2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium最新文献

Additive and Multiplicative Notions of Leakage, and Their Capacities 泄漏的加法和乘法概念及其容量

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.29

M. Alvim, K. Chatzikokolakis, Annabelle McIver, Carroll Morgan, C. Palamidessi, Geoffrey Smith

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引用次数: 75

Attribute-Based Encryption for Access Control Using Elementary Operations 基于属性的基于基本操作的访问控制加密

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.17

J. Crampton, A. Pinto

引用次数: 6

Certificates for Verifiable Forensics 可验证取证证书

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.11

R. Jagadeesan, C. Lubinski, Corin Pitcher, J. Riely, Charles Winebrinner

引用次数: 0

Compositional Information-Flow Security for Interactive Systems 交互式系统的组合信息流安全

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.27

Willard Rafnsson, A. Sabelfeld

引用次数: 21

Decidability for Lightweight Diffie-Hellman Protocols 轻量级Diffie-Hellman协议的可判定性

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.23

Daniel J. Dougherty, J. Guttman

引用次数: 15

The Complexity of Estimating Systematic Risk in Networks 网络系统风险评估的复杂性

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.30

Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka, Jens Grossklags

引用次数: 19

How Task Familiarity and Cognitive Predispositions Impact Behavior in a Security Game of Timing 任务熟悉度和认知倾向如何影响时序安全游戏中的行为

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.16

Jens Grossklags, D. Reitter

{"title":"How Task Familiarity and Cognitive Predispositions Impact Behavior in a Security Game of Timing","authors":"Jens Grossklags, D. Reitter","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2014.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2014.16","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses security and safety choices that involve a decision on the timing of an action. Examples of such decisions include when to check log files for intruders and when to monitor financial accounts for fraud or errors. To better understand how performance in timing-related security situations is shaped by individuals' cognitive predispositions, we effectively combine survey measures with economic experiments. Two behavioral experiments are presented in which the timing of online security actions is the critical decision-making factor. The feedback modality in the decision-environment is varied between visual feedback with history (Experiment 1), and temporal feedback without history (Experiment 2). Using psychometric scales, we study the role of individual difference variables, specifically risk propensity and need for cognition. The analysis is based on the data from over 450 participants. We find that risk propensity is not a hindrance in timing tasks. Participants of average risk propensity generally benefit from a reflective disposition (high need for cognition), particularly when visual feedback is given. Overall, participants benefit from need for cognition, however, in the more difficult, temporal-estimation task, this requires familiarity with the task.","PeriodicalId":285965,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122588331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

Automated Analysis and Synthesis of Block-Cipher Modes of Operation 分组密码操作模式的自动分析与综合

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.18

A. Malozemoff, Jonathan Katz, M. Green

{"title":"Automated Analysis and Synthesis of Block-Cipher Modes of Operation","authors":"A. Malozemoff, Jonathan Katz, M. Green","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2014.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2014.18","url":null,"abstract":"Block ciphers such as AES are deterministic, keyed functions that operate on small, fixed-size blocks. Block-cipher modes of operation define a mechanism for probabilistic encryption of arbitrary length messages using any underlying block cipher. A mode of operation can be proven secure (say, against chosen-plaintext attacks) based on the assumption that the underlying block cipher is a pseudorandom function. Such proofs are complex and error-prone, however, and must be done from scratch whenever a new mode of operation is developed. We propose an automated approach for the security analysis of block-cipher modes of operation based on a \"local\" analysis of the steps carried out by the mode when handling a single message block. We model these steps as a directed, acyclic graph, with nodes corresponding to instructions and edges corresponding to intermediate values. We then introduce a set of labels and constraints on the edges, and prove a meta-theorem showing that any mode for which there exists a labeling of the edges satisfying these constraints is secure (against chosen-plaintext attacks). This allows us to reduce security of a given mode to a constraint-satisfaction problem, which in turn can be handled using an SMT solver. We couple our security-analysis tool with a routine that automatically generates viable modes, together, these allow us to synthesize hundreds of secure modes.","PeriodicalId":285965,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122899408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 33

Noninterference under Weak Memory Models 弱内存模型下的非干扰

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.14

H. Mantel, Matthias Perner, Jens Sauer

引用次数: 8

Automated Generation of Attack Trees 自动生成攻击树

2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2014-07-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2014.31

R. Vigo, F. Nielson, H. R. Nielson

{"title":"Automated Generation of Attack Trees","authors":"R. Vigo, F. Nielson, H. R. Nielson","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2014.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2014.31","url":null,"abstract":"Attack trees are widely used to represent threat scenarios in a succinct and intuitive manner, suitable for conveying security information to non-experts. The manual construction of such objects relies on the creativity and experience of specialists, and therefore it is error-prone and impracticable for large systems. Nonetheless, the automated generation of attack trees has only been explored in connection to computer networks and levering rich models, whose analysis typically leads to an exponential blow-up of the state space. We propose a static analysis approach where attack trees are automatically inferred from a process algebraic specification in a syntax-directed fashion, encompassing a great many application domains and avoiding incurring systematically an exponential explosion. Moreover, we show how the standard propositional denotation of an attack tree can be used to phrase interesting quantitative problems, that can be solved through an encoding into Satisfiability Modulo Theories. The flexibility and effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on the study of a national-scale authentication system, whose attack tree is computed thanks to a Java implementation of the framework.","PeriodicalId":285965,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114346094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 76