The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501739606-002
V. Houghton
{"title":"1. A Reasonable Fear: The U.S. (Mis)Perception of the German Nuclear Program","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/9781501739606-002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501739606-002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133395488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0007
V. Houghton
{"title":"Whistling in the Dark","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"The sixth chapter discusses the reasons the United States Government did not consider the Soviet atomic bomb program an immediate national security threat. In contrast to their beliefs about German science, many American scientists and some within the civilian and military leadership regarded Soviet science as institutionally backward, and many of its scientists as intellectual inferiors. Other key players in American leadership, including Leslie Groves, argued that the Soviet Union did not have the industrial capabilities to manufacture an atomic bomb in less than 20 years. Regardless of the reasoning (whether it was an indictment of Soviet science, Soviet industry, or the Soviet system), the people in the positions of power in the United States almost universally assumed they had time to build an effective atomic intelligence system, and do so before the Soviets made much of that system obsolete.","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"24 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121005213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0008
V. Houghton
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability.\u0000While the rest of the American national security system was improving, the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite the emerging Soviet atomic threat.","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128718327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0006
V. Houghton
{"title":"Regression","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"The fifth chapter details the dismantling of the American atomic intelligence program following the conclusion of the Second World War. Although it was clear to most that the Soviet Union was intent on building its own atomic weapon, the American atomic intelligence program did not survive the general demobilization of the post-war United States. Groves’ Manhattan Project (MED) intelligence team was disbanded, and while he kept a small intelligence analysis unit, the means for adequate intelligence collection and analysis were decentralized and scattered across the U.S. Government. During the late 1940s, American intelligence made a series of estimates for when the Soviet Union would build their first atomic bomb. Based on supposition, speculation, and the American and German experiences, the estimates did not effectively evaluate the realities in the Soviet Union.","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124350230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0004
V. Houghton
{"title":"Alsos","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"The third chapter discusses the scientific intelligence mission sent to Europe to collect firsthand information about the German atomic project and to prevent its successful completion. Following in the footsteps of the Allied Armies, the intelligence mission to Europe, code-named “Alsos”, first arrived in Italy in December, 1943. Comprised of a mixture of intelligence operatives and trained scientific personnel, the mission scoured Italy for clues about the German atomic bomb program. Later in France, Alsos made a number of important discoveries, none more so than the location of a town on the French-German border which would, after close inspection, hold the key to unlocking all of the secrets of the German atomic bomb program.","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130652991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002
V. Houghton
{"title":"A Reasonable Fear","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The Germans had the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128846932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nuclear SpiesPub Date : 2019-09-15DOI: 10.7591/9781501739606-003
{"title":"2. Making Something out of Nothing: The Creation of U.S. Nuclear Intelligence","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501739606-003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501739606-003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128451802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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