Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal最新文献

{"title":"How J M Keynes Corrected the Only Major Error He Made in His General Theory in His Correspondence with J. Robinson between September and November, 1936: His Mention of Mrs. Joan Robinson in the Preface to the General Theory","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727672","url":null,"abstract":"J M Keynes stated the following on p.xii of his General Theory on December 13,1935: “I have also had much help from Mrs. Joan Robinson….who have read the whole of the proof-sheets.” (Keynes,1936, p.xii).<br><br>In the course of an extensive correspondence with J. Robinson in the months of September, October, and November,1936, over one of her books that she had sent him for review and comment, Keynes discovered that Joan Robinson had (a) no knowledge of basic undergraduate, lower division level training in international trade and exchange rates between two countries and, much, much more seriously, (b) had a serious lack of knowledge about his Liquidity Preference theory of the rate of interest that occupied all or some of chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21 of the General Theory.<br><br>It was now quite clear to Keynes that Joan Robinson had not understood what was in the final draft copy of the General Theory that he had given to her to read and comment on in June, 1935 and to which she replied in four days time:<br><br>“Given Keynes’s ambitions, limitations, and expectations, she could be useful, perhaps even valuable, in finishing the book. As in so many instances, events proved Keynes’s judgment sound even if not precisely in the way he anticipated. Within four days of receiving the second set of galleys, Robinson sent him an extensive and detailed set of comments as well as her general impressions of the book (Keynes 1973a, 638–45). How was this extraordinarily swift and thorough response possible? Keynes sent Harrod the galleys on June 5 but did not hear from him until July 31 (see Keynes 1973a, 526–27). Hawtrey’s set was sent on June 12, and he replied by the end of the month (1973a, 567). In four days, how could Robinson read a difficult and confusing book, digest it, and write elaborate and carefully crafted suggestions, many of which Keynes adopted?”(Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2009, p.205; boldface added).<br><br>The correct answer to the question posed by Aslanbeigui and Oakes in 2009, which was “In four days, how could Robinson read a difficult and confusing book, digest it, and write elaborate and carefully crafted suggestions, many of which Keynes adopted?” (Aslanbeigui and Oakes, 2009, p.205; boldface added), in light of her extremely poor performance in the Keynes-Robinson exchanges of September-November, 1936, is that she was not the author who wrote the “…elaborate and carefully crafted suggestions” on the General Theory in four days. The true authors were Richard Kahn and Austin Robinson, just as they were most probably the true authors of The Economics of Imperfect Competition,1933.<br><br>Keynes now realized that Joan Robinson’s reply to him in 1935 was not her own. This conclusion follows directly from the first two sentences of Keynes’s letter of November 9th,1936 to Joan Robinson:<br><br>“I beg you not to publish. For your argument, as it stands, is most certainly nonsense.” (Keynes, 1936, CWJMK, Vol. 14, p.147; boldface ad","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122269185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"J M Keynes’s Very Severe criticism ( '…your argument…is most certainly nonsense.') of J. Robinson in Keynes’s Letter of November 9th,1936 was due to Robinson’s Use of the Incorrect M=L(r) Instead of the Correct M=L(Y,r)","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3726778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3726778","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes’s very negative reaction to J. Robinson’s misuse of Keynes’s initial, beginning, introductory, preliminary exposition of liquidity preference in chapter 13 of the General Theory is explained by the fact that J. Robinson was repeating the same identical error made by R. Hawtrey, D. Robertson, and H. Henderson, which was to simply ignore Keynes’s M=L(r,Y) analyzed by Keynes on p.199-209 of the General Theory and incorporated on page 298 as part of his formal IS-LM(LP) model presented on pp. 298-299 in chapter 21 in Part IV of the General Theory.<br><br>Instead, she used M=L( r) and/or M=L2(r). It is impossible to present an analysis of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference unless (Y,r) space is used.<br><br>Nowhere in Robinson’s 1935 comments on the final draft of the General Theory, sent to her by Keynes for review and comment, is there the slightest criticism/mention/discussion/query of a conflict between the two functions M=L( r ) and M=L( r,Y). Keynes had made it clear in his exposition in chapter 15 of the General Theory that the exposition in chapter 13 was the alpha, while the exposition in chapter 15 was the omega, with Keynes’s analysis on pp. 179-182 being the equivalent material he used in his tutoring of R. Harrod in the July -September, 1935 time period, after which Harrod acknowledged to Keynes in his letter of August 30th,1935, that the I=S equilibrium was simply a single, downwardly sloping line in (r,Y) space that intersected NOTHING, so that Keynes’s LM curve, M=L(r,Y), was absolutely required for an equilibrium to exist in (r,Y) space. Harrod was very clear. In this letter Harrod credited Keynes with making a fundamental, 'radical reconstitution’ of the theory of the rate of interest.