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35 Years of Reforms: A Panel Analysis of the Incidence of, and Employee and Employer Responses to, Social Security Contributions in the UK 改革的35年:对英国社会保障缴款的发生率和雇员和雇主反应的小组分析
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-04-01 DOI: 10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.010
S. Adam, David Phillips, B. Roantree
{"title":"35 Years of Reforms: A Panel Analysis of the Incidence of, and Employee and Employer Responses to, Social Security Contributions in the UK","authors":"S. Adam, David Phillips, B. Roantree","doi":"10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2018.05.010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118659380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
Patent Boxes and the Relocation of Intellectual Property 专利箱与知识产权转移
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2943435
Laurie Ciaramella
{"title":"Patent Boxes and the Relocation of Intellectual Property","authors":"Laurie Ciaramella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2943435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2943435","url":null,"abstract":"Firms can make use of the discretionary aspect of the location of patent ownership to avoid taxation and maximise their profits. This paper investigates patent transfers with regard to patent box regimes, and study how firms' incentives to relocate patents vary with the heterogeneity of the features of such regimes. Using a comprehensive dataset on international patent transfers, I find that patent box countries significantly attract more patent relocations, and that incoming flows increase in the tax rebate. The fiscal incentives are stronger in countries with a high R&D level, suggesting multiple dimensions in firms' decisions of patent relocation. This is all the more true for more valuable patents. I distinguish between intra-group relocation and patent trade. The results indicate that policy makers could tweak the designs of patent box regimes and the stringency of the rules governing patent transfers to deter relocation driven solely by fiscal optimization motives. Finally, I propose a novel instrument to address the potential endogeneity of R&D expenditures.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131279967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Can Tax Drive Capital Investment? 税收能推动资本投资吗?
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2940961
P. Le
{"title":"Can Tax Drive Capital Investment?","authors":"P. Le","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2940961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940961","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effects of tax system changes and corporate tax payout changes on capital investment. We would expect a change in capital investment when the corporate tax payout changes and also when there is a shift from one tax system to another. \u0000This study examines the effects on capital investment of: \u0000(1) changing in corporate tax payout in Canada and the United Kingdom (1981-2015); and \u0000(2) when changing from a classical to an imputation tax system in Australia (1981-2002) and Taiwan (1989-2013). \u0000By employing fixed effect models, our findings show that changing in corporate tax payout within the imputation tax system of Canada and The United Kingdom increase capital investment. Our findings also suggest that moving from a classical to an imputation system had an impact on capital expenditure for firms in both Australia and Taiwan. However, we did not find a strong relationship between tax payout changes and capital investment within a classical system.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131624493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Enemies: The Role of Global Public Goods in Aid Policy Narratives 《公敌:全球公共产品在援助政策叙事中的作用》
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-26 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2941164
R. Davies
{"title":"Public Enemies: The Role of Global Public Goods in Aid Policy Narratives","authors":"R. Davies","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2941164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2941164","url":null,"abstract":"Ushered into the international development arena around the turn of this century by the German economist Inge Kaul, the concept of a global public good was an abstruse and surprising hit. Variations on it have found their way into most donor countries’ aid policy narratives. Kaul herself has long argued that international development assistance should not be used for the production of global public goods. Nevertheless, donor agencies have thoroughly appropriated the concept. In this paper, I do two things. First, I argue that the concept of a global public good has generally been used in an unduly restricted and self-serving way in aid policy narratives, as a euphemism for ‘solutions to transboundary problems of particular concern to donor countries’. I further argue that it might be deployed to greater effect were it linked more specifically to concrete, realistic global public policy commitments aimed at eliminating certain of the world’s ‘bads’—by, in effect, declaring them public enemies. I stress that global public policy commitments need not always yield net benefits for all. Some, morally based, might benefit only defined groups, as in the case of a global refugee resettlement regime. All such commitments, however, have in common a ‘whatever it takes’ character and credible means of implementation. Second, I here release, in an annex, the full transcript of an extended interview about the financing of global public goods that I conducted with Kaul in May 2015. This complements the material in the body of the paper because, while my own views about aid and global public goods do not completely accord with Kaul’s, particularly in relation to the use of aid to support the production of such goods, they were formed in part through reflection over a period of time on our 2015 discussion.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126836970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The True Art of the Tax Deal: Evidence on Aid Flows and Bilateral Double Tax Agreements 税收交易的真正艺术:关于援助流动和双边双重征税协议的证据
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/twec.12628
J. Braun, Martin Zagler
{"title":"The True Art of the Tax Deal: Evidence on Aid Flows and Bilateral Double Tax Agreements","authors":"J. Braun, Martin Zagler","doi":"10.1111/twec.12628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12628","url":null,"abstract":"Out of a total of 2,976 double tax agreements (DTAs), some 60% are signed between a developing and a developed economy. As DTAs shift taxing rights from capital importing to capital exporting countries, the prior would incur a loss. We demonstrate in a theoretical model that in a deal one country does not trump the other, but that the deal must be mutually beneficial. In the case of an asymmetric DTA, this requires compensation from the capital exporting country to the capital importing country. We provide empirical evidence that such compensation is indeed paid, for instance in the form of bilateral official development assistance, which increases on average by six million US$ in the year of the signature of a DTA.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"107 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124885766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Automatic Exchange of Information as the New Global Standard: The End of (Offshore Tax Evasion) History? 信息自动交换成为新的全球标准:(离岸逃税)历史的终结?
