{"title":"Multilevel secure database design: a practical application","authors":"Gary W. Smith","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81068","url":null,"abstract":"The Second Rome Air Development Center (RADC) Database Security Workshop held in May 1989, featured a 'Homework Problem'. The Homework Problem was a 22 page specification for a multilevel secure (MLS) database. Solutions to the Homework Problem were provided by many of the major research and development efforts in MLS database systems. The author describes the requirements of the Homework Problem and summarizes the database design approaches taken to meet those requirements.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133028458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Applying the TNI to system certification and accreditation","authors":"R. Niemeyer","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81058","url":null,"abstract":"Department of Defense systems that process sensitive (including classified) information must undergo formal technical assessment and approval before they are allowed to operate. The technical assessment and approval processes are called certification and accreditation, respectively. The author presents issues involved in certifying and accrediting networks with respect to the two network views, the Single Trusted System (STS) view and the Interconnected Accredited AIS (IAA) view, presented in the Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria, NCSC-TG-005. Certification and Accreditation procedures differ significantly between the STS view and the IAA view of networks.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129605858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"End-to-end encryption at the network layer","authors":"R. Nelson","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81020","url":null,"abstract":"Both network-layer and transport-layer encryption are permitted by the OSI Security Addendum. The advantages of network-layer encryption are discussed. Secure data network system (SDNS) protocols are described. In the SDNS, SP is a single, simple encryption protocol between end-systems. This protocol has two descriptions, SP3 (network layer) and SP4 (transport layer). Both definitions are OSI compliant. Extensions of the basic protocol allow SP3 to be used at intermediate systems and allow SP4 to provide a more connection-oriented service.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114529226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assessment of security requirements for sensitive systems","authors":"N. Brown","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81043","url":null,"abstract":"Summary form only given. A methodology for using a risk assessment approach to determine security and control requirements for sensitive systems is described. The assessment considers two categories of risk criteria: (1) pervasive risk and (2) specific risk. The final risk measure (or score) is calculated from the overall assessed risk ratings and weight factors assigned to these criteria. The final risk measure is matched to a sensitivity level which is further matched to a baseline security requirements level (SRL). The SRL prescribes specific base-set security and control requirements for each sensitive system as determined by the organizational policy and procedures for security and integrity of automated systems. Security requirements associated with a particular sensitivity level and SRL are translated into application security and control requirements. These requirements then become system design specifications for the subject system.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114884776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The role of vulnerability in risk management","authors":"K. Otwell, B. Aldridge","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81022","url":null,"abstract":"The treatment of vulnerability at the 1988 Risk Model Builders' Workshop is examined, and a definition of vulnerability that is intuitively satisfying and provides a foundation upon which mathematical models can be built is developed. Two vulnerability models that together appear to capture the general conceptualizations of vulnerability espoused by other authors are presented. The authors also discuss the ongoing development of their expert system for risk management (M/sup 2/RISK), which will utilize knowledge about vulnerabilities of information systems and their components. M/sup 2/RISK is designed to eventually function as a full risk-management system with interface tools that will allow rapid specification of systems and easy management of system changes, and generally aid the risk-management process.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134297798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Development of a multi level data generation application for GEMSOS","authors":"E. R. Schallenmüller, R. P. Cramer, B. Aldridge","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81032","url":null,"abstract":"The Gemini computer, which uses the Gemini Multiprocessing Secure Operating System (GEMSOS), is one of only a handful of computers which are designed to meet A1 level requirements. Martin Marietta's approach to using the Gemini computer as a process, device, and memory manager is discussed. An example application which was developed in 25 man-days with 125 lines of trusted code is presented. The evaluatable application is easily enhanced to perform a multitude of functions without adding a line of trusted code. It is noted that the significance of the multilevel data generator is that it provides a platform from which to design and integrate many systems. The platform has a wide applicability. For example, it can be used as a store-and-forward system, a data storage area (e.g. file system), or a local area network manager.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121792192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An approach for evaluating the security of an Air Force type network","authors":"N. Woodfield","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81025","url":null,"abstract":"An approach for assessing the security of an Air-Force-type network environment at the AFR 205-16 sensitive/unclassified Trusted Network Interpretation C2 levels is discussed. The first step in this approach was to assess the security for each stand-alone system. For the target network this was done using two separate assessment processes. The first was to assess the security profiles of functional area subsystems. Its main objective was to determine the necessary enhancements (in terms of internal hardware and software controls, physical, procedural, administrative, and Communications Security (COMSEC) controls) to bring these individual subsystems to the C2 level (as defined in DOD 5200.28-STD) and to provide protection for sensitive/unclassified systems as defined in AFR 205-16. The second process was to perform a similar security assessment of the ISDN (integrated services digital network) communications switch. In the second step, the information found from these two assessments was used to assess a target network.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121984017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Considerations on TCB subsetting","authors":"Helena B. Winkler-Parenty","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81036","url":null,"abstract":"The hierarchical trusted computing base (TCB) subsetting architecture, which is intended to allow database management systems (DBMSs) to take advantage of the effort expended in producing and evaluating trusted multilevel operating systems, is discussed. The advantages and disadvantages that result from the use of this security architecture are explored. Another architecture, functional modularization of a TCB, is presented. This architecture gives the DBMS much greater control over its security policy and resource management than the TCB subsetting approach, allowing the fuller functionality and performance.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130293617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A summary of the Unisys experience with GEMSOS","authors":"D. Paul","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81039","url":null,"abstract":"Summary form only given. In 1984, the Unisys Corporation was awarded a government contract to design and develop a multilevel secure communications system. This system contains multilevel administrative hosts that manage the connectivity between users on a network. The connectivity was driven by mandatory and discretionary policies. An early decision was made to use GEMSOS (Gemini Standard Operating Systems) as the kernal for the operating system that would reside on these administrative hosts. The decision was made to use the same compiler for the operating system and applications that Gemini used in developing GEMSOS. Experience with the GEMSOS product has been positive. GEMSOS provided adequate features to allow it to be the basis of the required operating system. The performance in the area of task creation greatly improved from the initial versions.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130937826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A perspective on integrity mechanisms","authors":"R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1109/CSAC.1989.81062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSAC.1989.81062","url":null,"abstract":"Accepting the common viewpoint that integrity is concerned with information modification rather than information disclosure or information availability, the author considers two views on what nondiscretionary controls are needed for information integrity: (1) Clark and Wilson's view that some separate mechanisms are required for enforcement of integrity policies, disjoint from those of the Orange Book (TCSEC), and (2) Gasser's view that techniques to protect against information modifications are almost always the same as (or a subset of) techniques to protect against information disclosure. The author agrees with the Clark-Wilson view, in which integrity requires nondiscretionary access-control mechanisms other than label-based mandatory controls. He lists his objections to Gasser's view.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":284420,"journal":{"name":"[1989 Proceedings] Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127508390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}