<br><br>Keynes now realized that Robinson had NEVER EVER understood what he had done in the General Theory, since the M=L(r ) curve could, at best, only be “interpreted “as a single, upward sloping line in (r,Y) space. Robinson’s misinterpretation is repeated in all heterodox, Post Keynesian and Institutionalist discussions such as Tily, who is a good example of the faithful continuing to put forth Robinson’s erroneous claims about Keynes’s theory of the rate of interest being a purely monetary one and as being what Keynes meant in the General Theory.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116745428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Joan Robinson Never Understood Any Part of Keynes’s Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest in the General Theory","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725978","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes‘s first paragraph in his letter of the 9th of November,1936, is the following two lines: “I beg you not to publish. For your argument as it stands is most certainly nonsense.”<br><br>Anyone who reads this correspondence will soon realize that it was simply impossible for Joan Robinson to have aided or contributed in any way to the development of the General Theory between 1930 and February, 1936, given the nature of these exchanges.<br><br>Keynes is very specific as regards his Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest:<br><br>“You do not seem to realize that if you are right the whole theory of liquidity preference has to be thrown overboard…Such a conclusion cannot be brought in as a tacit inference from an unargued obiter dictum,”(Keynes,1936,CWJMK,Vol.14, p.146).<br><br>Over the course of the two month correspondence from September 8th, 1936 till November 13th 1936, Keynes spent a great deal of time and effort trying to correct her many errors about his Liquidity Preference Theory of the Rate of Interest. J. Robinson compounded her original errors by making more additional errors due to her attempt to argue that Keynes was mistaken. Keynes finally realized that J. Robinson simply did not know what she was talking about.<br><br>R. Skidelsky accused Roy Harrod of covering up certain aspects of Keynes’s life in his 1951 biography of Keynes in order to ”protect” Keynes’s reputation. This is correct, although Skidelsky overlooked Harrod’s additional failure to cover Keynes’s original multiplier-accelerator model of August, 1938 and Keynes’s careful tutoring of Harrod in correspondence, between July and September, 1935, of Keynes’s IS-LM model, which is presented by Keynes formally in the General Theory in chapter 21 in Part IV on pages 298-299.<br><br>Unfortunately, Skidelsky has done exactly what he condemned R. Harrod of doing in 1951. Skidelsky never covered these exchanges between J M Keynes and Joan Robinson in the period between September and November, 1936 in any published work of his in the 20th or 21st centuries.<br><br>It is then straightforward to show that other claims related to the General Theory made by Robinson can’t possibly follow ,given her complete and total ignorance of Keynes’s Liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest.<br>","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127658013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adam Smith as an Example of Samuelson’s 1952 Point That Mathematics Can Be Written Out in the English Language: On Smith’s Anti-Utilitarianism Based on the Differences Between Precise and Imprecise Probability Presented in 1776 in the Wealth of Nations","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3723176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3723176","url":null,"abstract":"In the Wealth of Nations in 1776, Smith gave two clearly worked out mathematical examples involving a comparison- contrast examining the concepts of precise probability (exact, definite, linear, numerical) and imprecise probability(inexact, indefinite, nonlinear, non numerical) that must incorporate uncertainty, which means there is missing or unavailable evidence that is not available to the decision maker at the time that he must make a choice between two or more different alternative options or alternatives. <br><br>Smith’s analysis is carefully presented on pp. 106-113 and pp. 419-423 of the Modern Library edition of the Wealth of Nations edited by Cannon with the foreword by Max Lerner. It is interesting that there has not been a single academic economist, philosopher, historian, sociologist, psychologist, political scientist, social scientist or decision theorist in the 244 years since Smith published the Wealth of Nations in 1776 to note this fact. <br><br>The fact that Smith believed that the use of precise probability, as advocated by Jeremy Bentham, who was Smith’s great intellectual opponent and adversary, was possible only under very special conditions, explains why Smith rejected utilitarianism as an ethical system and foundation for the science of economics-the requirement for precise probabilities and precise outcomes was, in general, not possible, due to the fact of missing or unavailable relevant information data ,knowledge or evidence that the decision maker would need to estimate the consequences in the future of his present decision to act. An example of this severe misunderstanding and confusion of Smith’s approach to decision making can be seen, for just one instance, in the 2016 paper by Hollander <br><br>Thus, discussions about whether Smith was a utilitarian ,partly a utilitarian, whatever that may mean, not a utilitarian or anti-utilitarian are all besides the point once it is realized that Smith completely rejected the additivity and linearity of the probability calculus upon which Bentham based his utilitarianism on, that all men can calculate. Smith realized that Bentham’s belief in the ability to calculate future consequences was extremely limited. <br><br> Apparently, economists can’t read the English Language that Smith used to express his mathematical analysis of his approach to decision making in the Wealth of Nations. The belief that Smith did not use mathematical analysis in the Wealth of Nations can only be a conclusion reached by economists who are themselves mathematically illiterate, inept, innumerate or severely confused about how mathematical arguments and analysis can be presented.