Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University最新文献

{"title":"A Study on the Attachment of Chattel mortgage and Unjust Enrichment","authors":"Dae Kyung Kim","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.131","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of the target judgment boils down to whether, when the subject matter of the movable transfer security is attached to the other matter of he movable transfer security, the transfer security creditor who has lost ownership can claim the return of unjust enrichment against the owner or the transfer security creditor. There is a lot of controversy in academic theories and precedents regarding the position of the target judgment. This is because the position of the target judgment based on fairness and validity is causing considerable conflict with the existing legal principles regarding the return of unjust enrichment. Therefore, in this paper, how to understand the legal nature of the movable transfer security right, and then, if the object of the movable transfer security right is attached, how will be determined who is obligated to return the unjust enrichment. The purpose of this study was to examine the legal principle of return of unfair profits for the right to claim compensation, and the subject of actual gains according to compliance, in respect of the legislative purpose of the return of unfair profits system, which is to adjust unfair movement of goods based on the notions of justice and fairness. The ruling appears to have reached a conclusion considering the aspects of equity and substance. However, despite the fact that the concept is not easy to grasp due to its abstractness and ambiguity, it has been brought to the fore and established in the past on unfair enrichment. It may be said that this conclusion is difficult to accept, as it creates a contradiction or conflict in legal principles. In particular, if the debtor becomes incapacitated before or after the object of transfer security is satisfied, it is considered difficult to accept the conclusion of the subject judgment in that it may lead to unreasonable results in the interests of each transfer security creditor and the debtor. Taking the above points into consideration, it seems reasonable to consider that the entity to which the actual profits belong is the transfer secured creditor, as in the original trial. In any case, I would like to conclude this article with the hope that there will be more reasonable precedents and discussions related to this.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"155 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140417668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Meaning and Improvement of Rehousing Education as a Countermeasure to Terrorist Crimes in China","authors":"ChengMin Piao","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"In order to effectively regulate terrorist crimes, China enacted the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2015,and Article 30 of the Law stipulates Rehousing education measures. Rehousing education is a preventive measure applied to offenders who have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment or longer for terrorism or extremism offences and are deemed to be dangerous before their sentences expire and they are released. The introduction of these measures not only signalled China's strong control stance on terrorist crimes, but also demonstrated a range of options for dealing with terrorist crimes in the new era. In addition, the nature of terrorist crimes has raised questions about the effectiveness of crime prevention through punishment, so it has accepted the idea that it is necessary to regulate terrorist crimes through criminal means other than punishment, which is a result of the current globally accepted criminal policy. However, at present, China does not provide for a superordinate concept of “security measure”, and the resulting of Rehousing educationn is also Insufficient clarity, thus giving rise to much debate. In addition, in terms of the formal conditions of application, the provisions of the law did not take into account the dangerousness of reoffending by the offender, and in terms of the substantive conditions of application, the law did not provide adequate criteria for dangerousness assessment. In particular, Rehousing education is provided for in the Anti-Terrorism Law, which is an administrative law, The assessment of dangerousness is not made at the time of conviction, but rather a separate post- conviction assessment by the court. In this way, Rehousing education is actually operating independently of the criminal justice system. The procedural provisions do not clearly stipulate the timing, duration and content of the dangerousness assessment. Considering all of these, indicate that China's current system of Rehousing education has many deficiencies, which violate the principle of constitutional clarity and risk unjustifiable violations of the human rights of the accused. In this context, this article advocates for the integration of Rehousing education into the criminal justice system by integrating it with the security measures currently provided for in the Criminal Code. It also attempts to improve the formal and substantive conditions of application and the procedural and enforcement regulations of the education by focusing on the problems, and exploration of the legal basis of the Rehousing education is clarity and justified.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"41 14","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140419290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A review of Janpan’s Inherent Territory Theory of Dokdo","authors":"Jinwoong Seo","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.37","url":null,"abstract":"It is said that the inherent territory theory was invented by Japan. Japan, which lost a lot of territory after its defeat in World War II, began to raise claims of ‘inherent territory’ in order to recover such territory. The first time the claim of ‘inherent territory (固有の領土)’ was used for the two islands, Habomai and Shikotan, on the border with Russia. Afterwards, in 1956, Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu stated in a speech to the National Assembly that Dokdo was also Japan's inherent territory. In general, ‘inherent territory’ means ‘national territory that has never historically become the territory of another country’ or ‘unique national territory that has not been newly acquired through the mode of territorial acquisition.’ It is distinguished from ‘territory possessed since the establishment of a modern state’ or ‘territory possessed ab origine at the time of the establishment of a modern state, and territory acquired by gains after the establishment of the state.’ Inherent territory is understood to include three aspects: 1) the temporal and historical part, 2) the mode of territorial acquisition, and 3) the absence of foreign domination. Although the inherent territory theory seems similar to historical title at first glance, it is reasonable to believe that the inherent territory theory claimed by Japan is virtually impossible to apply not only under international law but also in actual reality, and is unlikely to be accepted as a theory under international law.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"185 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140421075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Responsibilities and Obligations of Generative AI Service Providers","authors":"Yun Myung Kim","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.55","url":null,"abstract":"AI is efficient for humans, but as a black box, AI can't clearly explain its results. In this sense, AI is ambivalent. As an unknown technology, it is difficult to predict how it will evolve, so it is necessary to hold those who develop or provide AI services accountable and responsible. However, we should not regulate the technology, but rather the service or business model. The goal is to ensure that AI services are provided reliably and that the content is not problematic. Even if service providers monitor their services, it is difficult to do so perfectly. Therefore, the law imposes certain obligations on service providers and holds them responsible for their omissions. This is the principle of OSP liability stipulated in the Copyright Act and the Information and Communications Network Act. By entering a safe harbor, OSPs can be immunized in certain cases. The safe harbor regulation has been positive for the development of the internet. Generative AI is often criticized. It's time to consider whether it applies to AI service providers as well. According to the interpretation of the Copyright Act and the Information and Com- munication Network Act, a service provider that provides generative AI services is a service provider that provides a tool for content production. Users give instructions through prompts or utilize it as a tool to create content. To clarify, the user uses the service to create the result that the user intends or desires. The scope of liability for AI services varies depending on the legal nature of the provider. Reviewing the legal status of the AI service provider is important for the activation of AI services. AI is considered a tool, and the rights to its output should belong to the user. Logically, the user is also responsible for the creation of infringing works. Since the service is ultimately created by the user, it is difficult to hold the service provider responsible for the content of the product. However, service providers are subject to a certain duty of care in that they are the developer of the service and the provider of the generative AI service. It is desirable for the development of the AI industry to impose a duty of care that requires certain actions on the part of the service provider for defects in AI, such as the continuous creation of infringing works or the illusion of inaccurate content.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"119 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140417878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Method of Calculating the net Inheritance when Calculating the Deficiency of the Reserve of Inheritance","authors":"Hyunjai Lee","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2024.44.1.159","url":null,"abstract":"The calculation of the shortfall in legal reserve of inheritance shall be the amount deducted from the legal reserve of inheritance. The Supreme Court sentenced on August 19, 2021, 2017Da235791, said, “When calculating the shortfall in legal reserve of inheritance that received special profits among joint heirs, special profits and net inheritance are deducted from the legal reserve of inheritance, and the net inheritance to be deducted is calculated based on a specific inheritance taking into account the special profits of the relevant legal reserve.” This ruling is significant in that it is the first ruling to reverse the so-called 'legal theory' adopted by the court below and adopt a 'specific theory' when calculating the net inheritance of the legal reserve of inheritance. Even if the specific inheritance cannot be known because the request for division of inherited property is not preceded, the court dealing with a claim for the return of legal reserve of inheritance shall interpret that the specific inheritance should be identified with special interests in mind and reflected in the calculation of net inheritance. In the end, it can be said that there is a very close correlation between the calculation of the shortfall in legal reserve of inheritance and the division of inherited property. However, the Supreme Court's 2017Da235791 ruling alone cannot determine which theory was taken between the 'specific inheritance standard theory' and the 'a theory of non-existence of a excess special beneficiary' discussed in the division of inherited property. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the Supreme Court's rulings on June 30, 2022, such as the rulings of 2017s98, 99, 100, and 101, which dealt with the case of the trial for the division of inherited property. Some scholars say that the Supreme Court 2017s98 ruling above adopted 'a theory of non-existence of a excess special beneficiary'. However, according to my analysis through a specific calculation process, the above ruling does not accept 'a theory of non-existence of a excess special beneficiary'. The above decision is significant in that it has been declared that the excess special income is divided according to the 'statutory inheritance' of other joint heirs excluding excess special beneficiaries. While the theory of non-existence of a excess special beneficiary treats excess special beneficiaries as non-successors, the 'statutory inheritance standard theory’ that I propose has a decisive difference in treating them as heirs.