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Essence and Existence最新文献

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Exact Truthmakers, Modality, and Essence 准确的真理制造者，形态和本质
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0008
B. Hale
{"title":"Exact Truthmakers, Modality, and Essence","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Non-reductive essentialist explanations of necessities and possibilities in general locate their source in a special, basic or fundamental kind of necessities—those directly arising from the essences of things. All remaining necessities and possibilities can be seen as grounded, more or less indirectly, in these basic necessities. If this idea is on the right lines, it ought to be possible to distinguish clearly between those necessities which are directly grounded in the natures of things, and those which are indirectly so grounded. Special interest is shown in this question, treated within the framework of Fine’s version of truthmaker semantics. We might expect that within this framework, it would be possible to capture the distinction between what is directly true in virtue of essence, and what is only indirectly true.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116697203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
S5 as the Logic of Metaphysical Modality: Two Arguments for and Two Arguments against S5作为形而上学形态的逻辑:两个赞成和两个反对的论点
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0009
B. Hale
{"title":"S5 as the Logic of Metaphysical Modality: Two Arguments for and Two Arguments against","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Two arguments for S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are favourably discussed: one from the logic of absolute necessity, one from Timothy Williamson. Two arguments against S5 being the logic of metaphysical modality are discussed and rebuffed: one from Nathan Salmon against S4, and thereby S5, being the logical of metaphysical modality; and one from Michael Dummett against the B principle for metaphysical modality. In the Appendix, some comments are offered on the logics of ‘true in virtue of the nature of’, and its relation to logical necessity. It is argued that the logic both of ‘true in virtue of the nature of x’ and of essentialist logical necessity is S5.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115926450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions with Crispin Wright Bolzano与Crispin Wright对分析命题的定义
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0016
B. Hale
{"title":"Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions with Crispin Wright","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter begins by drawing attention to some drawbacks of the Frege-Quine definition of analytic truth. With this the definition of analytic propositions given by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre is contrasted. If Bolzano’s definition is viewed, as Bolzano himself almost certainly did not view it, as attempting to capture the notion of analyticity as truth-in-virtue-of-meaning, which occupied centre stage during the first half of the last century and which, Quine’s influential assault on it notwithstanding, continues to attract philosophical attention, it runs into some very serious problems. It is argued that Bolzano’s central idea can, nevertheless, be used as the basis of a new definition which avoids these problems and possesses definite advantages over the Frege-Quine approach.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133196203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Makes True Universal Statements True? 什么使真全称命题为真?
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0007
B. Hale
{"title":"What Makes True Universal Statements True?","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"What makes true universal statements true? For example, what makes the statement that all aardvarks are insectivorous true? In addressing this question, this chapter focuses especially on how it is to be answered within the framework of what Kit Fine calls exact truthmaker semantics. The main aim is to promote an alternative account of the truthmakers for quantified propositions. This chapter also gives some attention to two closely-related questions: first, when, and why, we should favour an alternative to the standard account, and second, whether the alternative account proposed can be accommodated within the framework of exact truthmaker semantics, in Fine’s sense.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116671759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Definition, Abstraction, Postulation, and Magic 定义、抽象、假设和魔法
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0011
B. Hale
{"title":"Definition, Abstraction, Postulation, and Magic","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"In recent work, Kit Fine proposes a new approach to the philosophy of mathematics, which he calls procedural postulationism: the postulates from which a mathematical theory is derived are imperatival, rather than indicative, in character. According to procedural postulationism, what is postulated in mathematics are not propositions true in a given mathematical domain, but rather procedures for the construction of that domain. Fine claims some very significant advantages for procedural postulationism over other approaches. This chapter raises some questions for the view and its promised advantages. One crucial set of questions concerns how exactly the commands of procedural postulationism are to be understood. And in particular, how literally are we to take talk of construction?","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126173018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Properties, Predication, and Arbitrary Sets 属性、预测和任意集
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0014
B. Hale
{"title":"Properties, Predication, and Arbitrary Sets","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"Shapiro and Hale disagree over the appropriate domain of quantification for second-order logic: Shapiro allows property variables to range over the full power set of the first-order domain, whereas Hale restricts the domain to only subsets which can be defined. Hale defends his view, via a discussion of Shapiro’s view that objects in a domain of quantification need not be able to be objects of singular reference (for example, geometrical points and electrons). Shapiro’s view is clearly at odds with Hale’s favoured broadly Fregean approach to ontology, according to which objects are simply those things to which reference may be made by means of actual or possible singular terms.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129775118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relative Necessity Reformulated with Jessica Leech 杰西卡·里奇重新诠释了相对必要性
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0010
B. Hale
{"title":"Relative Necessity Reformulated with Jessica Leech","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses some serious difficulties for what it calls the standard account of various kinds of relative necessity, according to which any given kind of relative necessity may be defined by a strict conditional—necessarily, if C then p—where C is a suitable constant proposition, such as a conjunction of physical laws. It is argued, with the help of Humberstone (1981), that the standard account has several unpalatable consequences. It is argued that Humberstone’s alternative account has certain disadvantages, and another—considerably simpler—solution is offered. The proposed alternative takes seriously the idea that the standard account omits crucial information which, if suitably replaced, allows the problems to be solved.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125772752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ontological Categories and the Problem of Expressibility with Øystein Linnebo 本体范畴与可表达性问题Øystein Linnebo
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0006
B. Hale
{"title":"Ontological Categories and the Problem of Expressibility with Øystein Linnebo","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Frege famously held that ontological categories correspond to logico-syntactic types. Something is an object just in case it can be referred to by a singular term, and likewise for all the other ontological categories. However, this view faces an expressibility problem. In order to express the view, we need to generalize across ontological categories; but according to the view itself, any one variable can only range over a single ontological category. This chapter provides a sharp formulation of the problem of expressibility. It shows that there is no easy way out, and then explores some of the hard ways out.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127106666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Problem of Mathematical Objects 数学对象的问题
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-0431-2_2
B. Hale
{"title":"The Problem of Mathematical Objects","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1007/978-94-007-0431-2_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0431-2_2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129322123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ontology Deflated 本体泄气
Essence and Existence Pub Date : 2020-06-25 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0005
B. Hale
{"title":"Ontology Deflated","authors":"B. Hale","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854296.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Kit Fine (Fine, 2009) rejects the standard Quinean quantificational account of ontological questions and favours an account of a very different kind on which existence or reality is expressed not by quantifiers but by a predicate ‘exists’ or ‘is real’, itself ultimately to be explained in terms of a sentential operator. Although primarily directed against the quantificational account, Fine’s criticisms apply equally to the account favoured by Hale, which rejects much of Quine’s view but agrees with him on a fundamental point: ‘The mark of our commitment to entities of a given kind is our acceptance, as strictly and literally true, of statements embedding expressions which, if they have reference at all, have entities of that kind as their referents, or semantic values.’ The chapter’s aim here is to explain why Hale finds Fine’s criticisms to be unsound.","PeriodicalId":271962,"journal":{"name":"Essence and Existence","volume":"53 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115606186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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