{"title":"隐私权,多布斯诉杰克逊案,以及生育的宪法政治","authors":"Sophia Mihic","doi":"10.5840/wurop202332","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s reversal of the right to abortion has significantly changed reproductive rights in the United States, and adversely affected the lives of potentially pregnant persons. The political fragility of the privacy right to abortion also raises questions about the practice and epistemic rules of American constitutionalism itself. In this essay, I situate the history of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause in the tradition of legal reasoning. With Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I argue that the majority in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) departs from this tradition. The upshot of this departure is that we now have a new interpretive language game battling a long established language game of interpretation–battling, that is, a constitutional tradition–in a contest to redefine how disagreement is transacted among justices and between the people and their government.","PeriodicalId":276687,"journal":{"name":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Privacy, Dobbs v. Jackson, and the Constitutional Politics of Reproduction\",\"authors\":\"Sophia Mihic\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/wurop202332\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Supreme Court’s reversal of the right to abortion has significantly changed reproductive rights in the United States, and adversely affected the lives of potentially pregnant persons. The political fragility of the privacy right to abortion also raises questions about the practice and epistemic rules of American constitutionalism itself. In this essay, I situate the history of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause in the tradition of legal reasoning. With Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I argue that the majority in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) departs from this tradition. The upshot of this departure is that we now have a new interpretive language game battling a long established language game of interpretation–battling, that is, a constitutional tradition–in a contest to redefine how disagreement is transacted among justices and between the people and their government.\",\"PeriodicalId\":276687,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Washington University Review of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Washington University Review of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202332\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Washington University Review of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/wurop202332","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
最高法院撤销堕胎权的判决极大地改变了美国的生殖权利,并对潜在怀孕者的生活产生了不利影响。堕胎隐私权在政治上的脆弱性也引发了对美国宪政本身的实践和认知规则的质疑。在这篇文章中,我将隐私权的历史置于第十四修正案的正当程序条款的法律推理传统之下。在路德维希·维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)的《论确定性》(On Certainty)一书中,我认为多布斯诉杰克逊案(Dobbs v. Jackson, 2022)中的多数人背离了这一传统。这种背离的结果是,我们现在有了一种新的解释性语言游戏,与长期存在的解释性语言游戏作斗争——也就是说,与宪法传统作斗争——在一场重新定义法官之间、人民与政府之间如何处理分歧的竞赛中。
Privacy, Dobbs v. Jackson, and the Constitutional Politics of Reproduction
The Supreme Court’s reversal of the right to abortion has significantly changed reproductive rights in the United States, and adversely affected the lives of potentially pregnant persons. The political fragility of the privacy right to abortion also raises questions about the practice and epistemic rules of American constitutionalism itself. In this essay, I situate the history of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause in the tradition of legal reasoning. With Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I argue that the majority in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) departs from this tradition. The upshot of this departure is that we now have a new interpretive language game battling a long established language game of interpretation–battling, that is, a constitutional tradition–in a contest to redefine how disagreement is transacted among justices and between the people and their government.