Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks最新文献

On the Effect of Update Frequency on Geo-Indistinguishability of Mobility Traces 更新频率对移动轨迹地理不可分辨性的影响

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212490

Ricardo Mendes, J. Vilela

{"title":"On the Effect of Update Frequency on Geo-Indistinguishability of Mobility Traces","authors":"Ricardo Mendes, J. Vilela","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212490","url":null,"abstract":"Sharing location data is becoming more popular as mobile devices become ubiquitous. Location-based service providers use this type of data to provide geographically contextualized services to their users. However, sharing exact locations with possibly untrustworthy entities poses a thread to privacy. Geo-indistinguishability has been recently proposed as a formal notion based on the concept of differential privacy to design location privacy-preserving mechanisms in the context of sporadic release of location data. While adaptations for the case of continuous location updates have been proposed, the study on how the frequency of updates impacts the privacy and utility level is yet to be made. In this paper we address this issue, by analyzing the effect of frequency updates on the privacy and utility levels of four mechanisms: the standard planar Laplacian mechanism suitable for sparse locations, and three variants of an adaptive mechanism that is an adaptation of the standard mechanism for continuous location updates. Results show that the frequency of updates largely impacts the correlation between points. As the frequency of updates decreases, the correlation also decreases. The adaptive mechanism is able to adjust the privacy and utility levels accordingly to the correlation between past positions and current position. However, the estimator function that is used to predict the current location has a great influence in the obtained results.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130606093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Signal Jamming Attacks Against Communication-Based Train Control: Attack Impact and Countermeasure 基于通信的列车控制信号干扰攻击:攻击影响及对策

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212500

S. Lakshminarayana, Jabir Shabbir Karachiwala, Sang-Yoon Chang, G. Revadigar, Sristi Lakshmi Sravana Kumar, David K. Y. Yau, Yih-Chun Hu

{"title":"Signal Jamming Attacks Against Communication-Based Train Control: Attack Impact and Countermeasure","authors":"S. Lakshminarayana, Jabir Shabbir Karachiwala, Sang-Yoon Chang, G. Revadigar, Sristi Lakshmi Sravana Kumar, David K. Y. Yau, Yih-Chun Hu","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212500","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of signal jamming attacks against the communication based train control (CBTC) systems and develop the countermeasures to limit the attacks' impact. CBTC supports the train operation automation and moving-block signaling, which improves the transport efficiency. We consider an attacker jamming the wireless communication between the trains or the train to wayside access point, which can disable CBTC and the corresponding benefits. In contrast to prior work studying jamming only at the physical or link layer, we study the real impact of such attacks on end users, namely train journey time and passenger congestion. Our analysis employs a detailed model of leaky medium-based communication system (leaky waveguide or leaky feeder/coaxial cable) popularly used in CBTC systems. To counteract the jamming attacks, we develop a mitigation approach based on frequency hopping spread spectrum taking into account domain-specific structure of the leaky-medium CBTC systems. Specifically, compared with existing implementations of FHSS, we apply FHSS not only between the transmitter-receiver pair but also at the track-side repeaters. To demonstrate the feasibility of implementing this technology in CBTC systems, we develop a FHSS repeater prototype using software-defined radios on both leaky-medium and open-air (free-wave) channels. We perform extensive simulations driven by realistic running profiles of trains and real-world passenger data to provide insights into the jamming attack's impact and the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130634157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19

