财务专家CEO: CEO的工作经验和公司的财务政策

Cláudia Custódio, Daniel J. Metzger
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引用次数: 405

摘要

我们研究的是有金融职业背景的ceo。拥有财务专家首席执行官的公司持有的现金更少,债务更多,股票回购更多。财务专家首席执行官在财务上更老练:他们不太可能使用全公司范围内的贴现率,而不是特定项目的贴现率,他们更积极地管理财务政策,他们的公司投资对现金流不那么敏感。即使在信贷条件紧张的情况下,金融专家首席执行官也能够筹集外部资金,而且他们对2003年股息和资本利得税的削减反应更积极。基于财务经验分析ceo与公司的匹配,我们发现财务专家ceo倾向于被更成熟的公司聘用。我们的研究结果与ceo的就业经历与公司政策的相关性是一致的。然而,我们不能正式排除我们的发现部分是由内生的ceo -企业匹配来解释的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies
We study CEOs with a career background in finance. Firms with financial expert CEOs hold less cash, more debt, and engage in more share repurchases. Financial expert CEOs are more financially sophisticated: they are less likely to use one companywide discount rate instead of a project-specific one, they manage financial policies more actively, and their firm investments are less sensitive to cash flows. Financial expert CEOs are able to raise external funds even when credit conditions are tight, and they were more responsive to the dividend and capital gains tax cuts in 2003. Analyzing CEO-firm matching based on financial experience, we find that financial expert CEOs tend to be hired by more mature firms. Our results are consistent with employment histories of CEOs being relevant for corporate policies. However, we cannot formally rule out that our findings are partly explained by endogenous CEO-firm matching.
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