{"title":"Participatory Democracy and Public Administration: A Study of the Budget Experience of the State of Piauí","authors":"M. Souza, Monique Menezes","doi":"10.26694/RCP.ISSN.2317-3254.V2E1.2013.P105-133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26694/RCP.ISSN.2317-3254.V2E1.2013.P105-133","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the experience of participatory planningin Piaui, an instrument created in 2007 to increase the participation ofcivil society in defining the state’s public policies. The study has twocentral arguments. First, the great dependence of Piaui on the resourcesof the federal government leaves little room for the formulation ofspecific public policies, hindering the implementation of policiesconsidered to be priorities by the civil society, which participates inassemblies and councils that compose the participatory planning of thestate. Second, despite the creation of the participatory institution withinthe state’s executive branch, we observed a lack of planning by thegovernment in accommodating the demands of the population. Thestate’s departmentalised administrative structure inhibitscommunication between departments for the implementation ofintegrated policies.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127466567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foreign Assistance and Fiscal Transparency: The Impact of the Open Budget Initiative on Donor Policies and Practices","authors":"Linnea Mills","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2332247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2332247","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents research that sought to document how, when, and why three donor agencies — the U.S. Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) — have adopted the Open Budget Index in language and practice; assesses the contributions of the Open Budget Initiative and its partners to achieving these apparent advocacy successes; and analyzes other factors that may have influenced the decision of these three donors to use the language and methodology advocated by the Open Budget Initiative. In conclusion, the analysis of the three donor case studies covered in this report shows that the advocacy efforts by the Open Budget Initiative have had varied impact in changing policy debates and guidelines.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134019012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brian Olden, D. Last, Sami Ylaoutinen, Carla Sateriale
{"title":"Fiscal Consolidation in Southeastern European Countries: The Role of Budget Institutions","authors":"Brian Olden, D. Last, Sami Ylaoutinen, Carla Sateriale","doi":"10.5089/9781475503340.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475503340.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of fiscal institutions in ten Southeastern European countries, using recent benchmarking methodologies developed by FAD. The assessment evaluates each country’s understanding of the scale of the fiscal adjustment challenge, its ability to develop a credible consolidation strategy, and its capacity to implement the strategy. Key institutional arrangements, are generally in place, including top-down budgeting and medium-term budget frameworks. Other institutional arrangements require further attention, including macro-fiscal forecasting, fiscal risk analysis, setting fiscal objectives, presence and role of independent fiscal agencies, and top-down parliamentary approval.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126872671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Environmental Uncertainty and Budgetary Control Effectiveness on Propensity to Create Budgetary Slack in Public Sector","authors":"E. Yılmaz, G. Özer","doi":"10.5897/AJBM11.344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5897/AJBM11.344","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship among environmental uncertainty, effectiveness of budgetary control and propensity to create budgetary slack in public organizations. For this purpose, the data collected from 460 public organizations’ managers via questionnaire. Results of analyses show that negative and statistically significant relationship is found between environmental uncertainty and effectiveness of budgetary control and between effectiveness of budgetary control and propensity to create budgetary slack. However, environmental uncertainty has statistically significant and positive impact on propensity to create budgetary slack. It is also found that budgetary control has partial mediation effect on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and propensity to create budgetary slack.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133504688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simplified Budget Preparation","authors":"Varma","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1882047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1882047","url":null,"abstract":"In the present economic system the budget preparation is massive, multi staged, time consuming and laborious process. There are thousands of different high or very low valued goods or services to be segregated into different groups and taxed by both Centre and States with different taxes at three or more slab rates and, as if these are not enough, there are additional surcharges or cesses on selected goods. These tax structures and slab rates on different goods keep changing every year. With these complicated tax structures and ever changing slab rates every year, the tax compliance by individual manufacturers, dealers and retailers has been difficult, cumbersome and bothersome. Taxes are being collected by different tax collection departments based on the accounts maintained by individuals who run industry or business. There is plenty of room for understatement of production and sales, tax evasion and consequent by-product of black money. But in the suggested TOP Tax system there will be only single tax called TOP (Transfer Or Purchase) tax with fixed/stationary slab rate (4%) on all money transfers from one account to another account through cheque, debit card and online transfer/net banking in the purchase chain of consumers, retailers and manufacturers. The Transfer Or Purchase TOP Tax (4%) will be deducted automatically by computer systems of banks on all money transfers from one account to another account irrespective of the fact that for what purpose (purchase/donation/salaries/loans) and by whom these money transfers have been made. The tax will be only on money transfers form one account to another rather than on the value of goods and services with ever changing slab rates every year at budget time in the present taxation system. So the revenue collections for both Centre and Stated Governments will be instant, automatic, prompt and continuous process throughout the year with no room for tax evasion. There will be absolutely no tax collection expenditure for the Government and tax compliance cost for citizens. The purpose of budget preparation will be only the allocation of revenues, got from TOP Tax and Profit Tax, to various sectors, departments or ministries. So the budget presentation will become simple, smooth and time saving. Or even there will be no need for budget presentation each year. The yearly budget presentation can be solely utilised for percentage wise allocation and channeling of those automatically collected TOP Tax and Profit Tax revenues by banks to various sectors like housing, health care, education, drinking water, transport, irrigation, agriculture, environment, sanitation, infrastructure projects, rural development, defence and internal policing. The percentage of funds allocated to various ministries, departments or sectors can be changed every year depending upon the need, necessity and urgency acquired by them. The Government structure and machinery can be restructured, downsized and fine tuned not only to re","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126187988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Over-Optimism in Forecasts by Official Budget Agencies and its Implications","authors":"J. Frankel","doi":"10.1093/OXREP/GRR025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXREP/GRR025","url":null,"abstract":"The paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government agencies among 33 countries. In general, the forecasts are found: (i) to have a positive average bias, (ii) to be more biased in booms, (iii) to be even more biased at the 3-year horizon than at shorter horizons. This over-optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits, especially the failure to run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely, retrenchment is treated as unnecessary. Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or, better yet, the structural deficit. But we also find: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form of euroland's Stability and Growth Path, make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries. This effect may help explain frequent violations of the SGP. One country, Chile, has managed to overcome governments' tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action. As a result of budget institutions created in 2000, Chile's official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic, even in booms. Unlike many countries in the North, Chile took advantage of the 2002-07 expansion to run budget surpluses, and so was able to ease in the 2008-09 recession.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128753716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Municipal Government Strategies for Controlling Personnel Costs During the Fiscal Storm","authors":"J. West, Stephen E. Condrey","doi":"10.1108/JPBAFM-23-03-2011-B005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-23-03-2011-B005","url":null,"abstract":"Fiscal stress has spurred city governments to search for ways to reduce costs. Human resource professionals and municipal budget officers have been searching for ways to reduce personnel-related costs because this is where the greatest savings can be realized. This paper identifies and examines different personnel cost-containment strategies pursued by a national sample of 90 large U.S. cities. It focuses on hiring, wages and hours, employee benefits and other HR-related actions. Results indicate that jurisdictions whose municipal fiscal conditions are considered to be fair or poor are more likely than cities whose fiscal conditions are perceived to be good to excellent to use many of the cost reduction strategies. Other demographic and organizational variables had some limited relationship with the use of strategies, but were not as significantly associated with costcontainment actions as city economic climate.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133023240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Applying Method to the Madness: An Empirical Analysis of California Budget Delays","authors":"J. Cummins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1582803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1582803","url":null,"abstract":"California is notorious for its budget gridlock. From 1950 to 2008, the budget was adopted late 44 percent of the time. Although short delays have few consequences, delays in passage have become longer in the last two decades leading to more severe consequences, such as a lower credit rating and higher borrowing costs. The purpose of this paper is to systematically analyze late adoptions of the state budget and the factors responsible for them. I employ annual data from 1950 to 2008 and estimate regression models of the length of budget delays, controlling for economic conditions. This study reveals that divided government, party polarization, and revenue volatility, among other factors, prolong delays. Interestingly, budget gridlock is less pronounced in legislative election years when legislators seem to be fearful of voter retribution. I conclude by discussing potential reforms that could help the state avoid budget stalemates in the future.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134464462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paolo Biraschi, Marco Cacciotti, Davide Iacovoni, Juan Pradelli
{"title":"The New Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives and the Problem of Fiscal Sustainability after the Crisis","authors":"Paolo Biraschi, Marco Cacciotti, Davide Iacovoni, Juan Pradelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1697505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697505","url":null,"abstract":"The paper analyses the medium-term objectives (MTOs) recently adopted by the EU Member States as a reference for the multilateral budgetary surveillance, assessing the ability of the new MTOs to promote long-term fiscal sustainability. The paper calibrates the (yet undisclosed) algorithm for computing the minimum budgetary targets that EU countries can declare as MTO and discusses two novel features of the algorithm: a supplementary debt-reduction effort requested from high-debt countries, and the partial frontloading of the expected future increases in age-related expenditure -the cost of ageing-. The paper evaluates the impact of the crisis on EU countries‟ current as well as future MTOs through the channels of higher public debt, lower growth potential, and higher cost of ageing. On the basis of alternative scenarios for macroeconomic and budgetary conditions as of 2012 -when the next revision of MTOs is scheduled-, the paper concludes that prospective MTOs would be more stringent than the current ones. Therefore, a path for gradual fiscal tightening is already embedded into the European fiscal framework and should be considered when discussing exit strategies. Finally, an alternative indicator linking MTOs to the current fiscal and financial imbalances is presented.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133703217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chinese Public Finance Framework: A Critical Analysis","authors":"R. Scapens, Chunlei Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1533361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1533361","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the complexities of government financial management in China and examines the nature of the recent Public Finance Framework reform in that country. We argue that this Public Finance Framework reform is not just the latest idea in a centrally dominated reform agenda (and a logical and strategic development in the process of social, political and economic transformation) but that it reflects the Central Government's struggle to fine-tune central-local financial relationships and to grapple with the consequences of previously misplaced delegation of government budgets. In doing so, the paper challenges the prescriptive research which often pervades policy studies in China. Instead, it offers a critical reflection on the historical and contemporary contingencies shaping Chinese state administration and sheds new light on the background, the implementation and the future prospects of public sector financial reform in China. Overall, our contextual analysis provides a starting point for more critical research of changes in the Chinese state administration at both policy and organisational levels.","PeriodicalId":225425,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Budget; Budget Systems (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124089227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}