SRide: A Privacy-Preserving Ridesharing System SRide:一个保护隐私的拼车系统

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212483

U. Aïvodji, Kévin Huguenin, Marie-José Huguet, M. Killijian

{"title":"SRide: A Privacy-Preserving Ridesharing System","authors":"U. Aïvodji, Kévin Huguenin, Marie-José Huguet, M. Killijian","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212483","url":null,"abstract":"Ridesharing, in which drivers offer to share their rides, allows reduction of travel costs for both drivers and riders; such practice is increasingly popular. Modern ridesharing systems, enhanced with location-based features, have improved user experience by enabling drivers and riders to arrange a trip in near real time. However, the fine-grained nature of location data collected by the service providers and exchanged between users raises privacy issues that could disrupt the adoption of such systems. In this paper, we present SRide: a privacy-preserving protocol for ridesharing that addresses the matching problem for dynamic ridesharing systems. We design and implement a prototype of SRide that operates in four steps. First, it generalizes users spatiotemporal data of users. Next, it relies on a secure filtering protocol to compute feasible matches. Then, it uses an improved version of Priv-2SP-SP- a privacy-preserving protocol to compute meeting points for ridesharing- to compute a ridesharing score for each feasible pair. Finally, it computes the optimal assignment of drivers and riders based on their ridesharing scores. We conduct an experimental trace-driven evaluation of the proposed scheme to demonstrate its practical feasibility.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"347 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132469817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 42

Interference Suppression in Bandwidth Hopping Spread Spectrum Communications 跳频扩频通信中的干扰抑制

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212484

D. Giustiniano, Markus Schalch, Marc Liechti, Vincent Lenders

{"title":"Interference Suppression in Bandwidth Hopping Spread Spectrum Communications","authors":"D. Giustiniano, Markus Schalch, Marc Liechti, Vincent Lenders","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212484","url":null,"abstract":"Bandwidth hopping spread spectrum (BHSS) has recently been proposed as a spectrum-efficient technique to combat jamming. In BHSS, the transmitter is randomly hopping the signal bandwidth in order to make it unpredictable to an attacker. When the signal bandwidth is unpredictable, the attacker cannot match its interference bandwidth to the signal bandwidth of the transmitter, and the receiver can filter out the interference power (or parts of it) prior demodulation, and thus increase decoding performance. The main challenge in BHSS is that the bandwidth must be hopping very rapidly at the symbol level in order to prevent a reactive jammer from following the hopping pattern by simple tracking techniques. Existing receiver filtering techniques as proposed in prior work require a long time to estimate the filter parameters and are thus unable to suppress the interference from the jammer when the bandwidth is hopping at the symbol level. In this paper, we propose a new filtering approach adapted for BHSS which is able to suppress arbitrary jamming interference even when the signal bandwidth is hopping after every symbol. Our approach is based on a filter bank which applies different filters in parallel and dynamically selects the best filter for every symbol according to the soft-state output of the demodulator. We evaluate the improvement of our method over classical filtering techniques in experiments using software-defined radios. Our results show a gain in interference suppression above 30 dB with respect to state-of-the-art solutions. We further implement frequency hopping for a BHSS system, and demonstrate the superiority of a system combining hopping in bandwidth, code and frequency against jamming attacks.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133183969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Lightweight Message Authentication for Constrained Devices 受约束设备的轻量级消息身份验证

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212482

E. Dubrova, M. Näslund, G. Selander, Fredrik Lindqvist

引用次数: 1

LTE Misbehavior Detection in Wi-Fi/LTE Coexistence Under the LAA-LTE Standard LAA-LTE标准下Wi-Fi/LTE共存中的LTE不当行为检测

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212485

I. Samy, Loukas Lazos, Yong Xiao, Ming Li, M. Krunz

{"title":"LTE Misbehavior Detection in Wi-Fi/LTE Coexistence Under the LAA-LTE Standard","authors":"I. Samy, Loukas Lazos, Yong Xiao, Ming Li, M. Krunz","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212485","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider the fair coexistence between LTE and Wi-Fi systems in unlicensed bands. We focus on the misbehavior opportunities that stem from the heterogeneity of the coexisting systems and the lack of explicit coordination mechanisms. We show that a selfishly behaving LTE can gain an unfair share of the spectrum resources through the manipulation of the parameters defined in the LAA-LTE standard, including the manipulation of the backoff mechanism of LAA, the traffic class, the clear channel assignment threshold and others. We develop a detection mechanism for the Wi-Fi system that can identify a misbehaving LTE system. Our mechanism advances the state of the art by providing an accurate monitoring method of the LTE behavior under various topological scenarios, without explicit cross-system coordination. Deviations from the expected behavior are determined by computing the statistical distance between the protocol-specified and estimated distributions of the LAA-LTE protocol parameters. We analytically characterize the detection and false alarm probabilities and show that our detector yields high detection accuracy at very low false alarm rate, for a wise choice of statistical parameters.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126855627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