<br><br>This leads to the conclusion that the M. Friedman, G. Becker, and G. Stigler school of economics, that is taught at the University of Chicago, can have nothing to do at all with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations because they base all of their economic analysis on precise probability, which is an approach that is identical ","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116783373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Change and Continuity in Economic Methodology and Philosophy of Economics","authors":"John B. Davis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3719161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3719161","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides my reflections on the state of economic methodology and philosophy of economics as of the beginning of 2020 following the end a fifteen year co-editorship of the Journal of Economic Methodology with Wade Hands. It looks at how economic methodology and philosophy of economics, as a meta-field type of research, has changed since it emerged as a distinct subfield in economics in the 1980s. Using an evolution of technology analysis, it distinguishes two different possible scenarios for the field’s future according to environmental factors operating upon it and how specialization in research may affect both it and economics, and then makes a crossdisciplinarity argument for its further development as a diverse, pluralistic domain of research.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115964838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Creative Dynamics and Entangled Political Economy","authors":"Marta Podemska-Mikluch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3715819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3715819","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the relationship between two recently advanced research programs: the Creative Dynamics and the Entangled Political Economy. The two frameworks share some significant commonalities: both approach coordination as a process and not as a state, both focus on explanation as opposed to prediction, both work with open-ended models, and both follow the Hayekian tradition of treating knowledge as subjective, dispersed, and in need of discovery. However, the connection between the two approaches is not always clear as they seem to be created for different goals. Creative Dynamics is focused primarily on explaining novelty. Entangled Political Economy seeks to offer a uniform approach to understanding social coordination, treating political and economic activities as more similar than different. My paper serves three purposes. First, I provide a primer on the two distinct theories. Second, I explore their shared origins and common features. Third, I sketch three possible directions for future research.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"566 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123111555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"One Hundred Years After Keynes Published His 'A Treatise on Probability' in 1921, Edgeworth’s Two Reviews Still Stand Out As Being Vastly Superior to the Assessments Made by Any Other Philosopher of the Logical Theory of Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3699834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3699834","url":null,"abstract":"F. Y. Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes’s Logical Theory of Probability in his A Treatise on Probability among philosophers in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book, with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I. \u0000 \u0000The major problem confronting any philosopher, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, is the unfortunate fact that there is no philosopher,with the one exception of Edgeworth (Bertrand Russell did not read Part V), who has read beyond chapters 1-4 plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This assessment includes every philosopher associated with SIPTA, as well as B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I.Levi, S. Zabell, as well as younger philosophers, such as B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. Siedenfeld, G. Wheeler, etc. \u0000 \u0000The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one sure path currently available to philosophers who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. A reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. Kyburg’s claim, that he was the first to have put forth a detailed interval valued approach for a logical theory of probability, is simply a major oversight made by Kyburg. \u0000 \u0000Edwin B. Wilson's conclusion, that Edgeworth was by the far the most qualified academic to review Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, still holds good 100 years after he published his reviews of Keynes's book.