Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission最新文献

Index 指数

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-589520180000028011

引用次数: 0

“To Know Where You’re Going, Look at Where You’ve Been” “想知道你要去哪里，看看你去过哪里”

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028001

Deborah L. Feinstein

引用次数: 0

A Market All Its Own: Medicare Advantage as a Separate Product Market in the DOJ’s Case against the Aetna-Humana Merger 一个独立的市场:医疗保险优势作为一个独立的产品市场在美国司法部反对安泰- humana合并的案例

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028004

D. Ross, David A. Maas

{"title":"A Market All Its Own: Medicare Advantage as a Separate Product Market in the DOJ’s Case against the Aetna-Humana Merger","authors":"D. Ross, David A. Maas","doi":"10.1108/S0193-589520180000028004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520180000028004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000This chapter assesses the doctrine of reasonable interchangeability through the lens of the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) successful effort to enjoin the megamerger of two of the largest national insurance companies, Aetna and Humana. The DOJ focused its challenge on the companies’ Medicare Advantage business, arguing that it is a separate product market from original Medicare and the merger would substantially reduce competition in the market for Medicare Advantage in many geographic markets across the country. The case turned on whether there was reasonable interchangeability between original Medicare and Medicare Advantage in the eyes of consumers. The judge relied on both practical indicia of interchangeability, including evidence of how likely Medicare beneficiaries were to switch between Medicare Advantage and Original Medicare, along with econometric evidence. The decision provides a useful roadmap of how a knowledgeable judge reviewing a merger will consider both Brown Shoe factors and econometric evidence in assessing reasonable interchangeability.","PeriodicalId":231580,"journal":{"name":"Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114292593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Is the “Kennedy Correction” Appropriate in Estimating Overcharges? “肯尼迪修正”何时适用于估算超额收费?

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028009

Wenqing Li, James F. Nieberding

引用次数: 0

A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics 联邦贸易委员会经济局的历史

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-589520180000028005

P. Pautler

引用次数: 0

Franchisees Facing Online Sales in a European Legal Context 特许经销商在欧洲法律背景下面临在线销售

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028007

Guy Basset, Rozenn Perrigot, Gérard Cliquet

{"title":"Franchisees Facing Online Sales in a European Legal Context","authors":"Guy Basset, Rozenn Perrigot, Gérard Cliquet","doi":"10.1108/S0193-589520180000028007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520180000028007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000In this chapter, using a dual approach based on managerial and legal perspectives, we examine franchisee attitudes regarding online sales in franchise networks to better understand their views of the costs and benefits of e-commerce in a franchise network. We thus explore the following research questions from a franchisee perspective: What are franchisees’ attitudes regarding online sales?; Are online sales viewed as complementary or competing sales for physical stores?; What about the opening of a franchisor’s website?; and What about the opening of a franchisee’s website? We also analyze how several different e-commerce options available to franchisors impact franchisee incentives and how they would be treated under European Union competition law. \u0000 \u0000The empirical research is based on the conduction and analysis of 46 in-depth interviews with franchisees in the retail and service industries in the French market. \u0000 \u0000We find that online sales in franchise networks raise important questions for the franchisees, and for the franchisors as well. E-commerce has to be integrated into the development strategies of franchise networks. Franchisors should facilitate the online sales practices of their franchisees in order to avoid potential conflicts with them or among the franchisees themselves, thereby maintaining the control necessary to ensure healthy network growth. Moreover, franchisors should pay attention to the sharing of Internet sales with its franchisees. \u0000 \u0000Our chapter contributes to the stream of franchising literature dealing with the use of Internet in franchise networks. Moreover, it can be viewed by franchisors, franchise experts, franchisees, and franchisee candidates as an overview of issues linked to online sales in franchise networks. It also highlights best practices when having a multichannel strategy.","PeriodicalId":231580,"journal":{"name":"Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124137805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Mandatory Upstream Inputs and Upward Pricing Pressure: Implications for Competition Policy 强制性上游投入和价格上涨压力:竞争政策的启示

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028008

T. Tardiff, Dennis L. Weisman

引用次数: 0

Solving the Product-Hopping Conundrum through Safe Harbors and a No-Economic-Sense Test 通过安全港和非经济意义测试解决产品跳跃难题

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028003

Michael A. Carrier, Steve D. Shadowen

{"title":"Solving the Product-Hopping Conundrum through Safe Harbors and a No-Economic-Sense Test","authors":"Michael A. Carrier, Steve D. Shadowen","doi":"10.1108/S0193-589520180000028003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520180000028003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000Brand-name pharmaceutical companies have engaged in a variety of business conduct that has increased price. One of these activities involves “product hopping,” or brand switches from one version of a drug to another. The antitrust analysis of product hopping implicates antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws, as well as uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers different from decision makers. As a result, courts have offered inconsistent approaches to product hopping. \u0000 \u0000In this chapter, we offer a framework that courts and government enforcers can employ to analyze product hopping. The framework is the first to incorporate the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry. It defines a “product hop” to include instances in which the manufacturer (1) reformulates the product to make the generic nonsubstitutable and (2) encourages doctors to write prescriptions for the reformulated rather than the original product. \u0000 \u0000When the conduct meets both requirements, our framework offers two stages of analysis. First, we propose two safe harbors to ensure that the vast majority of reformulations will not face antitrust review. Second, the framework examines whether the hop passes the “no-economic-sense” test, determining if the behavior would make economic sense if the hop did not have the effect of impairing generic competition. Showing just how far the courts have veered from justified economic analysis, the test would recommend a different analysis than that used in each of the five product-hopping cases that have been litigated to date, and a different outcome in two of them.","PeriodicalId":231580,"journal":{"name":"Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130669314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Actavis, Authorized Generics, and the Future of Antitrust Law Actavis，授权仿制药和反垄断法的未来

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028002

Marc G. Schildkraut

{"title":"Actavis, Authorized Generics, and the Future of Antitrust Law","authors":"Marc G. Schildkraut","doi":"10.1108/S0193-589520180000028002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520180000028002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. is a challenge to conventional antitrust analysis. Conventional civil antitrust cases are decided by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that conduct challenged under the rule of reason is only condemned if the conduct resulted in more competitive harm in the actual world than a world without the alleged violation. Under conventional analysis, the intent of the parties also plays only a supporting role in determining whether the conduct was anticompetitive. A holder of a valid patent has a right to exclude others practicing the patented technology. And, the patent holder is not assumed to have market power because it expended resources in maintaining exclusionary rights. Actavis creates doubts about these propositions in circumstances beyond the “reverse” payment settlement of a patent suit that may have delayed an alleged infringer market entry. This chapter explores whether applying Actavis logic to antitrust litigation can result in condemnation of practices where there is little chance of an anticompetitive effect, where the patent holder likely has a valid and infringed patent, where there is little reason to believe that the patent holder has market power, and where only one party, or no parties, to an agreement have an anticompetitive intent. This chapter also investigates whether Actavis creates new problems with standing analysis, damages calculations, and the balancing of efficiencies against anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, the lower courts have begun to extend the logic of Actavis. This is apparent in the condemnation of no-Authorized-generic settlements.","PeriodicalId":231580,"journal":{"name":"Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117271149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Prelims 预备考试

Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission Pub Date : 2018-08-17 DOI: 10.1108/s0193-589520180000028012

引用次数: 0