ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)最新文献_第2页

The Effect of Gender on Tolerance of Type 1 and Type 2 Error in Judicial Decisions 性别对司法判决中第一类和第二类错误容忍度的影响

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3915049

Stanton Hudja, Jason Ralston, Siyu Wang, J. Aimone, Lucas Rentschler, Charles M. North

引用次数: 1

The Effect of Network Formation on Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 有限重复囚徒困境下网络形成对合作的影响

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3900196

Kyubin Yim, E. Hoffman

引用次数: 0

Hope Hurts: Attribution Bias in Yelp Reviews 希望伤害:Yelp评论中的归因偏见

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3891195

Ying Huang, David Min-heng Wang, Shuyan Zhan

{"title":"Hope Hurts: Attribution Bias in Yelp Reviews","authors":"Ying Huang, David Min-heng Wang, Shuyan Zhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3891195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891195","url":null,"abstract":"This paper incorporates applied econometrics, causal machine learning and theories of reference-dependent preferences to test whether consuming in a restaurant on special occasions, such as one's birthday, anniversary, graduation, etc., would raise one's expectations of the restaurant and would increase consumers' tendency to rate their consumption experiences lower. Furthermore, our study is closely linked to the emerging literature of attribution bias in economics and psychology and provides a scenario in which we can empirically test two leading theories of attribution bias. In our paper, we analyzed reviews from Yelp and combined the text analyses with regressions, matching techniques and causal machine learning. Through a series of models, we found evidence that consumers' ratings for restaurants are indeed lower when they go to restaurants on special occasions. This result can be explained by one theory of attribution bias according to which people have higher expectations about restaurants on special occasions and then misattribute their disappointment to the quality of the restaurants. From the connection between our empirical analysis and theories of attribution bias, this paper provides evidence of how attribution bias influences people's perceptions and behaviors.","PeriodicalId":263662,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123053219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Exploration Versus Exploitation: A Laboratory Test of the Single-Agent Exponential Bandit Model 探索与开发:单智能体指数强盗模型的实验室测试

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3484498

Stanton Hudja, Daniel Woods

引用次数: 4

Impatience for Information: Curiosity Is Here Today, Gone Tomorrow 对信息缺乏耐心:好奇心今天还在，明天就消失了

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3879168

A. Molnár, Russell Golman

{"title":"Impatience for Information: Curiosity Is Here Today, Gone Tomorrow","authors":"A. Molnár, Russell Golman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3879168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3879168","url":null,"abstract":"Based on the curiosity‐as‐drive theory and the theory of information gaps, we argue that curiosity—that is, the desire to seek out novel information for its own sake—is highly transient, and while people may be tempted by immediate answers, they may be less motivated when they need to wait for information. Contrary to standard economic models, we predict an immediacy effect (or present bias) for information even in those cases when waiting does not affect the objective value of information. Furthermore, we argue that this immediacy effect is independent from motivated emotion‐management; that is, introducing delays makes people less willing to obtain information for its own sake even when information does not elicit strong anticipatory feelings. We test these hypotheses in two pre‐registered experiments (N = 2406) featuring real effort and monetary incentives and find that introducing a delay in information provision significantly reduces participants' willingness to obtain information. In Study 1, we also show that people display a stronger immediacy effect for information than for monetary rewards. In Study 2, we demonstrate that people are impatient for information regardless of how they expect to feel after receiving the information, and even when the perceived instrumental value of information remains unaffected by the delay. The strong impatience for information in both studies is consistent with the notion that curiosity acts as a drive, and as such, is highly transient.","PeriodicalId":263662,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129542878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Leverage cycles when banks have a choice 当银行有选择时，杠杆周期

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3882467

Eva Levelt, K. Mavromatis, C. Hommes

{"title":"Leverage cycles when banks have a choice","authors":"Eva Levelt, K. Mavromatis, C. Hommes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3882467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3882467","url":null,"abstract":"Leveraged investing can aggravate crises when dropping asset prices force sales in falling markets. Leverage control policies introduced to coun- teract this could lead to agents targeting the maximal leverage deemed ‘prudent’ at all times. Aymanns and Farmer (2015) show how, for a Value at Risk type control policy, this ‘leverage targeting’ can not only lead to aggravated crises, but can also trigger the crisis to begin with and cause the boom that follows it. In modelling a whole cycle, however, the assumptions that investors base their demand for risky assets only on their leverage target becomes more dubious. In this paper, we allow our agents to repeatedly choose between a leverage targeting and a (leverage constrained) expected utility optimisation strategy. We find that both strategies persist, and in fact are equally prevalent on average. The endogenous cycles that Aymanns and Farmer (2015) found persist, although their amplitude is reduced. Agents will thus regularly choose to invest up to their leverage constraint, without further consideration of the state of the market, even though this destabilises the market. We find that allowing short-selling for agents using the optimisation strategy does stabilise the market.","PeriodicalId":263662,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123476262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Coping with Digital Extortion: An Experimental Study of Benefit Appeals and Normative Appeals 应对数字勒索:利益诉求与规范诉求的实验研究

