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Is Social Capital Associated with Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Publicly Listed Firms in the U.S. 社会资本与企业创新有关吗?来自美国上市公司的证据
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3562030
I. Hasan, Chun Keung Hoi, Qiang Wu, Hao Zhang
{"title":"Is Social Capital Associated with Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Publicly Listed Firms in the U.S.","authors":"I. Hasan, Chun Keung Hoi, Qiang Wu, Hao Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3562030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562030","url":null,"abstract":"We find that social capital in U.S. counties, as captured by strength of social norms and density of social networks, is positively associated with innovation of firms headquartered in the county, as captured by patents and citations. This relation is robust in fixed-effect regressions, instrumental variable regressions with a Bartik instrument, propensity score matching regressions, and a difference-in-differences design that isolates the effects of over time variations in social capital due to corporate headquarter relocations. Strength of social norms plays a more dominant role than density of social networks in producing these empirical regularities. Cross-sectional evidence indicates the prominence of the contracting channel through which social capital relates to innovation. Additionally, we find that social capital is also positively associated with trademarks and effectiveness of corporate R&D expenditures.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131882239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 66
Unnatural Selection of Outside Directors: Consequences of Japanese Corporate Governance Reforms 外部董事非自然选择:日本公司治理改革的后果
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-10-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3495129
Souhei Ishida, Takuma Kochiyama
{"title":"Unnatural Selection of Outside Directors: Consequences of Japanese Corporate Governance Reforms","authors":"Souhei Ishida, Takuma Kochiyama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3495129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3495129","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether firm compliance with the corporate governance reforms is associated with enhanced effectiveness of corporate governance in practice. Past literature has cast doubts on the efficacy of the “one-size-fits-all” approach and pointed out the possibility of in-form compliance, decoupling substance from appearance. Regarding this issue, we focus on the rapid increase in the number of outside directors in Japanese markets driven by the new corporate governance code and amended Companies Act. We find that, after implementation of the governance reforms, there is an increase in cases in which a company’s former auditors become new outside directors for the same company. We also report that firms that had no outside directors prior to the reforms are more likely to engage in decoupling owing to their innate unwillingness to change and redeploy former company auditors as new outside directors. Moreover, we find no evidence that increases in the number of outside directors are related to a firm’s future performance. We provide consistent but new evidence on the prediction of institutional theory and it suggests that firms tend to decouple their appearance of compliance from their practices when they have lower incentives to change.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128920769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Effects of Short Selling Bans on Resiliency and Commonality in Liquidity 卖空禁令对流动性弹性和共性的影响
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-01-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3315226
Ester Félez-Viñas
{"title":"Effects of Short Selling Bans on Resiliency and Commonality in Liquidity","authors":"Ester Félez-Viñas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3315226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315226","url":null,"abstract":"Using a unique implementation of a short selling ban on the financial stocks of Belgium, France, and Italy, I find that short selling restrictions have contrasting effects on resiliency and commona ...","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127838594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Wall Street Rule and Its Impact on Board Monitoring 华尔街规则及其对董事会监督的影响
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3102146
Brandon Chen, Lien Duong, T. Truong
{"title":"The Wall Street Rule and Its Impact on Board Monitoring","authors":"Brandon Chen, Lien Duong, T. Truong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3102146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102146","url":null,"abstract":"The “Wall Street Rule” (WSR), a form of monitoring by institutional investors, has been viewed as a “cut-and-run” strategy adopted to express dissatisfaction with a company’s management. In this study, we show that WSR, far from being a passive protest, is in fact a potent weapon to improve corporate governance. We present empirical evidence that WSR is positively associated with board monitoring when the firm is endowed with an outsider-dominated board. This suggests that WSR improves stock price informativeness, providing the board with an additional source of information so that it may monitor the company more effectively.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121590919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies 财务专家CEO: CEO的工作经验和公司的财务政策
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2024017
Cláudia Custódio, Daniel J. Metzger
{"title":"Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies","authors":"Cláudia Custódio, Daniel J. Metzger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2024017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2024017","url":null,"abstract":"We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one, they manage financial policies more actively, and their firm investments are less sensitive to cash flows. Financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tight, and they were more responsive to the dividend and capital gains tax cuts in 2003. Analyzing CEO-firm matching based on financial experience, we find that financial expert CEOs tend to be hired by more mature firms. Our results are consistent with employment histories of CEOs being relevant for corporate policies. However, we cannot formally rule out that our findings are partly explained by endogenous CEO-firm matching.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126354571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 405
Common Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions: Determinants and Consequences 并购中的共同顾问:决定因素和后果
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1929181
Anup Agrawal, Tommy Cooper, Qin Lian, Qiming Wang
