Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy最新文献

{"title":"Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert","authors":"P. Bolton, F. Samama","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2012.00284.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2012.00284.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that there is a Coasean Bargain available to banks, Long-term Investors, and Bank Regulators around a particular form of 'Contingent Capital'. By purchasing rights to issue equity in crisis events at a pre-specified price from Long-term Investors, banks can ensure that they will have sufficient regulatory capital available when they need it most: in a crisis. By selling these rights (effectively, a form of crisis insurance) long-term investors can monetize their counter-cyclical investments strategies in banks and, thus, obtain an adequate return as long-term investors. Bank Regulators, in turn, gain as they can thereby implement a more efficient form of equity-capital regulation. Banks have a special need to maintain their equity-capital base in the event of a crisis. Sovereign Wealth Funds and other long-term investors have proved to be the only available counterparties for banks in crisis times. This is why we argue that these investors must be able to monetize the countercyclical asset-management strategies they are trying to implement by obtaining a higher return on their cash reserves. The form of contingent capital we propose (Capital Access Bond) reflects a balance between investors’ preferences, issuers’ constraints, and regulators' objectives.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127563581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mobile Telecommunications and the Impact on Economic Development","authors":"H. Gruber, P. Koutroumpis","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2011.00266.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2011.00266.x","url":null,"abstract":"Using annual data from 192 countries over the period 1990–2007, we assess the impact of mobile telecommunications on economic growth. We find that this impact is smaller for countries with a low mobile penetration, usually low income countries. While in low income countries the mobile telecommunications contribution to annual GDP growth is 0.11%, for high income countries this is 0.20%. The increasing returns from mobile adoption are also emerging when assessing the impact on productivity growth. To promote mobile telecommunications penetration liberalization policies along with appropriate regulatory frameworks are recommended. Such policies should be pursued more forcefully in cases where serious shortcomings exist.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129387484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Monetary Policy Strategy in Good and Bad Times: Lessons from the Recent Past","authors":"S. Fahr, Roberto Motto, M. Rostagno, F. Smets, O. Tristani","doi":"10.1111/1468-0327.12008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0327.12008","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate the ECB's monetary policy strategy against some of the underlying economic features of the eurozone, in normal times and during the financial crisis. We show that in the years preceding the crisis the ECB's emphasis on monetary indicators and deliberate avoidance of excessive activism were justified by the underlying macroeconomic conditions that the ECB faced in the eurozone and contributed to avoid more volatile patterns of inflation and economic activity. After the collapse of financial intermediation in late 2008, the strategy of the ECB was to adopt several non‐standard policy measures. According to our quantitative evaluation of the impact of the main non‐standard policies decided in October 2008 and in May 2009, which notably did not include entering commitments regarding the future path of the policy rate, such measures have significantly contributed to preserving price stability and forestalling a more disruptive collapse of the macroeconomy.\u0000\u0000— Stephan Fahr, Roberto Motto, Massimo Rostagno, Frank Smets and Oreste Tristani","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131089923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lessons from a Collapse of a Financial System","authors":"Sigridur Benediktsdottir, Jón Dańıelsson, G. Zoega","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2011.00260.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2011.00260.x","url":null,"abstract":"The paper draws lessons from the collapse of Iceland’s banking system in October 2008. The rapid expansion of the banking system following its privatization in the early 2000s is explained, as well as the inherent fragility due to the size of the banking system relative to the domestic economy and the central bank’s reserves, market manipulation enabling bank capital to expand rapidly and the weak and understaffed public institutions. Most of Iceland’s banking system was traditionally in state hands but was privatized and sold to politically favoured entities at the turn of the century, with laws and regulations subsequently changed to facilitate the expansion of the banking system. Political connections and the tacit support of the authorities enabled senior bank managers and key shareholders to extract significant private benefits while shifting risk to domestic and foreign taxpayers and foreign creditors. These problems were exacerbated by symptoms of what the paper terms the small country syndrome. The size of the banking sector made the central bank incapable of serving as the lender of last resort. The domestic supervisor, the central bank and the ministries in charge of economic affairs were understaffed and lacking in experience in how to manage a large financial sector. The rapid growth was also ultimately unsustainable due to high levels of leverage and a weak capital base due to both the rapid expansion of balance sheets and lending to finance investment in own shares. The episode demonstrates the importance of closely monitoring rapidly growing financial institutions and even possibly slowing growth when institutions are systemically important. One lesson to be drawn from the crisis relates to the role of politics in a financial crisis. The Icelandic authorities as a matter of policy encouraged the creation of an international banking centre. This involved the privatization and deregulation of the banking system, rules and regulations being relaxed and the neglect of financial supervision. Another lesson is that floating exchange rates can be hazardous in the presence of large capital flows. The central bank raised interest rates during the boom years in order to meet an inflation target. This created an interest rate differential with other countries that encourages a large volume of carry trades and incentivized domestic agents to borrow in foreign currency. Both conspired to create an asset price bubble, excessive currency appreciation and – counter-intuitively – high inflation. The result was that monetary policy as conducted was ineffective at curbing domestic demand. The eventual large depreciation of the currency made a large section of the economy insolvent. Finally, there are lessons about the European passport system in financial services and the common market. The Icelandic banks had the right to set up branches in the European Union by means of the passport on the explicit assumption that home regulators were exercising ad","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"266 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122110432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"If You Pay Peanuts Do You Get Monkeys? A Cross-Country Analysis of Teacher Pay and Pupil Performance","authors":"P. Dolton, Ó. Marcenaro-Gutierrez","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00257.