2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)最新文献

Symbolic Models for Isolated Execution Environments 用于隔离执行环境的符号模型

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.16

Charlie Jacomme, S. Kremer, Guillaume Scerri

引用次数: 2

When Cellular Networks Met IPv6: Security Problems of Middleboxes in IPv6 Cellular Networks 当蜂窝网络遇到IPv6: IPv6蜂窝网络中中间件的安全问题

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.34

Hyunwook Hong, Hyunwoo Choi, Dongkwan Kim, Hongil Kim, Byeongdo Hong, Jiseong Noh, Yongdae Kim

{"title":"When Cellular Networks Met IPv6: Security Problems of Middleboxes in IPv6 Cellular Networks","authors":"Hyunwook Hong, Hyunwoo Choi, Dongkwan Kim, Hongil Kim, Byeongdo Hong, Jiseong Noh, Yongdae Kim","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.34","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, cellular operators have started migrating to IPv6 in response to the increasing demand for IP addresses. With the introduction of IPv6, cellular middleboxes, such as firewalls for preventing malicious traffic from the Internet and stateful NAT64 boxes for providing backward compatibility with legacy IPv4 services, have become crucial to maintain stability of cellular networks. This paper presents security problems of the currently deployed IPv6 middleboxes of five major operators. To this end, we first investigate several key features of the current IPv6 deployment that can harm the safety of a cellular network as well as its customers. These features combined with the currently deployed IPv6 middlebox allow an adversary to launch six different attacks. First, firewalls in IPv6 cellular networks fail to block incoming packets properly. Thus, an adversary could fingerprint cellular devices with scanning, and further, she could launch denial-of-service or over-billing attacks. Second, vulnerabilities in the stateful NAT64 box, a middlebox that maps an IPv6 address to an IPv4 address (and vice versa), allow an adversary to launch three different attacks: 1) NAT overflow attack that allows an adversary to overflow the NAT resources, 2) NAT wiping attack that removes active NAT mappings by exploiting the lack of TCP sequence number verification of firewalls, and 3) NAT bricking attack that targets services adopting IP-based blacklisting by preventing the shared external IPv4 address from accessing the service. We confirmed the feasibility of these attacks with an empirical analysis. We also propose effective countermeasures for each attack.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129218594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

Content delivery over TLS: a cryptographic analysis of keyless SSL 基于TLS的内容交付:无密钥SSL的加密分析

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.52

K. Bhargavan, Ioana Boureanu, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Cristina Onete, Benjamin Richard

{"title":"Content delivery over TLS: a cryptographic analysis of keyless SSL","authors":"K. Bhargavan, Ioana Boureanu, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Cristina Onete, Benjamin Richard","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.52","url":null,"abstract":"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is designed to allow two parties, a client and a server, to communicate securely over an insecure network. However, when TLS connections are proxied through an intermediate middlebox, like a Content Delivery Network (CDN), the standard endto- end security guarantees of the protocol no longer apply. In this paper, we investigate the security guarantees provided by Keyless SSL, a CDN architecture currently deployed by CloudFlare that composes two TLS 1.2 handshakes to obtain a proxied TLS connection. We demonstrate new attacks that show that Keyless SSL does not meet its intended security goals. These attacks have been reported to CloudFlare and we are in the process of discussing fixes. We argue that proxied TLS handshakes require a new, stronger, 3-party security definition. We present 3(S)ACCEsecurity, a generalization of the 2-party ACCE security definition that has been used in several previous proofs for TLS. We modify Keyless SSL and prove that our modifications guarantee 3(S)ACCE-security, assuming ACCE-security for the individual TLS 1.2 connections. We also propose a new design for Keyless TLS 1.3 and prove that it achieves 3(S)ACCEsecurity, assuming that the TLS 1.3 handshake implements an authenticated 2-party key exchange. Notably, we show that secure proxying in Keyless TLS 1.3 is computationally lighter and requires simpler assumptions on the certificate infrastructure than our proposed fix for Keyless SSL. Our results indicate that proxied TLS architectures, as currently used by a number of CDNs, may be vulnerable to subtle attacks and deserve close attention.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122076078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 21

