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At Brexit Crossroads: Autonomy and Growth as Alternatives? 在英国脱欧的十字路口:自主和增长是替代选择?
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3744705
H. Schäfer, J. Kämmerer
{"title":"At Brexit Crossroads: Autonomy and Growth as Alternatives?","authors":"H. Schäfer, J. Kämmerer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3744705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744705","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we have reviewed the main economic and legal problems of Brexit. The economic literature agrees that Brexit entails an economic loss for both the UK and the EU, but more so for the former, whose GDP is likely to incur a one-time 5 to 7% drop (not counting the Corona effect). These economic losses would be part of the price the UK would have to pay for the restoration of its full sovereignty in matters of international trade in the event of a hard Brexit. When the UK entered the EU in 1973, it cannot have been unaware of the ECJ being an atypical court and a motor of European integration, but its increasing uneasiness with the ECJ accumulating “super-constitutional” powers is also understandable. That the UK government now declares any form of ECJ involvement in the future legal relations with the Union a “red line” (a line that is also extended to the ECHR in police and judicial matters) is out of proportion but may indeed hinder a substantial agreement on important issues.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129162338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Legal Envelope Theorem 法律信封定理
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3725155
D. Weisbach, Daniel Hemel
{"title":"The Legal Envelope Theorem","authors":"D. Weisbach, Daniel Hemel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725155","url":null,"abstract":"Non-tax legal rules regulating the workplace, the financial sector, real property, and many other areas affect the ability of governments to collect revenues and provide public goods. Yet tax-collection considerations rarely enter into economic analyses of non-tax legal rules. Usually, tax-collection concerns are shunted aside to separate studies (and separate law-school courses) rather than being integrated into debates in non-tax spheres. This separation between non-tax legal rules and tax-collection considerations bears significant negative consequences for the ability of law and economics to generate descriptively accurate and normatively attractive accounts of important non-tax legal questions. \u0000 \u0000This Article takes a step toward remedying that oversight. We present an analytic framework for understanding the interaction between non-tax legal rules and tax collection. This framework—which we call the Legal Envelope Theorem—demonstrates that legal rules should systematically deviate from simple notions of efficiency to take stock of tax effects. We then provide a series of examples applying the Legal Envelope Theorem, illustrating how the non-tax legal system ought to be (and, on occasion, actually is) designed with tax effects in mind. These examples range from parental-leave mandates to bank capital requirements to centuries-old property and contract rules regularly taught in introductory law-school courses. We illustrate how a framework that is attentive to tax-collection considerations can enhance the government’s capacity to redistribute resources and address wealth inequality.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115916736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Law and Economics of Scottish Independence 苏格兰独立的法律和经济学
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-02 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3723298
Richard Mackenzie-Gray Scott, Geoffrey Chapman
{"title":"The Law and Economics of Scottish Independence","authors":"Richard Mackenzie-Gray Scott, Geoffrey Chapman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3723298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3723298","url":null,"abstract":"The movement for Scottish independence has, once again, become topical. With the United Kingdom (UK) now no longer part of the European Union (EU), in addition to the manner in which COVID-19 is being addressed across the UK, new debates have arisen concerning Scotland’s future. This article will address two aspects of this matter. The first is the applicable law to Scotland becoming an independent state. The second is the economic impact of Scotland becoming an independent state. The key components of constitutional and international law will be distilled to provide an appreciation of the legal context in which the economic factors would likely play out, should Scotland choose to become an independent state. The article then analyses the macroeconomic impact of new states, the findings of which are applied to the Scottish context. The article provides a new insight into the legal and economic implications of the Scottish independence debate, in particular the interdependency between legality and economic stability for Scotland and the UK.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121561197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Contest Design when Policing Damaging Aggressive Behavior 管理破坏性攻击行为时的最优竞赛设计
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3672557
Scott M. Gilpatric, Ye Hong
{"title":"Optimal Contest Design when Policing Damaging Aggressive Behavior","authors":"Scott M. Gilpatric, Ye Hong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3672557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672557","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productive \u0000effort but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must choose \u0000prizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggressiveness will be \u0000tolerated and the probability of inspection. The results are interesting. The optimal contest \u0000design leads the organizer to tolerate more aggressiveness than the level that minimizes it. \u0000The less accurate inspection measures associate with less tolerance on aggressive behavior and \u0000the zero-tolerance policy can be optimal if the aggressive behavior is valueless. Furthermore, \u0000when the value of contestants’ output is low it may be optimal to motivate much less effort \u0000than first best, because the prize spread necessary to induce higher effort necessitates a high \u0000level of enforcement, which is not worth the cost. When the value of output is sufficiently high \u0000it becomes optimal to offer a high prize spread to motivate effort that is substantial but still \u0000below first-best, with costly enforcement then being employed to constrain damaging actions.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129273201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
BITs and Bonds: The International Law and Economics of Sovereign Debt 双边投资协定和债券:主权债务的国际法和经济学
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3663299
Stratos Pahis