SCAnDroid: Automated Side-Channel Analysis of Android APIs SCAnDroid: Android api的自动侧信道分析

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212506

Raphael Spreitzer, Gerald Palfinger, S. Mangard

{"title":"SCAnDroid: Automated Side-Channel Analysis of Android APIs","authors":"Raphael Spreitzer, Gerald Palfinger, S. Mangard","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212506","url":null,"abstract":"Although the Android system has been continuously hardened against side-channel attacks, there are still plenty of APIs available that can be exploited. However, most side-channel analyses in the literature consider specifically chosen APIs (or resources) in the Android framework, after a manual analysis of APIs for possible information leaks has been performed. Such a manual analysis is a tedious, time consuming, and error-prone task, meaning that information leaks tend to be overlooked. To overcome this tedious task, we introduce SCANDROID, a framework that automatically profiles the Java-based Android API for possible information leaks. Events of interest, such as website launches, Google Maps queries, or application starts, are triggered automatically, and while these events are being triggered, the Java-based Android API is analyzed for possible information leaks that allow inferring these events later on. To assess the Android API for information leaks, SCANDROID relies on dynamic time warping. By applying SCANDROID on Android 8 (Android Oreo), we identified several Android APIs that allow inferring website launches, Google Maps queries, and application starts. The triggered events are by no means exhaustive but have been chosen to demonstrate the broad applicability of SCANDROID. Among the automatically identified information leaks are, for example, the java.io.File API, the android.os.storage.StorageManager API, and several methods within the android.net. Traffics tats API. Thereby, we identify the first side-channel leaks in the Android API on Android 8 (Android Oreo).","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131620507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 22

Hello, Is It Me You're Looking For?: Differentiating Between Human and Electronic Speakers for Voice Interface Security 你好，你在找我吗?:区分人类和电子扬声器的语音接口安全

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212505

Logan Blue, Luis Vargas, Patrick Traynor

{"title":"Hello, Is It Me You're Looking For?: Differentiating Between Human and Electronic Speakers for Voice Interface Security","authors":"Logan Blue, Luis Vargas, Patrick Traynor","doi":"10.1145/3212480.3212505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212505","url":null,"abstract":"Voice interfaces are increasingly becoming integrated into a variety of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Such systems can dramatically simplify interactions between users and devices with limited displays. Unfortunately voice interfaces also create new opportunities for exploitation. Specifically any sound-emitting device within range of the system implementing the voice interface (e.g., a smart television, an Internet-connected appliance, etc) can potentially cause these systems to perform operations against the desires of their owners (e.g., unlock doors, make unauthorized purchases, etc). We address this problem by developing a technique to recognize fundamental differences in audio created by humans and electronic speakers. We identify sub-bass over-excitation, or the presence of significant low frequency signals that are outside of the range of human voices but inherent to the design of modern speakers, as a strong differentiator between these two sources. After identifying this phenomenon, we demonstrate its use in preventing adversarial requests, replayed audio, and hidden commands with a 100%/1.72% TPR/FPR in quiet environments. In so doing, we demonstrate that commands injected via nearby audio devices can be effectively removed by voice interfaces.","PeriodicalId":267134,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134523135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 50

SWARD: A Secure WAke-up RaDio against Denial-of-Service on IoT devices SWARD:针对物联网设备上拒绝服务的安全唤醒无线电

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3212488

Maxime Montoya, Simone Bacles-Min, A. Molnos, J. Fournier

引用次数: 9

Analysis of the Effect of the Distance-Decreasing Attacks on GNSS Authenticated Signals 距离衰减攻击对GNSS认证信号的影响分析

Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI: 10.1145/3212480.3226102

Kewei Zhang, Panos Papadimitratos

引用次数: 0