{"title":"Enable the People to Say, 'We Did It!'","authors":"Yeomin Yoon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3742204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3742204","url":null,"abstract":"Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an effective means of attracting productive capital required for economic growth and development. Developing countries, however, should also look inside and mobilize inactive domestic capital they are sitting on. The leader's task in every developing country is to initiate and accomplish the necessary national reforms, enabling it to transform the \"dead\" capital into \"live\" capital that would be utilized productively together with FDI. Developing countries must keep the economy humane, and that requires leadership. According to a great thinker of ancient China, Lao Tsu:<br><br>A good leader is the one whom people respect and love. A bad leader is the one whom people fear. The worst leader is the one whom people despise. An ideal leader performs actions without <br><br>*As Faculty Fellow of the Institute for International Business, the Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University, the author gratefully acknowledges the research support provided by the Institute.<br><br>unnecessary speech (that is, without resorting to propaganda or spin), and his people say, \"We did it!\" Every leader should strive to become an ideal leader, as envisioned by Lao Tsu. Under such a leader (or leaders), the people will say, \"We did it!\" when they make remarkable economic development and enjoy high living standards in a civilized manner.<br>","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123674380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Executive Absolutism: The Dynamics of Authority Acquisition in a System of Separated Powers","authors":"William G. Howell, K. Shepsle, Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3440604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440604","url":null,"abstract":"Separated powers cannot permanently constrain individual ambitions. Concerns about a government's ability to respond to contemporary and future crises, we show, invariably compromise the principled commitments one branch of government has in limiting the authority of another. We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive's ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more authority. Neither robust electoral competition nor alternative characterizations of judicial rule fundamentally alters this state of affairs. The result, we show, is a persistent accumulation of executive authority.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"47 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120991420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Appearing Unbiased about Presidential War Powers","authors":"Jide Nzelibe","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3273083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3273083","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, we assume that political actors will generally tend to be biased in favor of expanding the scope of their constitutional authority. Thus, if one witnesses public officials making declarations against constitutional self-interest, it seems reasonable to give those declarations extra weight as reflecting the true scope of that official’s actual constitutional authority. For instance, if President Trump disavows that he has the constitutional authority to engage in certain kinds of immigration enforcement, we assume that it must be because he really lacks that authority. Or when President Obama insisted in 2015 that Congress had to take a greater role in any military actions against Syria, one might reasonably conjecture that it must be because his own authority to act unilaterally was genuinely constrained. In this essay, I suggest that politicians may manipulate the appearance of being unbiased about their constitutional authority in order to achieve partisan objectives. For instance, when a president disavows that he has constitutional authority to accomplish certain goals, he or she may be simply laying the foundation to constrain the authority of future presidents who may have different policy preferences. Alternatively, the president may simply be seeking to constrain executive branch authority on those particular issues in which he or she believes the political opposition have an advantage. Thus, political actors may have significant wiggle room to manipulate the appearance of not being biased about their constitutional authority in order to further partisan goals. In sum, one ought to be cautious about taking constitutional declarations against self-interest at face value.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127179501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Do You Get Economists as Policy-Makers?","authors":"Mark Hallerberg, Joachim Wehner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2191490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191490","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze when economists become top-level “economic policy-makers,” focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country’s leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader’s exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128449056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trump Tweets and the Efficient Market Hypothesis","authors":"Jeffery A. Born, David H. Myers, William J. Clark","doi":"10.3233/AF-170211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/AF-170211","url":null,"abstract":"In a Semi-Strong Form (SSF) Efficient Market, asset prices should respond quickly and completely to the public release of new information. In the period from his election on 11/8/16 and his swearing in ceremony on 1/20/17, President-elect Trump posted numerous statements (‘tweets’) on his Twitter messaging service account that identified ten publicly traded firms. In the absence of new information, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) predicts that these announcements should have little or no price impact on the common stocks of these firms. Using standard event study methods, we find that positive (negative) content tweets elicited positive (negative) abnormal returns on the event date and virtually all of this effect is from the opening stock price to the close. Within five trading days, the CARs are no longer statistically significant. President-elect Trump’s tweets were associated with increases in trading volume and Google Search activity. Taken as a whole, the price and trading volume response, combined with Google Search activity is consistent with hypothesis that it was small/noise traders who were acting on President-elect Trump’s tweets and that their impacts were transitory.