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-06-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3423200

Kay-Yut Chen, Jingguo Wang, Yan Lang

{"title":"Coping with Digital Extortion: An Experimental Study of Benefit Appeals and Normative Appeals","authors":"Kay-Yut Chen, Jingguo Wang, Yan Lang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3423200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423200","url":null,"abstract":"Digital extortion has emerged as a significant threat to organizations that rely on information technologies for their operations. Using human subject experimentation, we study the effectiveness of message appeals in encouraging defenders to adopt two mitigation strategies, investment in security and refusal to pay ransoms, to digital extortion threats. We explore two types of appeals, benefit and normative, for this purpose. We find that the decisions of the defenders (representing any organization that can be a potential victim) deviate from the predictions of game theory. However, given the strategic interactions between the defenders and the attacker as well as noisy decision-making behaviors, it is challenging to untangle the influence of the appeals on the defenders. We develop a structural model based on the quantal response equilibrium framework to measure how message appeals change the defenders’ utilities of investment and payment refusal. Although the interventions may be successful in increasing the utilities of investment and/or payment refusal, their impacts on investment rate and payment rate are mitigated by the attacker reducing ransoms. Thus, it is challenging for an intervention to significantly boost a community’s investment rate or to suppress the ransom payment rate. We characterize how security outcomes of a community (including expected ransom, attack rate, investment rate, and payment rate) vary with the defenders’ utilities of investment and pay refusal. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.","PeriodicalId":263662,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116291359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Effect of Market Information on Bidder Attrition in Online Auction Markets 网络拍卖市场中市场信息对竞标者流失的影响

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-06-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3866286

Hossein Ghasemkhani, Paulo B. Góes, Arvind K. Tripathi

{"title":"Effect of Market Information on Bidder Attrition in Online Auction Markets","authors":"Hossein Ghasemkhani, Paulo B. Góes, Arvind K. Tripathi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3866286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3866286","url":null,"abstract":"Information generated in online markets can affect both buyers’ and sellers’ expectations and therefore their choices. In this research, we investigate the effect of market information, generated in online auction markets, on buyers’ expectations and choices. To clear large inventories, sellers often conduct many auctions selling identical items over time, which creates an online auction market where competition dynamics spill over from one to auction to another. In these markets, bidders can participate in many auctions over a period of time, observe market information (supply, demand, and competition), and gain experience to increase their payoffs. We observe that despite having an opportunity to compete and win in future auctions, many bidders stop participating in these auction markets. We argue that observed market information affects their choices. We explore how bidders form expectations about market supply, demand, and competition based on information from two sources—market design parameters and behavior of market participants. By employing a hierarchical Bayesian latent attrition model, we empirically detect and investigate the effect of bidders’ expected market supply, demand, and competition on their attrition in these markets. Our study shows that the effect of market information on attrition is nuanced by bidders’ value heterogeneity. Through the lenses of behavioral economics theories, we show that the attrition behavior of high-value bidders is completely opposite that of low-value bidders. We discuss the practical implications of our findings.","PeriodicalId":263662,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115900233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Wealth Inequality: Opportunity or Unfairness? 财富不平等:机遇还是不公平?

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-06-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3862010

Michael Haliassos, T. Jansson, Yigitcan Karabulut

{"title":"Wealth Inequality: Opportunity or Unfairness?","authors":"Michael Haliassos, T. Jansson, Yigitcan Karabulut","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3862010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3862010","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents evidence of a new propagation mechanism for wealth inequality, based on differential responses, by education, to greater inequality at the start of economic life. It is motivated by a novel positive cross-country relationship between wealth inequality and perceptions of opportunity and fairness, which holds only for the more educated. Using unique administrative micro data and a quasi-field experiment of exogenous allocation of households, the paper finds that exposure to a greater top 10% wealth share at the start of economic life in the country leads only the more educated placed in locations with above-median wealth mobility to attain higher wealth levels and position in the cohort-specific wealth distribution later on. Underlying this effect is greater participation in risky financial and real assets and in self-employment, with no evidence for a labor income, unemployment risk, or human capital investment channel. This differential response is robust to controlling for initial exposure to fixed or other time-varying local features, including income inequality, and consistent with self-fulfilling responses of the more educated to perceived opportunities, without evidence of imitation or learning from those at the top.","PeriodicalId":263662,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115277216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Intertemporal Prospect Theory 跨期前景理论

ERN: Behavioral Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-05-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3849330

Immanuel Lampe, Matthias Weber

引用次数: 2