J. Gerring, Erzen Oncel, Kevin Morrison, Philip Keefer
{"title":"The Global Leadership Project: A Comprehensive Database of Political Elites","authors":"J. Gerring, Erzen Oncel, Kevin Morrison, Philip Keefer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2491672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2491672","url":null,"abstract":"Contributing to the recent revival in studies of the effects of the biographical characteristics of leaders, this paper presents an attempt at the most complete description to date of the world’s current leaders. The Global Leadership Project (GLP) provides the first dataset offering biographical information on leaders of most countries in the world, including members of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and other elites whose power is of an informal nature. GLP encompasses 146 sovereign and semisovereign nation-states and 40,566 leaders, each of whom is coded along 33 parameters, producing approximately 1.2 million data points in a cross-sectional format centered on 2010-13. This paper describes the coding process and the resulting data, and compares the characteristics of leaders across offices within countries, across countries, and across regions.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115717859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Governors and Governing Institutions: A Comparative Study of State-Business Relations in Russia's Regions","authors":"Gulnaz Gharafutdinova, G. Kisunko","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-7038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7038","url":null,"abstract":"The paper uses the latest 2011 round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for the Russian Federation, which for the first time was designed to be representative of Russian regions. The paper takes a closer look at regional-level factors influencing the business environment in Russia and, more specifically, conditions that favor the emergence of symbiotic relations between regional authorities and regional businesses. Considering the argued significance of informal rules, norms, and agreements for the regional-level business environment in Russia, the paper uses proxy variables such as tenure and origin of regional governors to identify how these rules are being institutionalized. The findings reveal that, at least in case of Russia, juxtaposing the state and business actors as separate and opposed to each other may overstate the distinction between these two groups of actors and understate the fact that many localities in Russia have witnessed the emergence of mutually beneficial state-business arrangements. Defining whether these arrangements are beneficial or harmful to regional development is beyond the scope of this exploratory paper.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131319075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chiefs of Staff to Presidents and Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective","authors":"Anne Tiernan, J. Pfiffner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2475602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2475602","url":null,"abstract":"All chief executives in modern democracies require that certain functions be performed; some of these functions are inherent in the nature executive power itself; some are necessitated by the expanding role of government; and some have to deal with the increasing complexity of public policy and a 24/7 news cycle. For the past several decades, chief executives have increased the size of their personal staffs to the point that the staffs themselves constitute bureaucracies. In order to manage these larger staffs, presidents and prime ministers have turned to the office of chief of staff. This article examines the development and functions of the chief of staff office in Australia and the United States. Despite differences in constitutions, institutions, and politics, we find striking similarities in the offices and functions.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121901708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Politicizing Europe: The Challenge of Executive Discretion","authors":"Jonathan White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2399441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2399441","url":null,"abstract":"Political decision-making in the Euro-crisis has relied heavily on executive discretion, exercised at speed and rationalised with reference to the pressing demands of emergency. This paper explores the challenges raised for political opposition, notably challenges of a temporal kind. With its deviations from policy and procedural norms, discretionary politics tends towards a politics without rhythm, leading to major asymmetries between decision-makers and voices of opposition. These centre on issues of timing and the ability to identify authorship and content of decisions. Such asymmetries arguably correspond to an underlying one between the temporality of political decision-making and of contemporary finance capitalism, with agents of the former increasingly inclined to pursue ‘fast policy’ as a means to keep pace. A democratic response is likely to involve strengthening and synchronising the rhythms of parliamentary politics, as well as being receptive to forms of opposition less reliant on the rhythms that discretion subverts.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129841858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reviving the Lost Art of Impoundment: How Congress Should Amend the Impoundment Control Act of 1974","authors":"Benjamin Sunshine","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2302222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2302222","url":null,"abstract":"Responding to a series of policy impoundments by President Richard Nixon, Congress passed Title X of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA). The passage of the ICA impedes a president’s ability to impound appropriated funds as the ICA put stringent controls on the Executive over the impoundment process. Although the ICA succeeded in moderating the struggle for fiscal control between Congress and the president the ICA went too far in one direction and needs to be amended. Therefore, this Article will argue that the Impoundment Control Act needs to be amended by Congress in order to put the impoundment power back in the hands of the president with less Congressional control.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"94 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132156157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Functioning of the Second Level Management Control in Light of the Declarations Made by the Polish Local Self-Government Bodies","authors":"Jarosław Ignacy, Tomasz Kopyściański","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2263827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263827","url":null,"abstract":"Entities operating in the public finance sector have recently started facing the challenge of implementing management control mechanisms. In order to successfully handle this task, it is not enough just to involve managers and employees of the given organisation, but it is also necessary to foster conditions favourable to improving management processes for public entities. Since management control is a rather new instrument of the public finance system, the need for ongoing monitoring of the progress taking place in the sphere of its implementation in individual institutions is becoming more and more evident. Bearing the foregoing in mind, the authors of the article have attempted to assess the extent of the management control implementation in local self-government bodies by analysing the declarations made by the these institutions pertaining to the management control status for the years 2010-2011.