{"title":"Which Politicians Respond?","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 9 expands on analyses of the field experiment to explore additional variation in the characteristics of politicians’ responsiveness. First, it investigates the degree to which politicians’ responses reflect state- and individual-level characteristics that may be associated with incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These analyses highlight, in particular, that—consistent with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4 and existing work on the personal vote—electoral politics play a key role in affecting the degree to which politicians attempt to build their individual reputations via provision of assistance to individual constituents. Chapters 8 and 9 therefore collectively explore the conditions under which constituency service does and does not occur.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122941898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partisan Targeting and Local Distributive Politics","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 6 presents the first set of empirical analyses focused on politics at the local level. Drawing on close-range qualitative shadowing of local council presidents and surveys of both presidents and citizens, it documents the close relationships these elected officials have with their constituents. This analysis suggests considerable responsiveness of local politicians to citizens, often highlighting a form of local constituency service that has not been sufficiently described in many prior accounts. However, it also underlines the partisan nature of local politics and the ways in which partisanship is emphasized, especially by those presidents who share the party of the more senior state legislator in their area. The chapter documents the implications of this partisanship for contingent distribution, showing that individuals who do not share partisan ties with their village council president tend to be locally blocked—in particular, they are less likely to receive benefits from the local council.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121443791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Is Responsiveness Partisan Bias?","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 10 evaluates the conditions under which politicians will allocate benefits in a contingent, versus noncontingent, manner. It shows that citizens living in areas that offered strong support to a politician in the last election are much more likely to receive spending from that politician’s constituency development fund (CDF). Drawing on data from the experiment, it then compares the behavior of politicians spending their CDF funds with responses to the experimental audit of responsiveness. This shows that, while patterns of electoral support predict behavior with regard to partisan targeting, they offer less explanatory value for understanding patterns of constituency service. Thus, the same factors cannot explain both partisan bias and constituency service, and the same individuals who engage in noncontingent individual assistance may also target group-based benefits in a largely partisan manner.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126010617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Political Responsiveness in a Patronage Democracy","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter draws on accounts from sustained, in-depth shadowing of Indian politicians, as well as large-scale politician surveys, to characterize the nature of politicians’ engagement with their constituents. It highlights the importance these politicians place on making time for citizen interactions and responding to requests—to the extent that high-level politicians spend, on average, a quarter of their time interacting with individual citizens. Critically, the primary focus of these contacts is requests for assistance with the same types of goods and services that are typically also requested of local politicians such as village council presidents, providing preliminary evidence that demands may at least partially originate from individuals’ failure to acquire these benefits at the local level—a topic to which the book later turns. Chapter 2 also shows that the individual benefits directly provided to citizens by high-level politicians are substantial.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126470519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partisanship, the Personal Vote, and Constituency Service","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 8 tests observable implications of the book’s theory on constituency service’s supply, using the field experiment introduced in Chapter 3 to assess politicians’ motivations to respond to petitions. It shows that indicators of a personal vote—that the petitioner has voted for the politician in the past—can have a small positive effect on the quality of a politician’s response, if not the baseline response rate. This chapter also investigates whether information on local blocking affects politicians’ willingness to respond. It shows that, in states with a long history of local elections, politicians interpret information about a failure to receive assistance locally as an indicator of local partisan blocking and, combined with information on electoral history, an indication that the petitioner is a supporter or persuadable voter. Consistent with qualitative evidence from politician shadowing, this experimental evidence substantiates the argument that politicians use constituency service to reach potential supporters.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125655704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Access to Services in a Patronage Democracy","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a discussion of service provision in India, to set the context for an analysis of distributive politics and, in particular, constituency service, in a patronage democracy. It lays out the features of India’s political economy that continue to lead us to describe it as a patronage democracy. It then outlines the characteristics of India’s primary political, bureaucratic, and social institutions, considering the formal roles and responsibilities of key actors at all levels of government with regard to distributive politics and their informal powers over distribution, at the national, state, and local levels. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the potential for constituency service in India from the perspective of prevailing theories, considering in particular the character of political institutions, the nature of electoral and party politics, and the dynamics that may—or may not—encourage politicians to build personal reputations for responsiveness.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124354127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Clients or Constituents?","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 4 offers a theoretical explanation for why we should expect to see constituency service in patronage democracies, despite existing expectations to the contrary. It discusses in greater detail the book’s argument for why constituency service constitutes a key element of distributive politics, alongside forms of locally brokered clientelism and contingent allocation of group-oriented goods. The chapter elaborates the sources of demand for, and supply of, constituency service in a patronage democracy. It then considers the limitations of more widely studied forms of distributive politics and outlines the ways in which constituency service offers a compelling alternative to politicians for pursuing their desired electoral ends. This discussion suggests a number of empirical implications, laid out in detail at the end of the chapter, which guide the analyses in subsequent chapters.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133913609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constituency Service in Comparative Perspective","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 11 considers the extent to which we should expect to observe similar dynamics of distributive politics in other parts of the world. It draws on a range of cross-national data to show that the contextual characteristics supporting constituency service—the dynamics of patronage democracy, difficulty in access to public benefits, and partisan allocation of benefits at local levels, accompanied by the presence of high-level representatives with little ability to monitor individual electoral behavior—coexist across a range of democracies around the world. It offers evidence to suggest that high-level politicians in countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America also engage in individual-level distribution to build a personal vote, rather than support for their party, and that highly partisan distribution by local operatives may ironically heighten their incentives to assist constituents in a nonpartisan manner. Thus, India is an exemplar of a common trend, rather than a global outlier.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133393259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Local Blocking and Appeals for Assistance","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 7 examines the implications of local blocking for citizen strategies to access state services. It shows that non-co-partisans of local officials, who are more likely to be denied services locally, are also expected to make appeals to a larger number of potential intermediaries when attempting to access benefits from the state, than do co-partisans of local officials. It then establishes that high-level politicians are important alternative sources of assistance, particularly when individuals have difficulty accessing public benefits from their local elected official. Importantly, the chapter shows that those individuals who appeal to high-level politicians for assistance are, on average, more successful in acquiring their desired service than those who appeal to local politicians. Thus, local blocking is associated with an increased demand for assistance from high-level politicians.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121148266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Provision of Constituency Service","authors":"Jennifer Bussell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190945398.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 3 draws on a field experimental audit of politicians with a near census of Indian state and national legislators to show that, on the whole, politicians do not take indicators of partisanship into account when responding to individual-level requests. Specifically, this national field experiment shows that for India’s high-level politicians, information on electoral preferences does not affect the willingness of representatives to respond to an individual’s request for assistance. In addition, indications of shared ethnicity, e.g., caste, which may be closely tied to political preferences, do not result in preferential treatment. Overall, these findings offer strong evidence that the aid high-level politicians offer to individuals requiring assistance navigating the state is often noncontingent in nature, taking the form of constituency service.","PeriodicalId":231566,"journal":{"name":"Clients and Constituents","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125898028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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