Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions with Crispin Wright

Abstract

The chapter begins by drawing attention to some drawbacks of the Frege-Quine definition of analytic truth. With this the definition of analytic propositions given by Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre is contrasted. If Bolzano’s definition is viewed, as Bolzano himself almost certainly did not view it, as attempting to capture the notion of analyticity as truth-in-virtue-of-meaning, which occupied centre stage during the first half of the last century and which, Quine’s influential assault on it notwithstanding, continues to attract philosophical attention, it runs into some very serious problems. It is argued that Bolzano’s central idea can, nevertheless, be used as the basis of a new definition which avoids these problems and possesses definite advantages over the Frege-Quine approach.