Privacy-Preserving User-Auditable Pseudonym Systems 保护隐私的用户可审计的假名系统

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.36

J. Camenisch, Anja Lehmann

{"title":"Privacy-Preserving User-Auditable Pseudonym Systems","authors":"J. Camenisch, Anja Lehmann","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.36","url":null,"abstract":"Personal information is often gathered and processed in a decentralized fashion. Examples include health records and governmental data bases. To protect the privacy of individuals, no unique user identifier should be used across the different databases. At the same time, the utility of the distributed information needs to be preserved which requires that it be nevertheless possible to link different records if they relate to the same user. Recently, Camenisch and Lehmann (CCS 15) have proposed a pseudonym scheme that addresses this problem by domain-specific pseudonyms. Although being unlinkable, these pseudonyms can be converted by a central authority (the converter). To protect the users' privacy, conversions are done blindly without the converter learning the pseudonyms or the identity of the user. Unfortunately, their scheme sacrifices a crucial privacy feature: transparency. Users are no longer able to inquire with the converter and audit the flow of their personal data. Indeed, such auditability appears to be diametral to the goal of blind pseudonym conversion. In this paper we address these seemingly conflicting requirements and provide a system where user-centric audits logs are created by the oblivious converter while maintaining all privacy properties. We prove our protocol to be UC-secure and give an efficient instantiation using novel building blocks.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128340978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

9-1-1 DDoS: Attacks, Analysis and Mitigation 9-1-1 DDoS:攻击、分析和缓解

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.23

Mordechai Guri, Yisroel Mirsky, Y. Elovici

{"title":"9-1-1 DDoS: Attacks, Analysis and Mitigation","authors":"Mordechai Guri, Yisroel Mirsky, Y. Elovici","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.23","url":null,"abstract":"The 911 emergency service belongs to one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks launched from a mobile phone botnet pose a significant threat to the availability of this vital service. In this paper we show how attackers can exploit the cellular network protocols in order to launch an anonymized DDoS attack on 911. The current FCC regulations require that all emergency calls be immediately routed regardless of the caller's identifiers (e.g., IMSI and IMEI). A rootkit placed within the baseband firmware of a mobile phone can mask and randomize all cellular identifiers, causing the device to have no genuine identification within the cellular network. Such anonymized phones can issue repeated emergency calls that cannot be blocked by the network or the emergency call centers, technically or legally. We explore the 911 infrastructure and discuss why it is susceptible to this kind of attack. We then implement different forms of the attack and test our implementation on a small cellular network. Finally, we simulate and analyze anonymous attacks on a model of current 911 infrastructure in order to measure the severity of their impact. We found that with less than 6K bots (or $100K hardware), attackers can block emergency services in an entire state (e.g., North Carolina) for days. We believe that this paper will assist the respective organizations, lawmakers, and security professionals in understanding the scope of this issue in order to prevent possible 911-DDoS attacks in the future.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131684258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge 密封玻璃证明:使用透明飞地证明和销售知识

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.28

Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Huang Lin, J. Hubaux, A. Juels, E. Shi

{"title":"Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge","authors":"Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Huang Lin, J. Hubaux, A. Juels, E. Shi","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.28","url":null,"abstract":"Trusted hardware systems, such as Intel's new SGX instruction set architecture extension, aim to provide strong confidentiality and integrity assurances for applications. Recent work, however, raises serious concerns about the vulnerability of such systems to side-channel attacks. We propose, formalize, and explore a cryptographic primitive called a Sealed-Glass Proof (SGP) that models computation possible in an isolated execution environment with unbounded leakage, and thus in the face of arbitrary side-channels. A SGP specifically models the capabilities of trusted hardware that can attest to correct execution of a piece of code, but whose execution is transparent, meaning that an application's secrets and state are visible to other processes on the same host. Despite this strong threat model, we show that SGPs enable a range of practical applications. Our key observation is that SGPs permit safe verifiable computing in zero-knowledge, as data leakage results only in the prover learning her own secrets. Among other applications, we describe the implementation of an end-to-end bug bounty (or zero-day solicitation) platform that couples a SGX-based SGP with a smart contract. Our platform enables a marketplace that achieves fair exchange, protects against unfair bounty withdrawals, and resists denial-of-service attacks by dishonest sellers. We also consider a slight relaxation of the SGP model that permits black-box modules instantiating minimal, side-channel resistant primitives, yielding a still broader range of applications. Our work shows how trusted hardware systems such as SGX can support trustworthy applications even in the presence of side channels.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126134457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 91

