio makes the leverage ratio irresponsive or inversely related to US banks’ asset risk.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131955273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Changing Dynamics of Wired and Wireless Networks","authors":"C. Bazelon, P. Sanyal, Ryan Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3927643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3927643","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless networks have long been described as wired networks with wireless links at the edge. This observation has important implications as 5G is rolled out. One of the innovations of 5G is to push the wired part of the network closer to the user, and the need for high capacity and low latency wired networks will increase as 5G becomes ubiquitous. The increased number of nodes in a 5G network, along with the increased capacity and need for lower latency, will transform the demand for backhaul capacity, and the dynamics between the wired and wireless networks will evolve where the wired network becomes an ever-increasing critical complementary input in the 5G services. We show that the presence of wired infrastructure in a license area is an important predictor of spectrum value in 5G auctions.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115265841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The European Crowdfunding Regulation: Opportunities for Alternative Investment Fund(s) (Managers)?","authors":"Sebastiaan Niels Hooghiemstra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3922604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3922604","url":null,"abstract":"On the 10th of November 2021, the European crowdfunding regulation (“ESCPR”), as well as a related directive to amend Directive 2014/65/EU (“MiFID II”), entered into force. The ESCPR facilitates the scaling up of crowdfunding services across the internal market to increase access to finance for entrepreneurs, start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in general. Till the introduction of the ESCPR, crowdfunding services had not been subject to EU action. European crowdfunding service providers (“ECSPs”) were, therefore, subject to the different national frameworks implementing existing EU law that hindered the emergence of a European market for crowdfunding. The EU regime has created a level playing field by introducing a harmonized EU legal framework for these service providers and introduced a European passport for ECSPs. As the ESCPR will provide many opportunities, it is not only worthwhile to explore the ESCPR and the impact on the European crowdfunding industry, but also what opportunities it offers for alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) and their alternative investment fund managers (“AIFMs”). This contribution seeks to assess whether and to what extent the ESCPR offers opportunities for private equity/debt AIFs and their AIFMs. To that end, section 2 starts of by discussing private equity and private debt under Directive 2011/61/EU, as amended (the “AIFMD”), and crowdinvesting and –lending under the ESCPR. In particular, it discusses the status of retail investors/investments under the ESCPR and AIFMD; and compares crowdlending under the ESCPR with (private equity/debt) AIFs under the AIFMD. Section 3 focuses on crowdfunding services related to crowdinvesting and crowdlending under the ESCPR. Apart from “general crowdfunding services”, it also explains that ECSPs may offer crowdinvesting/-lending offers to investors on the basis of “investment proposals” and “individual portfolio management (of loans)”. The analysis in this section is restricted in terms of opportunities for, in particular, (private equity/debt) AIFs as “investors” and their AIFMs as “ECSPs”. Section 4 ends by discussing the limitation of types of projects in which AIFMs on their AIFs can invest through a ECSP, whereas section 5 concludes.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126291103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nishan-e-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Yongyeh Ngalim Elizabeth, A. J. Davis
{"title":"The historical evolution and enforcement of competition law in Pakistan","authors":"Nishan-e-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Yongyeh Ngalim Elizabeth, A. J. Davis","doi":"10.47264/idea.lassij/5.2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/5.2.3","url":null,"abstract":"The study aims to attempt has been made to highlight competition law in various aspects with reference to Pakistan. The present study gives a detailed account of its origin or historical evolution over time by underscoring legislation's salient characteristics; the research attempts to feature its structure, power, and policies while identifying the challenges faced by the contemporary competition law in Pakistan. The study adopts qualitative data analysis to analyse the respective aims and objectives. The research assessed the regulatory agency's effectiveness as a principal authority to apply competition policies while preventing anti-competitive conduct. The research contents that many sustainability challenges are being faced by competition law in Pakistan and globalized transformation is one of the reasons behind it, it needs to be addressed. The research recommended that there should be an ability to attract professionals and judicial discourse that needs to be based upon sound economic rationale as per competition theory. However, competition law is supposed to prevent anti-competition rituals and practices by nurturing free and fair Competition in the market. It promotes greater Competition in the market by safeguarding customers against inaccurate means adopted by firms.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115196974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Inefficiency of Perfect Price Discrimination","authors":"Camelia Bejan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3918789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918789","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a general equilibrium model with at least three goods, a perfectly price-discriminating monopoly (PDM) selects an inefficient production plan even if consumers are homogeneous, their preferences are representable by quasi-linear utilities, and their characteristics are known to the monopolist. In the same setting, regulation via a two-part tariff induces an efficient equilibrium allocation.","PeriodicalId":288499,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121736407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}