Law & Society: Legislation eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Opposition by the States: How Negative Responses to the No Child Left Behind Act has Impacted the Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act","authors":"M. Grayson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1669835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1669835","url":null,"abstract":"The initial passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2002 was seen as a bipartisan victory towards education reform that would close the achievement gap. Since the passage of the NCLB, 38 states have shown opposition to the legislation through a variety of responses including producing legislation in attempts to opt-out of provisions, turning to the judicial system for recourse when funding is withheld, and passing symbolic resolutions. This paper completes a cross-state analysis to determine why so much opposition exists to NCLB and how states’ responses have influenced Congress’s inability to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 2007, under which NCLB was created. States showing opposition vary tremendously, including by size, average family income, political ideology, and academic achievement prior to passage. By analyzing policy feedbacks due to implementation concerns of states, this paper adds to current scholars’ theories about the implementation process. By recognizing how excluded actors from the adoption of NCLB have influenced previously supportive actors of the law this paper combines elements of both top-down and bottom-up implementation approaches discussed in the literature to provide a richer and more accurate understanding of the implementation process. The starting point for such a study comes from understanding the response of those who have struggled with implementing NCLB.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"341 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122820867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Sovereign Obligations of We, the People: An Argument for Compulsory Voting in the United States","authors":"Hannah Alejandro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1789900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1789900","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents an argument for compulsory voting in the United States on the grounds that the practice best meets our civic obligations under popular sovereignty. When popular sovereignty was established by the Constitution, it transferred not only rights but the sovereign responsibilities set out in Declaration of Independence to “the People,” as well. Most basic and inalienable of these sovereign duties is the obligation to participate in governance. Because the people in representative democracy “govern” through their vote, the basic principles of both the Declaration and the Constitution reasonably support a legal obligation to participate in national elections. In reorienting the compulsory voting debate away from higher turnout concerns and towards democratic theory, the paper also examines jury service as an analogous civic obligation. I argue that coercion in jury service reinforces, rather than undermines, democratic values of equality and individual public worth, and that the same affirmative principles for civic obligation should inhere to voting. The paper then sketches the elements of a fair and administrable compulsory voting policy in the United States, based largely on the Australian model (successful since 1924). Closing with responses to the most likely internal and external critiques of the main arguments presented, the paper ultimately aims to stimulate the debate on compulsory voting by inviting further challenges to – and support for – the policy.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126620562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach","authors":"Ciara Torres-Spelliscy","doi":"10.4324/9780203804988-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203804988-24","url":null,"abstract":"American shareholders lack the ability to consent to political spending by corporations. Indeed, because of gaps between corporate and campaign finance law, U.S. corporations can make political expenditures without giving shareholders any notice of the spending either before or after the fact. This is problematic because the political interests of the managers who spend the corporate money may diverge from the political interests of shareholders who provided the funding. By contrast, British companies must seek permission from shareholders to make political expenditures under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000 and must report such spending to U.K. shareholders on an annual basis. Shareholders in U.S. companies have been protected by a century’s worth of election laws which limited the amount of money that could be spent in federal elections by corporations, unions and banks. Corporations are required to pay for federal political expenditures through corporate political action committees (PAC's). This PAC requirement was struck in Citizens United, a Supreme Court decision dated January 21, 2010. The federal corporate PAC requirement safeguarded the interests of shareholders in particular because most investors are unaware of how, when or why corporations make political expenditures. For example, in states that lack federal-style election rules, corporations may give political donations directly from their corporate treasuries (money in the corporate treasury includes funds from the sale of stocks and products). Corporations can spend money on politics without consent from or notice to shareholders. The shareholder may not know who the corporation supports or may even actively disagree with who the corporation supports. By contrast, if a shareholder chooses to give to a corporate PAC, then the shareholder is fully on notice that the money will be used for a political purpose and there is meaningful consent in the transaction. The laws that require corporations to pay for political expenditures through corporate PAC's are under legal attack in the courts. Most recently, the Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and part of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission-two cases which required corporations to conduct political spending through corporate PAC's. The Supreme Court used Citizens United as an opportunity to expand corporate speech rights. This new development in the law has hurt shareholders by allowing corporate managers to use corporate treasury funds to make political expenditures. A recent study, “Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency?” by Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2009) found that large corporate political expenditures are linked with lower shareholder value and poor corporate management. In other words, managers make political donations because they want to, not because giving will necessarily benefit the corporations they manage. Overruling Austin and part of McConn","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132777130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fishers, Divers, Scientists, Lawyers, and Marine Protected Areas: The U.S. Experience in Protecting Coral Reefs","authors":"R. Craig","doi":"10.3727/154427308787716721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3727/154427308787716721","url":null,"abstract":"Coral reef tourism in the US provides significant economic benefits that exceed those of reef-based commercial and recreational fisheries. While US coral reefs are subject to a number of stressors, fishing has created the most opposition to coral reef protection. One solution is increased use of coral reef marine protected areas (MPAs), which could simultaneously improve reef-based fisheries. US law provides a number of mechanisms for creating MPAs but contains no clear policy in favor of coral reef preservation. Nevertheless, a tension between fishing and coral reef ecosystem protection has been emerging in US law, indicating that federal law should be modified to promote coral reef ecosystem preservation.