什么时候反应是党派偏见?

Jennifer Bussell
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第10章评估了政治家以偶然或非偶然方式分配福利的条件。结果显示,在上届选举中大力支持某一政治人物的地区,居民更有可能从该政治人物的选区发展基金(CDF)中获得支出。根据实验数据,该研究将政治家使用CDF基金的行为与对响应性实验审计的反应进行了比较。这表明,虽然选举支持模式预测了党派目标方面的行为,但它们对理解选区服务模式提供的解释价值较低。因此,同样的因素不能同时解释党派偏见和选区服务,从事非偶然个人援助的同一个人也可能以很大程度上的党派方式瞄准基于群体的福利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When Is Responsiveness Partisan Bias?
Chapter 10 evaluates the conditions under which politicians will allocate benefits in a contingent, versus noncontingent, manner. It shows that citizens living in areas that offered strong support to a politician in the last election are much more likely to receive spending from that politician’s constituency development fund (CDF). Drawing on data from the experiment, it then compares the behavior of politicians spending their CDF funds with responses to the experimental audit of responsiveness. This shows that, while patterns of electoral support predict behavior with regard to partisan targeting, they offer less explanatory value for understanding patterns of constituency service. Thus, the same factors cannot explain both partisan bias and constituency service, and the same individuals who engage in noncontingent individual assistance may also target group-based benefits in a largely partisan manner.
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