{"title":"Common Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions: Determinants and Consequences","authors":"Anup Agrawal, Tommy Cooper, Qin Lian, Qiming Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1929181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1929181","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the determinants of merging firms' choice of a common or separate mergers and acquisitions adviser and the consequences of this choice on several deal outcomes. In a large sample of acquisitions, common advisers appear to be chosen in economically sensible ways. After controlling for other variables and accounting for endogeneity, we find that deals with common advisers take longer to complete and provide lower premiums to targets. We find some evidence of lower target valuations and higher bidder returns in such deals. While there is no significant difference in deals' overall quality, our evidence showing that deals with common advisers are somewhat better for acquirers than for targets favors the conflict-of-interest hypothesis over the deal improvement hypothesis. We find no evidence that merging firms avoided sharing advisers during the 1980s but strong and growing evidence of such avoidance over the following 2 decades.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133886542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Are Turnaround Specialists Special? An Examination of CEO Reputation and CEO Succession 转型专家特别吗?CEO声誉与CEO继任研究
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-09-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1956691
Jesse A. Ellis
{"title":"Are Turnaround Specialists Special? An Examination of CEO Reputation and CEO Succession","authors":"Jesse A. Ellis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1956691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1956691","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the economic consequences for firms that hire CEOs who have a reputation for being turnaround specialists. Abnormal returns around announcements that turnaround specialists have been hired as CEOs are significantly positive and more than 6 percentage points larger than the returns associated with announcements of other CEO successions. Significant differences exist in the attributes of firms that hire turnaround specialists as CEOs versus firms that hire others as CEOs in ways consistent with several hypotheses that I develop. Specifically, firms that hire turnaround specialists face a higher probability of distress, lower profit rates, and lower pre-succession stock returns than firms that hire others as CEOs. Firms that hire turnaround specialists reduce operating scale and show significant improvement in operating performance on average, indicating that the turnaround specialists’ reputation is commensurate with their abilities and managerial style.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131872837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Information Disclosure, CEO Traits and Share Buyback Completion Rates 信息披露、CEO特质与股票回购完成率
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2023051
Dimitris Andriosopoulos, Hafiz Hoque, K. Andriosopoulos
{"title":"Information Disclosure, CEO Traits and Share Buyback Completion Rates","authors":"Dimitris Andriosopoulos, Hafiz Hoque, K. Andriosopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2023051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023051","url":null,"abstract":"Open market buybacks are not firm commitments and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. We employ a comprehensive set of hand-collected data on information disclosure on open market share buyback announcements and the respective buyback trades in UK. We assess whether CEO traits can affect the buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure is one of the major determinants of buyback completion rates. Like previous studies, we find that large and widely held firms, firms conducting subsequent buyback programmes, and firms which complete their previous programmes, have higher completion rates. Finally, we find that firms with senior CEOs, who hold external directorships and have received a business education, are more likely to complete their buyback programs. Our results suggest there is clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO traits and buyback completion rates.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122624419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entrenchment and Investment 堑壕与投资
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2022867
Suman Banerjee, Ronald W. Masulis
{"title":"Entrenchment and Investment","authors":"Suman Banerjee, Ronald W. Masulis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2022867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022867","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate governance is on the reform agenda all over the globe. This paper shows that restrictions on the issuance of non-voting shares may cause managers who own equity in the firm to under-invest. When a firm issues voting shares to raise capital for new investment, there is a dilution in the manager's ownership. This increases the risk to the manager's control of the firm, decreasing his chances of obtaining the private benefits of control. The problem is most severe in firms where managers extract significant private benefits. Non-voting stock allows a firm to raise equity capital without a dilution in the manager's ownership and alleviates the under-investment problem. There are costs to the issuance of non-voting stock -- managerial entrenchment, dividend dilution and firms in the control of inferior managers. The issuance of non-voting equity is optimal when the benefits, higher firm value because of higher investment, outweigh the costs of managerial entrenchment. We obtain conditions under which it is optimal for firms to issue non-voting stock. Our theory is consistent with the empirical findings of Faccio & Masulis (2005) who show that a fear of loss of control makes shareholders reluctant to issue voting equity to finance M&A activities. In addition, our model produces new empirical predictions regarding the relationship between the likelihood of dual-class recapitalization and incumbent management quality, management ownership and the effectiveness of other mechanisms to restrict private benefits.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128417963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effects of Ownership Structure and Governance on Corporate Financing Decisions 股权结构和治理结构对公司融资决策的影响
ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1985536
Thomas O'Connor, T. Flavin
{"title":"The Effects of Ownership Structure and Governance on Corporate Financing Decisions","authors":"Thomas O'Connor, T. Flavin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1985536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1985536","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the impact of firm-specific stock market liberalization events on the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms from emerging market economies. In particular, we focus on the potentially different responses of firms with different ownership structures and associated governance regimes at the time of liberalization. Our empirical results show that single-class-share (typically with stronger corporate governance) firms respond differently to their dual-class-share counterparts. Liberalization results in lower debt reliance for the former group while the latter lengthen the maturity of their debt portfolios.","PeriodicalId":273234,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Corporate Governance (Econometrics) (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129616542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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