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00257.x","url":null,"abstract":"Why are teachers paid up to four times as much in some countries compared to others and does it matter? Specifically, is the quality of teachers likely to be higher if they are paid higher up the income distribution in their own country, and are pupil outcomes influenced by how well their teachers are paid? This paper considers the determinants of teachers' salaries across countries and examines the relationship between the real (and relative) level of teacher remuneration and the (internationally) comparable measured performance of secondary school pupils. We use aggregate panel data on 39 countries published by the OECD to model this association. Our results suggest that recruiting higher ability individuals into teaching and permitting scope for quicker salary advancement will have a positive effect on pupil outcomes.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132678128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ethnic Identity and Labour Market Outcomes of Immigrants in Europe","authors":"Alberto Bisin, Eleonora Patacchini, T. Verdier, Y. Zenou","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00258.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00258.x","url":null,"abstract":"We study the relationship between ethnic identity and labor-market outcomes of non-EU immigrants in Europe. Using the European Social Survey, we find that there is a penalty to be paid for immigrants with a strong identity. Being a first generation immigrant leads to a penalty of about 17 percent while second-generation immigrants have a probability of being employed that is not statistically different from that of natives. However, when they have a strong identity, second-generation immigrants have a lower chance of finding a job than natives. Our analysis also reveals that the relationship between ethnic identity and employment prospects may depend on the type of integration and labor-market policies implemented in the country where the immigrant lives. More flexible labor markets help immigrants to access the labor market but do not protect those who have a strong ethnic identity.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116431995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Currency Mismatch, Systemic Risk and Growth in Emerging Europe","authors":"Romain G. Rancière, A. Tornell, A. Vamvakidis","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00251.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00251.x","url":null,"abstract":"\"Currency mismatch is a vehicle that exposes the economy to systemic risk, but it is also an engine of growth. We analyse this dual role at the macro and the micro levels. At the aggregate level, we construct a new measure of currency mismatch in the banking sector that controls for bank lending to unhedged borrowers - that is, those with no foreign currency income. Using our measure, we find that across emerging European economies, increases in currency mismatch are associated with higher growth in tranquil times, but also with more severe crises. On net, after taking into account the crisis period, we find a positive link between currency mismatch and growth. These results are also confirmed for a broader sample of emerging economies. In our firm-level analysis, we find that in emerging Europe, currency mismatch relaxes borrowing constraints, reduces interest rates and enhances growth across sets of firms that arguably are the most credit constrained - that is, small firms in non-tradables sectors - but not across large firms. An advantage of our approach is that it considers both listed and non-listed firms, and so we are able to effectively capture the effects of currency mismatch across the entire economy, not just the financially privileged stock market listed firms.\" Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2010.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124827554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mitigating the Pro-Cyclicality of Basel II","authors":"Rafael Repullo, Jesus Saurina Salas, Carlos Trucharte","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00252.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00252.x","url":null,"abstract":"Policy discussions on the recent financial crisis feature widespread calls to address the pro-cyclicaleffects of regulation. The main concern is that the new risk-sensitive bank capital regulation (Basel II) may amplify business cycle fluctuations. This paper compares the leading alternative procedures that have been proposed to mitigate this problem. We estimate a model of the probabilities of default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 1987 2008, and use the estimated PDs to compute the corresponding series of Basel II capital requirements per unit of loans. These requirements move significantly along the business cycle, ranging from 7.6% (in 2006) to 11.9% (in 1993). The comparison of the different procedures is based on the criterion of minimizing the root mean square deviations of each adjusted series with respect to the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the original series. The results show that the best procedures are either to smooth the input of the Basel II formula by using through the cycle PDs or to smooth the output with a multiplier based on GDP growth. Our discussion concludes that the latter is better in terms of simplicity, transparency, and consistency with banks� risk pricing and risk management systems. For the portfolio of Spanish commercial and industrial loans and a 45% loss given default (LGD), the multiplier would amount to a 6.5% surcharge for each standard deviation in GDP growth. The surcharge would be significantly higher with cyclically-varying LGDs.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"7 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133205432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Tax Harmonization in the EU","authors":"L. Bettendorf, M. Devereux, A. van der Horst, Ruud A. De Mooij","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00248.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00248.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the economic consequences of proposed EU reforms for a common consolidated corporate tax base. The reforms replace separate accounting with formula apportionment as a way to allocate corporate tax bases across countries. To assess the economic implications, we use a numerical computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Europe. It encompasses several decision margins of firms such as marginal investment, FDI decisions, and multinational profit shifting. The simulations suggest that consolidation does not yield substantial welfare gains for Europe. The variation of effects across countries is large and depends on the choice of the apportionment formula. Consolidation with formula apportionment does not weaken incentives for tax competition. Tax competition instead offers a rationale for rate harmonization, in addition to base harmonization.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129766944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Monetary Policy and Financial Imbalances: Facts and Fiction","authors":"Katrin Assenmacher, S. Gerlach","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00249.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2010.00249.x","url":null,"abstract":"\"Following the financial crisis, many have argued that monetary policy should lean against asset price increases and that deviations of credit and asset prices from trend can be used to capture financial imbalances. We study quarterly data spanning 1986-2008 for a sample of 18 countries and argue that such measures contain little information useful for forecasting the future economic conditions. This casts doubts on the leaning-against-the-wind view. We also argue that tightening monetary policy in response to such imbalances are likely to depress real growth substantially. That finding, however, is sensitive to the Lucas critique.\" Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2010.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125515808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}