{"title":"合理的恐惧","authors":"V. Houghton","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The Germans had the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.","PeriodicalId":237084,"journal":{"name":"The Nuclear Spies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Reasonable Fear\",\"authors\":\"V. Houghton\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The Germans had the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.\",\"PeriodicalId\":237084,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Nuclear Spies\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Nuclear Spies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Nuclear Spies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The first chapter details the causes of the United States Government’s considerable apprehension about the German atomic bomb program. By 1942 American progress in atomic development had made it apparent that atomic bombs were more than theoretical possibilities, they were practical certainties. That is to say, it was only a matter of time before someone built an atomic bomb. The Germans had the best scientists, a well-developed industrial system, widespread political support, and they had a significant head start. American scientists had reason to worry.
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