Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Ipos and Long Term Relationships: An Advantage of Book Building","authors":"Ann E. Sherman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.235928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.235928","url":null,"abstract":"There is a global trend in initial public offerings toward the increased use of book building. Relative to other methods such as auctions, a key feature of book building is that the underwriter has total discretion in allocating shares, allowing allocations to be based on long-term relationships between underwriters and investors. In a multiperiod model with endogenous (and costly) information acquisition. I show that the underwriter's ability to lower underpricing depends largely on its ability to favor regular uninformed investors. One implication is that the hybrid book building/open offer method, which is becoming increasingly popular internationally, will lead to higher underpricing than straight book building. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131508294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Earnings Skewness and Analyst Forecast Bias","authors":"Joanna S. Wu, Zhaoyang Gu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.230772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.230772","url":null,"abstract":"Statistically optimal forecasts need not be unbiased. If analysts' objective is to provide the most accurate forecast through minimizing the mean absolute forecast error, the optimal forecast is the median instead of the mean earnings. When earnings distribution is skewed, the median is different from the mean and forecast bias is observed. Thus, analyst forecast bias could be a natural result of analysts' effort to improve forecast accuracy combined with skewed distribution of earnings. We find that earnings skewness explains a significant amount of variation in analyst forecast bias across firms, across fiscal quarters and across time. Moreover, the market appears to understand at least part of the skewness-induced bias and adjusts accordingly. One salient feature of our explanation is that we predict not only forecast optimism for firms with negatively skewed earnings, but also pessimism for firms with positively skewed earnings, thus providing a more coherent explanation of analyst forecast bias.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"272 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125834197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lawyer Experience and IPO Pricing","authors":"R. R. Barondes, Gary C. Sanger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.227729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.227729","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the level of experience of law firms participating in IPOs and the impact of law firm experience on IPO pricing. We find a statistically significant, negative relationship between market share of the law firm representing the investment banks and IPO price. In general, the relationship between legal counsel to the issuer and IPO price is of the same sign but not statistically significant, at customary levels, in all model specifications. We also find regional variations; there is a statistically significant, negative relationship between price and the participation of New York City underwriters? lawyers. This evidence is consistent with more practiced legal counsel requiring more negative disclosure in prospectuses.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127318960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Do Companies Go Public? Empirical Evidence from Germany's Neuer Markt","authors":"Christoph A. Fischer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.229529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229529","url":null,"abstract":"Comparing the balance sheet structure of privately held German firms and companies which went public on Neuer Markt, Europe's dominant stock market segment for growth firms, we analyse the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) of technology-based firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the proportion of intangible assets as well as R&D intensity. IPOs are more likely for firms that grew and invested a lot. Leverage is only significant in year two before flotation and increases the probability of going public. We conclude that issuers on Neuer Markt are in urgent need of equity capital to fund new investment. The analysis of the companies that went public in other stock market segments on Frankfurt Stock Exchange shows that these IPO were realised at a time when the issuers were in sound eco-nomic and financial conditions. In a second step, the evolution of ownership and control around the IPO is analysed. The controlling shareholders of the Neuer Markt companies, most often board members, keep tight control over the firm's assets even after flotation. Founders continue to hold a significant stake of voting equity and keep up to be strongly represented in the firm's management and supervisory board. Board members typically use the IPO not only as a vehicle to get new funding without any significant loss of control due to a dispersed allocation of sold shares. They even consolidate control as the relative size of their blockholding - in comparison with the other blockholders' stakes - increases.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115320015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Economic, Political, and Legal Factors in Financial System Development: International Patterns in Historical Perspective","authors":"Caroline M. Fohlin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.267674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267674","url":null,"abstract":"Financial systems are often described either as bank-based, universal, and relational or as market-based, specialized, and arms-length; and for many years academics and policymakers have debated the relative merits of these different types of systems. This paper inquires into the underlying causes of financial system structure and development. Older theories dictated that financial institutions developed in relationship to the economy's level of development. Newer work has brought political and legal factors to the fore: hypothesizing specific relationships between banking structure and state centralization and between financial development and legal tradition. This study classifies countries by type of financial system, and in doing, indicates that few banking systems fit the extreme paradigms of universal-relationship or specialized-arms length banking. On the other hand, despite several cases of temporary upheaval, and recent widespread movement toward conglomeration, banking system structure has remained remarkable stable over the last 100 to 150 years. Economic factors in the late nineteenth century provide relatively strong explanatory power for financial system development, market orientation, and banking structure at the eve of World War I and in the present day. Banking specialization and market orientation appear strongly associated with legal tradition, though it seems more likely that the three characteristics are jointly determined or that the legal system variable simply proxies for a close or historical