{"title":"Natural Privacy","authors":"John Perry","doi":"10.5840/wurop202337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202337","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last century and a half, appeals to “privacy” have become common in American law. The result is a rather chaotic mix of concepts, which philosophers might be able to help bring into some kind of order. But I want to discuss one kind of privacy that isn’t discussed much in the law literature, what I call “natural privacy.” I strongly suspect that unlike cricket or checkers or bridge with respect to our concept of game (Wittgenstein’s example) there is something very basic about natural privacy that can illuminate, at least to a certain extent, part of the web of concepts for which we have come to use the term “privacy.” The basis of this hunch is that two aspects of natural privacy, imagination and contemplation, seem to be a very important part of what it is to be a human being. The privacy we seek by building houses, fences and private offices seems to bear a close kinship with the kind of privacy with which nature endows us. And so does the sort of privacy we seek to provide, often in vain, for things we do with the help of modern technology, from the printing press to the internet.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121441382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Marx’s Destruction of the Private by Criticism and Force","authors":"Judith A. Swanson","doi":"10.5840/wurop202335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202335","url":null,"abstract":"This essay contends that Marx sought to destroy privacy, analyzes his conception of it, and explains why he thought privacy impedes the full development of human beings. Central to his argument is a critique of constitutional states and modern liberalism, which, he maintains, by protecting and justifying individual rights, fail to recognize citizens as species beings.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121469056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sexual Violence in Conflict Situations as Structural Injustice","authors":"S. Scholz","doi":"10.5840/wurop202223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202223","url":null,"abstract":"Jus post bellum, a relatively new addition to the just war tradition, offers a set of principles to ensure a just peace. The jus post bellum principles establish important guidelines for punitive and transitional justice in the wake of unjust aggression. However, sexual violence during conflict highlights some of the limits of relying solely on a rights-based approach to jus post bellum. Using the jus post bellum principles, I offer some suggestions for what might be required regarding punishment, compensation, and rights vindication for both individuals and communities, highlighting throughout the limits of relying solely on a rights-based approach to jus post bellum. I then argue that post bellum considerations need to account for the structural injustices of sexual violence in conflict situations. Doing so supports important social justice initiatives proposed for a global response to sexual violence in conflict aimed not only at punishment but at prevention.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117044158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privacy, Dobbs v. Jackson, and the Constitutional Politics of Reproduction","authors":"Sophia Mihic","doi":"10.5840/wurop202332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202332","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s reversal of the right to abortion has significantly changed reproductive rights in the United States, and adversely affected the lives of potentially pregnant persons. The political fragility of the privacy right to abortion also raises questions about the practice and epistemic rules of American constitutionalism itself. In this essay, I situate the history of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause in the tradition of legal reasoning. With Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I argue that the majority in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) departs from this tradition. The upshot of this departure is that we now have a new interpretive language game battling a long established language game of interpretation–battling, that is, a constitutional tradition–in a contest to redefine how disagreement is transacted among justices and between the people and their government.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131021523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2021 Editorial Team","authors":"","doi":"10.5840/wurop2021111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop2021111","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124634353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privacy at Great Cost: An Argument Against Collecting and Storing DNA and Location Data and Other Mass Surveillance","authors":"M. Tunick","doi":"10.5840/wurop2023311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop2023311","url":null,"abstract":"Mass surveillance involves the collection and storage of vast amounts of information, such as DNA samples from the general population, or location data from cell phones towers, aerial surveillance, and other sources, to then be used when a future crime occurs. For example, DNA from a crime scene could be checked against the database to identify a suspect; location data could identify suspects who were at the scene of a crime. Mass surveillance implicates important privacy interests, but it would surely reduce crime and therefore has been defended by those who reject “privacy at all costs.” I also reject “privacy at all costs.” However, while agreeing that privacy is a value that must be balanced against competing values, I argue that requiring everyone to provide a sample of their DNA or keeping track of everyone’s movements would limit the autonomy of vast numbers of people who there is no reason to suspect will pose a threat, and though such policies would make society safer, that is not worth the cost to individual autonomy. After explaining why individuals can have a substantial interest in privacy even if they are not guilty of a crime, by linking that interest to the value of individual autonomy, and drawing on a political theory of liberal pluralism to restrict what counts as a legitimate public interest that might justify mass surveillance, I articulate a method of balancing these competing interests that is more feasible than a utilitarian approach.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129274009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“The Circumstances of Democracy”: Why Random Selection Is Not Better Than Elections if We Value Political Equality and Privacy","authors":"Annabelle Lever","doi":"10.5840/wurop202339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202339","url":null,"abstract":"Elections are generally considered the only way to create a democratic legislature where direct democracy is not an option. However, in recent years that assumption has been challenged by individuals who claim that lotteries are a democratic way of selecting people for office, elections are aristocratic or oligarchic, not democratic, and that elections as we know them are inadequate if true democracy is prioritized. In opposition to this wave, my paper argues that the assertions made to support the democratic merits of lotteries are unpersuasive. Current evidence that sortition is either more egalitarian or produces epistemically better results than elections is poor. Instead, these assertions illuminate the importance of elections in enabling the constituents of a democracy to reconcile the personal and political dimensions of their lives and, therefore, better reflect citizens’ claims to privacy and equality. The paper begins by recapping the main arguments for treating sortition as a democratic way to select a legislature, outlines their deficiencies, and then turns to what these perceived failings actually suggest about the democratic value of elections.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114621983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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