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-02-27 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2924650
M. Meinzer
{"title":"Automatic Exchange of Information as the New Global Standard: The End of (Offshore Tax Evasion) History?","authors":"M. Meinzer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2924650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2924650","url":null,"abstract":"Automatic exchange of information (AEoI) for tax purposes has become the global standard for international tax cooperation in 2013. As a tool for containing offshore tax evasion, it has encountered opposition in the past and continues to be fraught with challenges. This paper recapitulates the rationale for AEoI, including estimates on the magnitudes of assets held offshore, with a specific focus on Turkish assets held in Germany (chapter 1). Subsequently, chapter 2 summarises the recent history and describes the processes and milestones until breakthrough for global AEoI in 2013. Chapter 3 then discusses three current challenges, including the de facto exclusion of developing countries; how to incentivise recalcitrant jurisdictions to participate, such as the USA; and issues around the implementation of the CRS, including OECD’s Global Forum of Transparency and Exchange of Information, the peer reviews and public statistics. Chapter 4 concludes.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131174872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Euro Area Fiscal Stance 欧元区财政状况
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-01-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2910976
Krzysztof Bańkowski, M. Ferdinandusse, M. Attinasi, Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal, Georgios Palaiodimos, M. Campos
{"title":"Euro Area Fiscal Stance","authors":"Krzysztof Bańkowski, M. Ferdinandusse, M. Attinasi, Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal, Georgios Palaiodimos, M. Campos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2910976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910976","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the appropriateness of the euro area fiscal stance. In this context, the paper presents the relevant definitions and how the euro area fiscal stance has evolved over time. Furthermore, it contains an evaluation of the appropriateness of the euro area aggregated fiscal stance set out in the European Commission JEL Classification: E61","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"190 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131387351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Behavioural Types in Public Goods Games: A Re-Analysis by Hierarchical Clustering 公共物品博弈中的行为类型:基于层次聚类的再分析
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-01-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2937841
Francesco Fallucchi, R. Andrew Luccasen, III, Theodore L. Turocy
{"title":"Behavioural Types in Public Goods Games: A Re-Analysis by Hierarchical Clustering","authors":"Francesco Fallucchi, R. Andrew Luccasen, III, Theodore L. Turocy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2937841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937841","url":null,"abstract":"We re-analyse participant behaviour in standard economics experiments studying voluntary contributions to a public good. Previous approaches were based in part on a priori models of decision-making, such as maximising personal earnings, or reciprocating the behaviour of others. Many participants however do not conform to one of these models exactly, requiring ad hoc adjustments to the theoretical baselines to identify them as belonging to a given behavioural type. We construct a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies using hierarchical clustering analysis. We identify four clearly distinct behavioural types which together account for over 90% of participants in six experimental studies. The resulting type classification distinguishes behaviour across groups more consistently than previous approaches.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127049317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Income Inequality, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth 收入不平等、税收政策和经济增长
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2017-01-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2595524
S. Biswas, Indraneel Chakraborty, Rong Hai
{"title":"Income Inequality, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth","authors":"S. Biswas, Indraneel Chakraborty, Rong Hai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2595524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2595524","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how the reduction of income inequality through tax policy affects economic growth. Taxation at different points of the income distribution has heterogeneous impacts on households’ incentives to work, invest, and consume. Using US state‐level data and micro‐level household tax returns over the last three decades, we find that reducing income inequality between low and median income households improves economic growth. However, reducing income inequality through taxation between median and high‐income households reduces economic growth. These asymmetric economic growth effects are attributable both to supply‐side factors (i.e. changes in small business activity and labour supply) and to consumption demand.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121063978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 76
From Debt Collection to Relief Provision: 60 Years of Official Debt Restructurings Through the Paris Club 从债务催收到债务减免:通过巴黎俱乐部进行官方债务重组的60年
Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2973097
Gong Cheng, Javier Díaz-Cassou, Aitor Erce
{"title":"From Debt Collection to Relief Provision: 60 Years of Official Debt Restructurings Through the Paris Club","authors":"Gong Cheng, Javier Díaz-Cassou, Aitor Erce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2973097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973097","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the frequency of official debt restructurings, little systematic evidence has been produced on their characteristics and implications. Using a dataset covering more than 400 Paris Club agreements, this paper aims to fill that gap. It provides a comprehensive description of the evolving characteristics of these operations and studies the economic dynamics surrounding them. The progressive introduction of new terms of treatment gradually turned the Paris Club from a mere debt collector into a provider of sequential debt relief. The study finds that more generous restructuring conditions involving nominal relief are associated with higher economic growth. In contrast, agreements including only NPV relief have no positive impact on growth. However, the countries that get these restructuring conditions turn out to be more likely to pursue a prudent fiscal policy after the event than those receiving a nominal haircut. In other words, when deciding upon the type of relief to be granted through debt restructuring, the official sector faces a trade-off between the objectives of stimulating growth and fostering fiscal sustainability.","PeriodicalId":282044,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132212518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
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