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129396332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bargaining Over a New Welfare State","authors":"A. Bonatti, Kaj Thomsson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1677433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1677433","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to develop an estimable model of legislative politics in the US Congress, second, to provide a greater understanding of the objectives behind the New Deal. In the theoretical model, the distribution of federal funds across regions of the country is the outcome of bargaining game in which the President acts as the agenda-setter and Congress bargains over the final shape of the spending bill. For any given preferences (of the President) and distribution of seats in Congress, the model delivers a unique predicted allocation. Combined with data on New Deal programs, this is used to estimate the objectives of the Roosevelt administration. The results indicate that economic concerns for relief and recovery, though not necessarily for fundamental reform and development, largely drove New Deal spending. Political concerns also mattered, but more on the margin.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114231098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who Lobbies Whom? Electoral Systems and Organized Interests' Choice of Bureaucrats vs. Politicians in Japan","authors":"Megumi Naoi, E. Krauss","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1017170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1017170","url":null,"abstract":"How do interest groups choose across different venues of lobbying to influence policy? Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? In contrast to the existing approaches that view lobbying as one-sided action by organized interest in an effort to influence a policy, we theorize lobbying as an organized interests' effort to form and enforce a contract with policy-makers, politicians or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups substantially affect their choice of lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy-makers and punish them when they fail. Specifically, we demonstrate that whether organizational structures are centralized or decentralized accounts for a good part of the variations in their decisions to lobby politicians versus bureaucrats even after controlling for organization resources, issue areas, and sectors. The types of electoral system such as majoritarian and proportional, we further argue, affect the effectiveness of various instruments of monitoring and punishment (votes, political funds, and candidate endorsement) and hence interest groups' choice to lobby politicians or bureaucrats. We test these arguments with the case of a major democracy which recently went through an electoral reform from SNTV to MMM system without major partisan change, Japan. We use a unique longitudinal survey data on lobbying which spans two decades (1980, 1994, 2003), covers around 250 organized interest groups that encompasses various sectors and issue areas. The results lend strong support to our organizational structure argument and the effect of electoral reform on interest groups' choice of lobbying tactics.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134074454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Retiring the 'Deadliest Enemies' Model of Tribal-State Relations","authors":"M. Fletcher","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1007756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1007756","url":null,"abstract":"State governments have long been described as the \"deadliest enemies\" of Indian people and Indian tribes, even with now-Chief Justice Roberts famously reversing the description in a 1997 Supreme Court brief to describe Indian tribes as the perpetrator - the \"dead[ly] enemies\" of states. The Constitutional common law rule resulting from this description prevents states from engaging with Indian tribes absent Congressional consent. But this view of tribal-state relations dates back to the first 100 years of American Constitutional jurisprudence and Indian affairs, when states and Indian tribes engaged in oft-horrific and genocidal violence. The \"deadliest enemies\" model of tribal-state relations has long passed and transformed into political and legal disputes. Outside of litigation, these disputes often are resolved via intergovernmental agreement. However, the bright-line rule resulting from the \"deadliest enemies\" model operates as a barrier to the development of peaceable tribal-state relationships. This short Essay argues for the retirement of the \"deadliest enemies\" model.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126552431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reviving the Right to Vote","authors":"Ellen D. Katz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.982853","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.982853","url":null,"abstract":"Losers in partisan districting battles have long challenged the resulting districting plans under seemingly unrelated legal doctrines. They have filed lawsuits alleging malapportionment, racial gerrymandering, and racial vote dilution, and they periodically prevail. Many election law scholars worry about these lawsuits, claiming that they needlessly \"racialize\" fundamentally political disputes, distort important legal doctrines designed for other purposes, and provide an inadequate remedy for a fundamentally distinct electoral problem. This Essay argues that the application of distinct doctrines to invalidate or diminish what are indisputably partisan gerrymanders is not necessarily problematic, and that the practice may well have salutary effects. The focus is on the Supreme Court's recent decision in LULAC v. Perry, the most recent example of the sort of judicial decision about which election law scholars fret. Unable to articulate any constitutional problem with a blatant partisan gerrymander in Texas, the Supreme Court found traction under the Voting Rights Act and held that a portion of that gerrymander diluted minority voting strength in the southwest portion of the State. A close reading of that holding as well as the Court's refusal to provide relief on a related claim brought by African-American voters in Fort Worth reveals that the race-based injuries presented in LULAC were hardly an ancillary distraction obscuring the core dispute, but instead, a predictable consequence of the gerrymander itself. As important, the surprising manner in which the Court resolved the VRA claims suggests a nascent conception of political harm experienced by all voters when system is rigged to block competition. In other words, LULAC suggests that Justice Kennedy may find within the Voting Rights Act itself the standard he has been seeking for managing claims of partisan gerrymandering.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132281596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}