关于基本安全权的宪法研究

Boo-Ha Lee
{"title":"关于基本安全权的宪法研究","authors":"Boo-Ha Lee","doi":"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"‘Freedom’ can be defined as the absence of physical and psychological coercion, and ‘safety’ can be defined as the absence of danger and risk. Danger and risk can lead to undesirable and forcible restrictions on personal freedom. In this respect, security can be said to be a prerequisite for individual freedom. The fundamental right to safety can be said to be an unwritten fundamental right that is recognized even if it is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution. However, if it is not stipulated in the Constitution, it may be difficult for the Constitutional Court to make a decision on the right to security as a fundamental right. Public safety is an important legal interest and national task that the state must protect. Regarding the legal nature of safety, there are views that view it as a ‘public interest’ and views that view it as a ‘national task.’ Even if the legal nature of safety is viewed as a public interest or national task, it is not a reason to deny the fundamental right to safety. In a situation where security is threatened, the fundamental right as an effective right specified in the Constitution can no longer be understood as an effective right, and may be subordinated to the ‘fundamental right to security’, which is abstract and has the upper hand in balancing test. Freedom and security are compatible only when the legislator regulates the content of the law as clearly as possible and ensures legal stability in accordance with the pro- visions of each pre-structured national legal order. From this perspective, the principle of clarity in the rule of law can guarantee legal stability and properly perform the function of guaranteeing freedom when the offender has predictability and substantive and content clarity. In this case, a constitutional balance between freedom and safety can be achieved. However, in areas where uncertainty reigns, such as science and technology law and communications law, pre-structured substantive and content laws seek to protect the current legal status by preventing danger and risks. As open legal norms such as the Science and Technology Act and the Communications Act continue to develop, they lose control of legal norms because they use legal concepts and legal terms that are not defined in existing laws. Unclearness of the law in terms of substance and content causes the absence of standards for the content of the law, weakens its binding force, and inevitably leads to uncertainty about the existence of the law. In situations of uncertainty in relation to these areas, it follows that freedom can no longer be guaranteed by safety. This is because safety guarantees based on content-related laws always face limitations.","PeriodicalId":288398,"journal":{"name":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Constitutional Study on the Fundamental Right to Safety\",\"authors\":\"Boo-Ha Lee\",\"doi\":\"10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"‘Freedom’ can be defined as the absence of physical and psychological coercion, and ‘safety’ can be defined as the absence of danger and risk. Danger and risk can lead to undesirable and forcible restrictions on personal freedom. In this respect, security can be said to be a prerequisite for individual freedom. The fundamental right to safety can be said to be an unwritten fundamental right that is recognized even if it is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution. However, if it is not stipulated in the Constitution, it may be difficult for the Constitutional Court to make a decision on the right to security as a fundamental right. Public safety is an important legal interest and national task that the state must protect. Regarding the legal nature of safety, there are views that view it as a ‘public interest’ and views that view it as a ‘national task.’ Even if the legal nature of safety is viewed as a public interest or national task, it is not a reason to deny the fundamental right to safety. In a situation where security is threatened, the fundamental right as an effective right specified in the Constitution can no longer be understood as an effective right, and may be subordinated to the ‘fundamental right to security’, which is abstract and has the upper hand in balancing test. Freedom and security are compatible only when the legislator regulates the content of the law as clearly as possible and ensures legal stability in accordance with the pro- visions of each pre-structured national legal order. From this perspective, the principle of clarity in the rule of law can guarantee legal stability and properly perform the function of guaranteeing freedom when the offender has predictability and substantive and content clarity. In this case, a constitutional