{"title":"Bargaining with Rational Inattention","authors":"D. Ravid","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2957890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2957890","url":null,"abstract":"I study a one-sided oers bargaining game in which a fully rational seller is making repeated oers to a rationally inattentive buyer (Sims, 1998). The quality of the good is random and is known to the seller. The buyer needs to pay attention to both the quality of the good and the seller’s oers. I show that the buyer attains half of the uncertain portion of the surplus as attention costs become negligible and oers are frequent. With infrequent oers and positive attention costs an equilibrium exists both in the finite and the infinite horizon games. This equilibrium involves the buyer paying more for, but also obtaining a higher surplus from, higher quality goods. Trade occurs with delay that is decreasing with the quality of the good and persists even when oers are frequent. Finally, I show that revealing the quality of the good to the buyer reduces both the buyer’s surplus and overall eciency.","PeriodicalId":229249,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116501432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems","authors":"Jin Yeub Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2930907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2930907","url":null,"abstract":"I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage-when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types-and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex ante incentive efficient mechanisms and apply the concept of neutral optima (Myerson 1984b). I show that those mechanisms may not be ex ante incentive efficient. This note suggests that ex ante incentive efficient mechanisms are not robust to a perturbation of the ex ante informational structure at the time of mechanism selection.","PeriodicalId":229249,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121723644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No Compromise: Uncertain Costs in Reputational Bargaining","authors":"Jack Fanning","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2907401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2907401","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I show how uncertainty about agents' future costs of delay can lead to substantial bargaining delays when agents have reputational concerns. Reputational concerns arise because with positive probability agents are behavioral types, committed to demanding a fixed share of the surplus. In equilibrium, rational agents may demand almost the entire surplus and then wait, with the deadlock only broken by the arrival of news about future costs, even as the probability of behavioral types vanishes. Although both agents would benefit from a compromise reached immediately, they do not propose such agreements, because doing so would increase an opponent's option value of waiting.","PeriodicalId":229249,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125110933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Relationship between Leverage and the Bargaining Power of Labor Unions: Evidence from Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives","authors":"Chil Sun Choi, P. Sohn, Ji-Yong Seo","doi":"10.4067/S0718-52862016000100003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-52862016000100003","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether a firm’s leverage can be used strategically to improve its bargaining position with an organized labor union using samples of non-financial firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) from 1999 to 2013. Through empirical testing, we find that the portfolio with the lowest union labor coverage has the lowest leverage, while the portfolio with the highest union labor coverage has the highest leverage. We also find that collective bargaining power positively affects leverage through the regression of leverage on the bargaining power of the labor union, regardless of the analysis methods, such as static and dynamic models. With a robustness test model that used the industry adjusted labor union concentration index (IUCI), we obtain evidence that collective bargaining power positively influences leverage, which corresponds with the regression results. In conclusion, we suggest the existence of evidence demonstrating that variables related to labor unions affect leverage levels, as suggested in previous studies.","PeriodicalId":229249,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127773526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining","authors":"Avidit Acharya, Juan Ortner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1603748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1603748","url":null,"abstract":"We model a situation in which two players bargain over two issues (pies), one of which can only be resolved at a future date. We find that if the players value the issues asymmetrically (one player considers the existing issue more important than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation) then they may delay agreement on the first issue until the second one is finally on the table. If we allow for partial agreements, then the players never leave an issue completely unresolved. They either make a partial agreement on the first issue, and wait for the second one to emerge before completing the agreement; or they come to complete agreements on each of the issues at their earliest possible dates. We discuss applications to legislative bargaining and international trade negotiations.","PeriodicalId":229249,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121771440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heterogeneous Impacts of the Decentralization of Collective Bargaining","authors":"A. Kauhanen, Terhi Maczulskij, Krista Riukula","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3730465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730465","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the heterogeneous effects of the decentralization of collective bargaining on the incidence of wage increases and wage dispersion in Finland. We use linked employer-employee panel data for the 2005-2013 period, which includes major changes in bargaining systems and economic conditions. Our regression results from models with high-dimensional individual and firm fixed effects show that decentralized bargaining leads to very different outcomes for blue- and white-collar employees. Decentralized bargaining decreases wage dispersion among blue-collar employees and slightly increases it among white-collar employees. Decentralization also affects the incidence of wage increases differently for blue- and white-collar employees. We argue that these differences reflect the different preferences of the employee groups. We also show that the fallback option in local negotiations affects the decentralization outcomes.","PeriodicalId":229249,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134589169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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