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"45 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140420544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Combination and Identity Crimes, Timing of Commencement of Execution","authors":"Oh Geol Kwon","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.235","url":null,"abstract":"The target ruling determines that the crime of home invasion rape is a status crime and the starting point of its execution is the point of assault and threat for rape, which is a subsequent act. However, as seen earlier, in a combined crime, the preceding act is an ‘act’-related element as the first act, and together with the subsequent act, which is the second act, it forms one constituent element as a whole. Therefore, the attitude of the precedent that ‘act’-related prior acts act as status elements is not considered to be a conclusion faithful to the concept of status. In addition, if the crime of home invasion rape is a combined crime, it is reasonable to view the start of execution as the time when the home invasion began. Since the appellate court ruled that “the defendant appears to have already intended to commit sexual crimes such as pseudo-rape against the victim when he dragged her into the bathroom,” the intention for the crime of home invasion-like rape was committed from the beginning - that is, the first act, home invasion. The appellate court also acknowledged that there was intent to commit sexual assault and intent to commit pseudo-rape, which was the second act. Nevertheless, the appellate court judged that the starting point of execution was not the first act, the time of intrusion into a home (the point of dragging someone to the bathroom), but the second act, the moment of attempted pseudo-rape (the point of assault and threats), which means that the point of execution in a combined crime is There appears to be a lack of consistency in judgment regarding launch. Why did the precedent take this attitude? When the crime of home invasion rape is considered a combined crime, it can be understood that although it is logical that the starting point of its execution is a preceding act, the logical contra- diction of viewing it as a subsequent act is an attempt to overcome the contradiction by viewing the preceding act as a status element. Of course, from a macro perspective, it is more advantageous for the defendant to set the starting point of execution on the subsequent act rather than the preceding act. In addition, viewing a criminal as a status criminal rather than a non-status criminal requires a judgment on the presence or absence of a status criminal, so it is inevitably a judgment that is more favorable to the defendant. From the defendant's perspective, he or she can claim that he or she has no status, and even if he or she does have status - even if the home invasion has been completed - he or she can claim that he or she has not yet begun the act. Meanwhile, in the target ruling, the court may be seen as implying that it is different from the original status crime by expressing it as “a type of identity crime…” However, in the reference case, it is said to be a type of identity crime, but mentions the possibility of establishing an accomplice under Article 33. Therefore, we cannot help but say that the type of ide","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139201153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Study on the War Powers of the President of the United States","authors":"Hwan Kyung Lee","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.27","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. president's right to war is one of the key issues in the separation of powers between the president and Congress under the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution distributes the right to war to the president and Congress, and the president is given the right to wage war and the Congress is given the right to declare war. However, this decentralized power worked in the president's favor in reality, and the president often waged war without the consent of Congress. The provisions of the right to war in the U.S. Constitution are stipulated in Article 2, Paragraph 2, which gives the president the right to command the military, and Article 1, Paragraph 8, which gives the Congress the right to declare war. Constitutional makers gave the president the right to wage war, allowing the president to take military action quickly and flexibly in wartime situations. In addition, by granting the Congress the right to declare war, the president's right to war was checked and a mechanism was prepared to reflect the people's intention to war. The right to war in the United States has been a subject of debate since the beginning of the founding of the United States. George Washington, the first president, exercised his own right to wage war without Congress' consent, and this behavior was inherited by subsequent presidents. However, the prolongation and defeat of the Vietnam War changed the perception of the war in American society, and in 1973, Congress enacted the War Rights Resolution to limit the president's right to wage the war. The Warzone Resolution requires the president to end the military operation unless approved by Congress within 60 days. However, the resolution of the war zone was virtually neutralized by the president's disregard for Congress and the Supreme Court's denial of constitutionality. In addition, the resolution of the right to war does not clearly define the concept of war or the scope of war, so it does not substantially limit the president's right to wage war. America's right to war remains a major source of conflict between Congress and the president. Congress is trying to limit the president's right to wage war, but the president is trying to exercise the right to wage war stipulated in the constitution. These conflicts are expected to have a major impact on the US foreign and security policy. America's right to war is a key issue in the separation of powers between the president and Congress. It is necessary to readjust the right to war in order to secure the legitimacy and democracy of war while maintaining the separation of powers between the president and the parliament. To this end, legislative efforts are needed to clearly define the concept of war and the scope of war conduct, and to substantially strengthen the parliament's right to war.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"118 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139200813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Constitutional Study on the Fundamental Right to Safety","authors":"Boo-Ha Lee","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.1","url":null,"abstract":"‘Freedom’ can be defined as the absence of physical and psychological coercion, and ‘safety’ can be defined as the absence of danger and risk. Danger and risk can lead to undesirable and forcible restrictions on personal freedom. In this respect, security can be said to be a prerequisite for individual freedom. The fundamental right to safety can be said to be an unwritten fundamental right that is recognized even if it is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution. However, if it is not stipulated in the Constitution, it may be difficult for the Constitutional Court to make a decision on the right to security as a fundamental right. Public safety is an important legal interest and national task that the state must protect. Regarding the legal nature of safety, there are views that view it as a ‘public interest’ and views that view it as a ‘national task.’ Even if the legal nature of safety is viewed as a public interest or national task, it is not a reason to deny the fundamental right to safety. In a situation where security is threatened, the fundamental right as an effective right specified in the Constitution can no longer be understood as an effective right, and may be subordinated to the ‘fundamental right to security’, which is abstract and has the upper hand in balancing test. Freedom and security are compatible only when the legislator regulates the content of the law as clearly as possible and ensures legal stability in accordance with the pro- visions of each pre-structured national legal order. From this perspective, the principle of clarity in the rule of law can guarantee legal stability and properly perform the function of guaranteeing freedom when the offender has predictability and substantive and content clarity. In this case, a constitutional balance between freedom and safety can be achieved. However, in areas where uncertainty reigns, such as science and technology law and communications law, pre-structured substantive and content laws seek to protect the current legal status by preventing danger and risks. As open legal norms such as the Science and Technology Act and the Communications Act continue to develop, they lose control of legal norms because they use legal concepts and legal terms that are not defined in existing laws. Unclearness of the law in terms of substance and content causes the absence of standards for the content of the law, weakens its binding force, and inevitably leads to uncertainty about the existence of the law. In situations of uncertainty in relation to these areas, it follows that freedom can no longer be guaranteed by safety. This is because safety guarantees based on content-related laws always face limitations.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139207821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Principles and Problems of the Concept of Restricted Discretion","authors":"Young Moo Lee","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.153","url":null,"abstract":"Control over the acts of discretion is one of the long-standing challenges faced by the administrative law community. Control over the acts of discretion begins with the distinction between binding acts and acts of discretion. However, the relevant precedents are aggravating the difficulty of control over the acts of discretion by recognizing the concept of restricted discretion as a third area that is neither binding acts nor acts of discretion. According to the theory of precedents, acts of restricted discretion are binding acts in principle, but in exceptional cases, they refer to acts that can refuse approval or acceptance of reports when there is a need for important public interests. However, the ‘need for important public interests’ referred to in restricted discretion corresponds to a representative amorphous concept. However, precedents understand the interpretation and application of amorphous concepts as a matter of discretion. Then, it is logical to understand restricted discretion as acts of discretion in principle. Nevertheless, the precedents commit a contradiction in viewing restricted discretion as binding acts. In addition, the concept of restricted discretion causes numerous contradictions and incongruities with existing administrative law theories, such as violation of the principle of statutory reservation, avoidance of the obligation to set disposition standards under the Administrative Procedure Act, deformation of the judgment under circumstances, and contradictions with the withdrawal system and reporting system. In light of the above, the concept of restricted discretion should be abolished in accordance with principle of the rule of law. Restricted discretion should be considered to be established only when individual laws expressly stipulate that refusal disposition can be made due to the need for important public interests. In addition, it is reasonable to say that at the moment such a regulation is made in an individual law, the relevant acts already fall under acts of discretion in terms of the intent and purpose of the regulation.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"157 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139203798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Realization of Right to Work in response to Digital Transformation","authors":"Seokhan Hong","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.53","url":null,"abstract":"Digital transformation has emerged as a hot topic around the world, attracting attention as an opportunity to overcome various crises and discover new growth engines. This paper examines the impact and problems of digital transformation in realizing Right to Work and suggests normative responses. Digital transformation may increase unemployment and lead to job polarization and subsequent expansion of income inequality and poverty. Additionally, as the number of unstable workers increases, blind spots in protection of labor laws and social insurance may increase. In addition, as work flexibility increases, the risk of work-life balance, health, and privacy being violated may increase. Furthermore, as recruitment and personnel management using intelligent information technology expands, problems such as trans- parency, fairness, and the possibility of infringement on personal information and privacy may arise. The normative response to these problems is to maintain the principle that digital transformation is ultimately for the benefit of humans and must contribute to the guarantee of basic rights, while keeping in mind the harmony of autonomy and regulation, strengthening transparency, and securing social integration. Above all, policies are needed to revitalize industrial dynamics to promote employment. The introduction of basic income may be considered, but sufficient prior review and social consensus must be obtained. In addition, we must be able to adapt to various new problems in the work area that arise due to digital transformation by expanding the scope of application of labor-related laws and including new disciplinary content. First, the requirements for recognizing worker status must be newly established and a social security system that can cover all unemployed individuals must be established. Next, in response to problems that may arise as digital work and full-time work becomes possible, the right to disconnect is needed to be specified and the paradigm of the occupational safety and health legislation must be changed. Furthermore, it is necessary to respond to situations where recruitment and personnel management using intelligent information technology are widely used. Measures are needed to establish minimum standards for data use and ensure transparency while being careful not to excessively restrict the possibility of data use or infringe on autonomy by imposing excessive regulations.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139208153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}