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115417291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Laws of Returns and Exogenous Distribution: The Metaphysics of Justice and Adjustment in Political Economy","authors":"Up Sira Nukulkit","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3703406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703406","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reiterates and clarifies the heterodox economic assumption of exogenous distribution. It discusses Sraffa's analysis of the laws of returns and extends to the metaphysical questions of justice and adjustment in political economy. The laws of returns show the outcome of economic production from inputs to outputs. Returns have to be paid to the sources of production. In other words, returns are justice served to the works of capital and labor. However, there is a problem of knowledge and methodology about distributive justice in the measurement of capital. This paper applies Sraffa's critique of economic theory to capital accumulation, technological progress, and the distribution of income. Adjustment to the natural physical expansion of the system has a problem of knowledge and cannot be determined a priori external to the system. The paper argues about the adjustment and determination of the distribution of income according to the history of economic thought tradition of theory of value and capital. Capital is the metaphysical measurement and adjustment variable of our moral science and physical science. Without human conscience, it is impossible to measure systemic growth and quantify capital.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130270777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Keynes Had Already Answered Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 Critiques Concerning Objective, Logical Probability Relations on Pages 35–36 of the A Treatise on Probability","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3697924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697924","url":null,"abstract":"Ramsey’s 1922 and 1926 critiques about Keynes’s logical ,objective probability relations overlooked Keynes’s already specified response that Keynes had incorporated on pp. 35-36 of chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability FIVE YEARS before Ramsey made his critique .This fact calls into question (a) whether Ramsey ever actually read the book he claimed to be reviewing and (b) whether those adhering to Ramsey’s “critique “ ever read the A Treatise on Probability either. It is bizarre that these same unsupportable claims are being rehashed again in C. Misak’s autobiography on Ramsey in 2020.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114351860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Is Clive Bell, an Artist With No Training in Logic, Mathematics, Statistics or Probability, Being Cited as an Expert on J M Keynes’s a Treatise on Probability?","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3693582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693582","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes had already answered Ramsey’s incoherent( bizarre?) criticism that “… the obvious one is that there really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he describes ...\"on page 36 of the A Treatise on Probability BEFORE Ramsey ever made his criticism. Keynes pointed out that the “…analogy between orders of similarity and probability is so great that its apprehension will greatly assist that of the ideas I wish to convey.” Ramsey completely failed to grasp the analogy between similarity and probability before criticizing Keynes. No where does Ramsey show that he understands the analogy between probability and similarity that Keynes is using. Nor has any philosopher, economist, psychologist, sociologist, historian or decision theorist demonstrated any understanding of Keynes’s argument in the 20th or 21st century. Only in the writings of cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists is their evidence that Keynes’s position has been understood. I know of NO such specialist who has critiqued Keynes’s position. This means that Ramsey’s critique is based on ignorance on his part. <br><br>Before one can rationally criticize any argument of any type, the person doing the critique MUST demonstrate that he understands the position he is critiquing.<br><br>Keynes’s introductory comments on p.36 were then explored in Part III of the A Treatise on Probability in far, far, far greater depth and detail by Keynes. Keynes’s objective probability relations are simply objective similarity relations existing between old known situations and new unknown situations. Human pattern recognition skills involve using resemblance functions based on past memory that projects past knowledge of old situations into new situations, where there are similarities that are seen to exist between the old, known situation and a new, unexplored situation by SOME researchers. One then can come up with a rational degree of belief regarding how some new situation will play out, given the similarities between the old and new situations.<br><br>Herbert Simon independently rediscovered some parts of Keynes’s Part III analysis in the A Treatise on Probability that dealt with the connection between intuition and induction when he started to analyze the decision making capabilities of tournament chess players in Over the Board competition, where the players must make decisions under time constrain(a clock),in the 1950’s. Simon was a part of the developing fields of Cognitive Science and cognitive psychology that started in the 1950’s.Keynes ‘s positions on intuition, induction, similarity (dissimilarity), resemblances, analogy and pattern recognition are all accepted basic conclusions in these fields. Ramsey’s concept that supposed humans were capable of calculating exact, precise probabilities, using the purely mathematical laws of the probability calculus to make decisions, is completely rejected except as very special case. One very special case would be correspond","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"246 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116208383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}