balance between freedom and safety can be achieved. However, in areas where uncertainty reigns, such as science and technology law and communications law, pre-structured substantive and content laws seek to protect the current legal status by preventing danger and risks. As open legal norms such as the Science and Technology Act and the Communications Act continue to develop, they lose control of legal norms because they use legal concepts and legal terms that are not defined in existing laws. Unclearness of the law in terms of substance and content causes the absence of standards for the content of the law, weakens its binding force, and inevitably leads to uncertainty about the existence of the law. In situations of uncertainty in relation to these areas, it follows that freedom can no longer be guaranteed by safety. This is because safety guarantees based on content-related laws always face limitations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":288398,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.1\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Institute for Legal Studies Chonnam National University","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.38133/cnulawreview.2023.43.4.1","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

自由 "可以定义为没有身体和心理胁迫,"安全 "可以定义为没有危险和风险。危险和风险可能导致对个人自由的不可取的强制限制。在这方面,安全可以说是个人自由的先决条件。享有安全的基本权利可以说是一项不成文的基本权利,即使《宪法》中没有明文规定,也会得到承认。但是,如果《宪法》中没有规定,宪法法院可能很难将安全权作为一项基本权利做出裁决。公共安全是国家必须保护的重要法律利益和国家任务。关于安全的法律性质,有将其视为 "公共利益 "的观点,也有将其视为 "国家任务 "的观点。即使安全的法律性质被视为公共利益或国家任务,也不能成为剥夺基本安全权的理由。在安全受到威胁的情况下,《宪法》中规定的作为有效权利的基本权利就不能再被理解为有效权利,而可能从属于 "安全的基本权利",后者是抽象的,在平衡测试中占上风。 只有当立法者尽可能明确地规范法律内容,并根据每个预先构建的国家法律秩序的愿景确保法律的稳定性时,自由与安全才能相容。从这个角度看,当犯罪人具有可预见性、实质和内容的明确性时,法治的明确性原则才能保证法律的稳定性,并恰当地发挥保障自由的功能。在这种情况下,可以实现自由与安全之间的宪法平衡。 然而,在科技法、通信法等不确定因素较多的领域,预先结构化的实体法和内容法则力图通过防范危险和风险来保护当前的法律地位。随着《科学技术法》和《通信法》等开放性法律规范的不断发展,由于其使用的法律概念和法律术语在现有法律中没有界定,从而失去了对法律规范的控制。法律在实质和内容上的不明确造成了法律内容标准的缺失,削弱了法律的约束力,必然导致法律存在的不确定性。在这些方面存在不确定性的情况下,自由就不能再由安全来保障。这是因为基于与内容相关的法律的安全保障总是面临着限制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Constitutional Study on the Fundamental Right to Safety
‘Freedom’ can be defined as the absence of physical and psychological coercion, and ‘safety’ can be defined as the absence of danger and risk. Danger and risk can lead to undesirable and forcible restrictions on personal freedom. In this respect, security can be said to be a prerequisite for individual freedom. The fundamental right to safety can be said to be an unwritten fundamental right that is recognized even if it is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution. However, if it is not stipulated in the Constitution, it may be difficult for the Constitutional Court to make a decision on the right to security as a fundamental right. Public safety is an important legal interest and national task that the state must protect. Regarding the legal nature of safety, there are views that view it as a ‘public interest’ and views that view it as a ‘national task.’ Even if the legal nature of safety is viewed as a public interest or national task, it is not a reason to deny the fundamental right to safety. In a situation where security is threatened, the fundamental right as an effective right specified in the Constitution can no longer be understood as an effective right, and may be subordinated to the ‘fundamental right to security’, which is abstract and has the upper hand in balancing test. Freedom and security are compatible only when the legislator regulates the content of the law as clearly as possible and ensures legal stability in accordance with the pro- visions of each pre-structured national legal order. From this perspective, the principle of clarity in the rule of law can guarantee legal stability and properly perform the function of guaranteeing freedom when the offender has predictability and substantive and content clarity. In this case, a constitutional balance between freedom and safety can be achieved. However, in areas where uncertainty reigns, such as science and technology law and communications law, pre-structured substantive and content laws seek to protect the current legal status by preventing danger and risks. As open legal norms such as the Science and Technology Act and the Communications Act continue to develop, they lose control of legal norms because they use legal concepts and legal terms that are not defined in existing laws. Unclearness of the law in terms of substance and content causes the absence of standards for the content of the law, weakens its binding force, and inevitably leads to uncertainty about the existence of the law. In situations of uncertainty in relation to these areas, it follows that freedom can no longer be guaranteed by safety. This is because safety guarantees based on content-related laws always face limitations.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信