tie to the exporter of many political-economic institutions, England. Legal orientation exerted little impact on financial institution growth at the turn of the century and provides no consistent prediction of real economic growth rates over the past 150 years. Finally, political structure relates significantly to market orientation but not to banking system design or legal tradition. Nonetheless, many individual country histories make it clear that political forces played important roles in shaping regulations that in turn altered the course of financial institutions and markets. The results here simply suggest that these political forces appeared inconsistently and had no traceable, uniform relationship to the overall political system in place in the nineteenth century. The results underscore two principal themes: the weight of history in determining the growth and design of financial institutions and markets, and the importance of idiosyncratic forces that buffet institutions over time. Despite obvious connections among political, legal, economic, and financial institutions, robust, long-term, causal relationships often prove to be elusive.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129273237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Lead to Poor Performance?","authors":"W. Mikkelson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.186950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.186950","url":null,"abstract":"Conservative financial policies are often criticized as serving the interests of managers rather than the interests of stockholders. We examine the operating performance and other characteristics of firms that for a five-year period held more than one-fourth of their assets in cash and cash equivalents. Following the five-year period operating performance of high cash firms is comparable to or greater than the performance of firms matched by size, industry, or prior performance. In addition, proxies for managerial incentive problems, such as ownership and board characteristics, are not unusual and do not explain differences in operating performance among high cash firms. We conclude that persistent large holdings of cash and equivalents have not hindered corporate performance.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134636001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Japanese Corporate Governance and Macroeconomic Problems","authors":"Masao Nakamura, R. Morck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.235758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.235758","url":null,"abstract":"Japan's prolonged economic problems are due to more than faulty macro-economic policies. We do not deny the importance of bungled macro-economic policy, but argue than deeper maladies in Japanese corporate governance made that country increasingly vulnerable to such problems. We argue that Japan's main bank and financial keiretsu systems left corporate governance largely in the hands of creditors rather than shareholders. thus, Japanese governance practices did not assign effective control rights to residual claimants. This, we argue led to a widespread misallocation of capital that mired Japan in excess capacity and liquidity problems.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122053591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing","authors":"J. Matsusaka, Vikram Nanda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.8212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.8212","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a theory of organization based on the benefits and costs of internal capital markets. A central assumption is that the transaction cost of raising external funds is greater than the cost of internal funds. The benefit of internal resource allocation is that it gives the firm a real option to avoid external capital markets (and the associated deadweight transaction costs) in more states of the world than single-business firms. The cost is the internal resource flexibility exacerbates an over investment agency problem. The optimal focus is determined by trading off the benefit of the option against the cost of over investment. In this context, we show how the relative efficiency of integration and separation depends ultimately on assignment of control rights over cash flow. Testable implications are derived for the level of divisional investment, the sensitivity of divisional investment to cash flow, and the diversification discount.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133969817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Of What Value are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?","authors":"Andrew K. Prevost, R. Rao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.177268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.177268","url":null,"abstract":"This study finds that public pension fund proposals act as a signaling mechanism in alerting the market that management is unwilling or unable to negotiate a settlement with the public fund in order to prevent the submission of the proposal. We find that firms receiving proposals for the first time experience a transitory decrease in shareholder wealth, while firms targeted repeatedly exhibit negative wealth effects over much wider event windows. Long-run changes in the firms' operating performance and stock price returns are consistent with these results. A comparison of corporate governance characteristics provides further insight into our findings. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129008926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Managerial Myopia and Non-Financial Measures: The Case of Customer Satisfaction Mitigating Hard-Selling","authors":"A. Thevaranjan, K. Joseph, Dhinu Srinivasan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.208388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.208388","url":null,"abstract":"Increasingly, firms are augmenting financial measures of performance with non-financial measures of performance with a view to instill a long-run focus and reduce managerial myopia. Thus, in this paper, we utilize an agency-theoretic model to examine closely how financial measures cause managerial myopia and how non-financial measures mitigate managerial myopia. To this effect, we explicitly model a specific myopic behavior within the personal selling function, namely, hard-selling. In this context, we find that incentives based on financial measures (gross profits) do not always cause managerial myopia and that non-financial measures (customer satisfaction) are not always useful in mitigating managerial myopia. However, when non-financial measures are useful, we find that they can serve two different roles, namely, suppressing hard-selling and enhancing the utilization of the financial measure. Moreover, their introduction can either increase or decrease the weight placed on financial measures. Finally, we find that improvements in the precision of non-financial measures increase both the weight placed on non-financial measures as well as the weight placed on financial measures. Key Words: Non-financial measures; Agency theory; Salesforce compensation","PeriodicalId":272257,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115722712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}