An Expressive (Zero-Knowledge) Set Accumulator 表达性(零知识)集合累加器

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.35

Yupeng Zhang, Jonathan Katz, Charalampos Papamanthou

{"title":"An Expressive (Zero-Knowledge) Set Accumulator","authors":"Yupeng Zhang, Jonathan Katz, Charalampos Papamanthou","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.35","url":null,"abstract":"We present a new construction of an expressive set accumulator. Unlike existing cryptographic accumulators, ours provides succinct proofs for a large collection of operations over accumulated sets, including intersection, union, set difference, SUM, COUNT, MIN, MAX, and RANGE, as well as arbitrary nestings of the above. We also show how to extend our accumulator to be zero-knowledge. The security of our accumulator is based on extractability assumptions and other assumptions that hold in the generic group model. Our construction has asymptotically optimal verification complexity and proof size, constant update complexity, and public verifiability/updatability—namely, any client who knows the public key and the last accumulator value can verify the supported operations and update the accumulator. The expressiveness of our accumulator comes at the cost of quadratic prover time. However, we show that the cryptographic operations involved are cheap compared to those incurred by generic approaches (e.g., SNARKs) that are equally expressive: our prover runs faster for sets of up to 5 million items. Our accumulator serves as a powerful cryptographic tool with many applications. For example, it can be applied to efficiently support verification of a rich collection of SQL queries when used as a drop-in replacement in existing verifiable database systems (e.g., IntegriDB, CCS 2015).","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125764118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 23

SoK: Single Sign-On Security — An Evaluation of OpenID Connect 单点登录安全性- OpenID连接的评估

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.32

Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg Schwenk, Tobias Wich

{"title":"SoK: Single Sign-On Security — An Evaluation of OpenID Connect","authors":"Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg Schwenk, Tobias Wich","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.32","url":null,"abstract":"OpenID Connect is the OAuth 2.0-based replacement for OpenID 2.0 (OpenID) andone of the most important Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols used for delegatedauthentication. It is used by companies like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, andPayPal. In this paper, we systematically analyze well-known attacks on SSOprotocols and adapt these on OpenID Connect. Additionally, we introduce twonovel attacks on OpenID Connect, Identity Provider Confusion and MaliciousEndpoints Attack, abusing flaws in the current specification and breaking thesecurity goals of the protocol. In 2014 we communicated with the authors of theOpenID Connect specification about these attacks and helped to repair the issue(currently an RFC Draft). We categorize the described attacks into two classes: Single-Phase Attacksabusing a lack of a single security check and Cross-Phase Attacks requiring acomplex attack setup and manipulating multiple messages distributed across thewhole protocol workflow. We provide an evaluation of officially referencedOpenID Connect libraries and find 75% of them vulnerable to at least oneSingle-Phase Attack. All libraries are susceptible to Cross-Phase Attacks, which is not surprising since the attacks abuse a logic flaw in the protocoland not an implementation error. We reported the found vulnerabilities to thedevelopers and helped them to fix the issues. We address the existing problemsin a Practical Offensive Evaluation of Single Sign-On Services (PrOfESSOS). PrOfESSOS is our open source implementation for a fully automatedEvaluation-as-a-Service for SSO. PrOfESSOS introduces a generic approach toimprove the security of OpenID Connect implementations by system-aticallydetecting vulnerabilities. In collaboration with the IETF OAuth and OpenIDConnect working group, we integrate PrOfESSOS into the OpenID Connect certification process. PrOfESSOS is available at https://openid.sso-security.de.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122034073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 51

Redactable Blockchain – or – Rewriting History in Bitcoin and Friends 可重写的区块链——或者——在比特币和朋友中改写历史

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.37

G. Ateniese, Bernardo Magri, D. Venturi, Ewerton R. Andrade

{"title":"Redactable Blockchain – or – Rewriting History in Bitcoin and Friends","authors":"G. Ateniese, Bernardo Magri, D. Venturi, Ewerton R. Andrade","doi":"10.1109/EuroSP.2017.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2017.37","url":null,"abstract":"We put forward a new framework that makes it possible to re-write or compress the content of any number of blocks in decentralized services exploiting the blockchain technology. As we argue, there are several reasons to prefer an editable blockchain, spanning from the necessity to remove inappropriate content and the possibility to support applications requiring re-writable storage, to \"the right to be forgotten.\" Our approach generically leverages so-called chameleon hash functions (Krawczyk and Rabin, NDSS '00), which allow determining hash collisions efficiently, given a secret trapdoor information. We detail how to integrate a chameleon hash function in virtually any blockchain-based technology, for both cases where the power of redacting the blockchain content is in the hands of a single trusted entity and where such a capability is distributed among several distrustful parties (as is the case with Bitcoin). We also report on a proof-of-concept implementation of a redactable blockchain, building on top of Nakamoto's Bitcoin core. The prototype only requires minimal changes to the way current client software interprets the information stored in the blockchain and to the current blockchain, block, or transaction structures. Moreover, our experiments show that the overhead imposed by a redactable blockchain is small compared to the case of an immutable one.","PeriodicalId":233564,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133789184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 262

Privacy Threats through Ultrasonic Side Channels on Mobile Devices 移动设备上超声波侧信道对隐私的威胁

2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2017.33

Dan Arp, Erwin Quiring, Christian Wressnegger, Konrad Rieck

引用次数: 49