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126027187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Happened on November 8, and What Happens Next? A Tour of Social Scientists' Answers","authors":"J. Hochschild","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2884365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2884365","url":null,"abstract":"How do social scientists explain strong popular support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, and what do they predict for his presidency? Initial explanations can be divided into two broad categories: voters supported Trump because of what he said about blacks, immigrants, Muslims, women, the disabled, and other groups or despite what he said about these groups. Initial predictions range from arguments that not much will change in a Trump presidency to arguments that American liberal democracy is in jeopardy. Social scientists??? explanations and prognostications often bear a striking resemblance to whatever framework each scholar has been deploying for a long time; like most people influenced by motivated reasoning, we tend to fit our new knowledge into the contours of what we thought we already knew. Whether social scientists are able to rethink cherished theories as a result of the November 8 surprise is a concern for us academics ??? but which explanations and predictions, if any, turn out to be most accurate is of concern to the nation and even the world.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"277 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122095945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aligning National Interest with Trump's Business Interests: A Fair Solution to Potential Conflicts of Interest","authors":"H. Vinod","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2877494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877494","url":null,"abstract":"Certain lawyers are asking the president-elect Trump and family to sell all his assets including vast world-wide real estate at fire-sale prices and place the proceeds in a blind trust or US Treasury bonds. This will be very disruptive, unfair and may discourage future global entrepreneurs from seeking US presidency. This article offers a fair solution which does not require any sale of assets using some insights from economic theory and Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966. Aligning the interest of the American people with that Trump family can be accomplished by requiring the Trump family to forfeit all ‘excess’ gain in their net worth to the US treasury. Accountants at the IRS should be able to estimate what the Trumps might have earned, had Mr. Trump not been the president and hence estimate the excess, if any, at the end of his term.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129386768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions","authors":"C. Bjørnskov, S. Voigt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2697144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2697144","url":null,"abstract":"Nine out of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. This paper therefore aims at providing first answers to two questions: 1) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and 2) which political and economic factors cause the inclusion of particular emergency provisions into constitutions. To answer the first question we construct an Indicator of Emergency Powers (INEP) which takes six central elements of emergency provisions explicitly into account. Structuring our discussion regarding reasons for the choice of emergency provisions, we discuss three theoretical motives, namely (1) a pragmatic, (2) a power-maximizing and (3) a more elaborate commitment motive. We test our theoretical conjectures and find that emergency constitutions in countries with stronger veto institutions, higher average income, and which recently experienced a coup allow more discretionary power while countries that are prone to natural disasters and countries far from the equator allow less power. Our findings are mostly in line with theoretical options 2) and 3).","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116709831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Controlling Presidential Control","authors":"Kathryn A. Watts","doi":"10.36644/mlr.114.5.controlling","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.114.5.controlling","url":null,"abstract":"Presidents Reagan and Clinton laid the foundation for strong presidential control over the administrative state, institutionalizing White House review of agency regulations. Presidential control, however, did not stop there. To the contrary, it has evolved and deepened during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Indeed, President Obama’s efforts to control agency action have dominated the headlines in recent months, touching on everything from immigration to drones to net neutrality. Despite the entrenchment of presidential control over the modern regulatory state, administrative law has yet to adapt. To date, the most pervasive response both inside and outside the courts has been a reflexive form of “expertise forcing,” which simplistically views presidential influence as “bad” and technocratic decisionmaking as “good.” In narrowly focusing on the negative aspects of presidential control, expertise forcing overlooks key benefits that flow from presidential control—namely, political accountability and regulatory coherence. It also ignores the fact that presidential control is here to stay. A more realistic and nuanced response to presidential control is needed. After examining three different case studies and discussing the inadequacies of expertise forcing, this Article provides a roadmap for how a wide range of nonconstitutional administrative law doctrines could be coordinated to enhance the positive attributes and restrain the negative attributes of presidential control. The Article gives attention to doctrinal tools, such as judicial review doctrines and notice-and-comment procedures, falling into three general categories: statutorily facing rules; transparency-enhancing mechanisms; and process-forcing rules. If used in a coordinated fashion, doctrinal tools falling into each of these three categories provide a powerful and much-needed framework for responding to the new realities of presidential control and ultimately controlling— without unnecessarily constraining—presidential control.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131648175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Class Conscious? Economic Inequality, Party Commitments, and Class Rhetoric in American Presidential Campaigns","authors":"Jesse H. Rhodes, Kaylee T. Johnson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2560427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2560427","url":null,"abstract":"The growing gap in outcomes and opportunities between citizens of different economic classes over the past five decades has given rise to an explosion of scholarly research on the ways in which economic inequality has reshaped the politics of class in American life. To date, however, this work has largely ignored whether - and if so, how - this development has affected the politics of presidential campaigning. Drawing on a comprehensive new dataset of presidential candidate class appeals over the 1952- 2012 period, we analyze trends in the volume, tone, and policy linkages of Democratic and Republican candidate class appeals. We show that these trends are closely linked to the rise in economic inequality, but that party differences have mediated this relationship, with Democratic candidates making much more extensive use of class rhetoric. Given mounting evidence that elected officials are most responsive to the wealthy, our findings raise concerns that candidates are increasingly exploiting the salient language of class for purely tactical purposes.","PeriodicalId":249864,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: The President & Executives eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125073478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}