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116326439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Presidential Position Taking and the Puzzle of Representation","authors":"Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, Brandon Rottinghaus","doi":"10.1111/PSQ.12000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PSQ.12000","url":null,"abstract":"The president's representational responsibilities are unique and varied. Because a national constituency elects the president, the centrist model of representation contends that presidents must respond to and lead the entire nation. Woodrow Wilson (1961, 67-68) observed this when he wrote that as \"political leader of the nation,\" the president is \"representative of no constituency but of the whole people.\" James MacGregor Burns (1973, 106) echoed this perception: \"the President is custodian of popular safety, national destiny, and the conscience of the people.\" Consistent with the centrist view of representation, numerous scholars have found that presidents are highly responsive to changes in national public mood (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Jacobs 1992; Stimson, Erikson, and MacKuen 1995), respond to the national public concerns about foreign and economic issues (Cohen 1999), and respond to national public preferences conditionally, by issue area, popularity, and the president's electoral cycle (Canes-Wrone and Shorts 2004; Rottinghaus 2006). Being a partisan political figure, the president also represents party interests (Skinner 2008). This partisan model of representation holds that presidents must consider their partisan's policy preferences to win their party's nomination (see Key 1964), and the president's success in Congress is predicated on party control (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). Unsurprisingly, party predicts presidential liberalism and contributes to presidential representation of public opinion (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995). Wlezien (1996), in particular, finds that the president's party affiliation is a strong indicator of representation on defense spending in the 1970s and 1980s. Wood (2009) not only shows that the partisan model best explains the relationship between presidential liberalism and public mood, but, consistent with Wlezien's (1995) thermostatic model of representation, he also demonstrates that the national public does not follow, but rather tends to move away from the president's policy liberalism over time. Yet, debate persists on two levels regarding the president's responsiveness to public opinion. First, despite the plausibility that presidents may prefer taking positions on partisan issues and recent evidence that confirms this tendency (Wood 2009), most research that considers presidential-public relationships builds upon the centrist model of representation, that presidents represent the nation. Canes-Wrone's (2006) strategic model of going public, for example, hinges on presidential leadership of issues that are popular with the mass public. Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) also develop a model of centrist presidential representation. Still others argue that presidents may try to satisfy both constituencies by switching their support between mass and partisan public opinion (Druckman and Jacobs 2006; Pious 1996, 184), but this is not without costs, as the public shifts its support awa","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"47 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120897692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating in the Dark: Examining Bush Midnight Regulations","authors":"S. Abdukadirov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2343912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2343912","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether political motivation plays a role in the timing of some midnight regulations. It further examines whether political motivation has a negative impact on the analytical quality of midnight regulations. In contrast to other studies that focus on the overall regulatory activity using proxies, this paper concentrates on a detailed analysis of three regulations issued in the final days of the Bush administration.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134541590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service","authors":"Anthony M. Bertelli, D. Lewis","doi":"10.1093/JOPART/MUS044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOPART/MUS044","url":null,"abstract":"Executive turnover influences agency performance, policy implementation and ultimately the success of legislative delegations. We argue that turnover intention is a function of labor market opportunities – specifically, outside employment opportunities and the acquisition of non-transferable, agency-specific human capital – as well as perceptions about the way in which political decisions have impacted federal executive influence over policymaking. Statistical evidence for these claims is provided using data from the 2007-2008 Survey on the Future of Government Service, the largest ever survey of U.S. federal executives. Agency- specific human capital drives down turnover intention in our estimates. The availability of outside options has the opposite effect except in cases where the executive has invested a lot in agency-specific human capital. Turnover intention increases when an agency’s senior executives have little influence over policy. We draw out the implications of these findings for our understanding of federal labor markets, the construction of civil service systems, and the politicization of executive branch agencies.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117130020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Essay on the President’s Constitutional Duty to Prioritize Expenditures","authors":"David R. Upham","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2112507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2112507","url":null,"abstract":"In 2011, the debt-ceiling crisis led several commentators to argue that the Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the President to continue borrowing money on the credit of the United States, even in excess of the statutory debt ceiling. In response, many scholars argued that the Clause would not authorize such action but, at most, would require the President to prioritize the spending necessary to repay the public debt. The suggestion that the Public Debt Clause imposes spending priorities prompts a broader inquiry: Do other constitutional provisions establish additional spending priorities that would more extensively govern presidential authority in case of an unfinanced budget deficit? In this essay, I will explore this question and offer a tentative, affirmative answer. Several provisions of the Constitution, including Article IV’s Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses, the Bill of Rights, as well as the Public Debt Clause, require the United States, and the President thereof, to spend money for various purposes, including (1) to maintain the functional existence of the Union and the states, (2) to preserve their republican character, and (3) to secure certain rights to individuals, including all federal criminal defendants, some federal civil litigants, and all federal public creditors, defined broadly to include beneficiaries of some entitlement programs. These constitutional duties require the President to prioritize those expenditures. The extent of these constitutional priorities would, in the aggregate, not merely limit, but extensively eliminate, presidential discretion in the event of an unfinanced budget deficit.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"215 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114372128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}