{"title":"BITs and Bonds: The International Law and Economics of Sovereign Debt","authors":"Stratos Pahis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3663299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663299","url":null,"abstract":"Recent jurisdictional decisions suggest that sovereign debt will be subject to bilateral investment treaties (BITs) for the foreseeable future. This Article demonstrates that applying BITs to sovereign bonds threatens to undermine the core economic function of those treaties by encouraging inefficient State and creditor behavior. It further argues that this dilemma can be resolved through an interpretative approach that leads to the equal treatment of like creditors.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115482430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
International Financial Regulation: Why it Still Falls Short 国际金融监管:为何仍有不足
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-25 DOI: 10.36687/inetwp131
W. White
{"title":"International Financial Regulation: Why it Still Falls Short","authors":"W. White","doi":"10.36687/inetwp131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp131","url":null,"abstract":"While recent reforms are welcome in many ways, there are still significant reasons to doubt that the post-crisis tightening of international financial regulation guarantees future financial and economic stability. The most important reason is that the reforms have focused too narrowly on ensuring that an unstable financial sector will not aggravate downturns by restricting the supply of credit. More attention needs to be paid to ensuring that an overly exuberant financial system does not weaken other parts of the economy by encouraging a rapid buildup of debt during upturns. Some combination of time-varying monetary and regulatory policies (a macrofinancial stability framework) will be required to do this. In addition, many of the individual regulatory measures taken to date, both macroprudential and microprudential, have shortcomings. Their coherence as a package has also been questioned.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127490023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Zero-Based Regulation 从零开始的监管
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3651238
James Broughel
{"title":"Zero-Based Regulation","authors":"James Broughel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3651238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3651238","url":null,"abstract":"A common way of imposing fiscal discipline in private companies, as well as in some governments, is a practice called zero-based budgeting (ZBB). The idea behind ZBB is simple: require that all expenditures be justified anew each period. There is no assumption that spending set at a particular level in a previous year means the same level of spending or more spending will be authorized the next period. Instead, a zero-base is the relevant baseline from which spending levels are set during the budgeting process. This chapter discusses a counterpart to ZBB in the regulatory sphere, namely zero-based regulation (ZBR). The idea behind ZBR is that regulations must periodically be justified anew, just as spending authorizations are periodically reevaluated under ZBB. A ZBR system will have two central pillars: sunset provisions and regulatory impact analysis requirements. Sunset provisions are automatic expiration dates built into regulations. These trigger reevaluation of rules and ensure the default is that rules go away, i.e., return to zero. Regulatory impact analysis requirements, meanwhile, are a form of economic analysis, which can be used as a means to rank and prioritize regulations according to their effectiveness. Taken together, these reforms have the potential to reduce costs substantially while also improving regulatory efficiency.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131210608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Web Appendix to: Why the Optimal Long-Run Tax Rate on Capital is Zero...or Very High: The Missing Explanation Web附录:为什么资本的最优长期税率为零…或非常高:缺失的解释
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3589726
C. Sanchirico
{"title":"Web Appendix to: Why the Optimal Long-Run Tax Rate on Capital is Zero...or Very High: The Missing Explanation","authors":"C. Sanchirico","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3589726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589726","url":null,"abstract":"This posting is the mathematical appendix to Sanchirico, Chris William, Why the Optimal Long-Run Tax Rate on Capital is Zero…Or Very High: The Missing Explanation (April 30, 2020). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 20-33. \u0000 \u0000Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589720.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126034480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Probabilistic Causation in the Law 定律中的概率因果关系
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-01 DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0003
F. Schauer, Barbara A. Spellman
{"title":"Probabilistic Causation in the Law","authors":"F. Schauer, Barbara A. Spellman","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper challenges the widespread view that the legal system’s conception of causation is largely deterministic and token-level, that view stemming from the law’s principal focus on assigning ex post responsibility for past acts. We argue, in opposition to this view, that the probabilistic, ex ante, and type-level conceptions of causation that dominate the social sciences have a larger place in the legal system than is often recognized. Not only does the legal system frequently and appropriately use probabilistic conceptions of causation when engaged in ex ante rule generation (as opposed to rule application), but probabilistic conceptions of causation also play a substantial role even in the ex post application of legal rules.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115789243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Theories of Tax Deductions: Income Measurement versus Efficiency 税收扣除理论:收入计量与效率
LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-09 DOI: 10.1561/108.00000042
Yehonatan Givati
{"title":"Theories of Tax Deductions: Income Measurement versus Efficiency","authors":"Yehonatan Givati","doi":"10.1561/108.00000042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000042","url":null,"abstract":"What is the purpose of tax deductions? A common view among tax law scholars is that tax deductions are required to properly measure income. I present an alternative theory of tax deductions, relying on standard economic efficiency grounds. I develop a model which highlights the fact that economic activities have costs and benefits, but an income tax system taxes only some of those benefits. The efficient deduction rule allows the deduction of a share of the cost equal to the share of the benefit that is taxed. I also show that the deadweight loss due to a departure from the efficient deduction rule increases quadratically with the departure, making larger departures from the rule much more costly than smaller ones. I then review various tax deduction rules in the Internal Revenue Code, analyzing each rule under the two theories of tax deductions, and demonstrating that the efficiency theory is useful both for teaching tax deductions and as a guide to optimal tax policy.","PeriodicalId":231496,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116954901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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